

# THE NORTH-EASTERN FRONTIER

A Documentary Study of the  
Internecine Rivalry between  
India, Tibet and China

VOLUME 2, 1914-54

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**For Shefali  
who means so much**





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I should add that while the broad plan of the second volume is by no means different from the first, two features may be of interest. One, each section in the table of contents has been given a separate heading; two, the scope of 'Biographical Sketches' has been considerably enlarged.



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## Abbreviations

<b>CMTA</b>	<b>(Kuomintang government's) Committee for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs</b>
<b>Encl.</b>	<b>Enclosure</b>
<b>F O</b>	<b>Foreign Office</b>
<b>Foreign</b>	<b>Foreign and Political (Department) Proceedings, National Archives of India</b>
<b>H E</b>	<b>His (Her) Excellency</b>
<b>HMG</b>	<b>His (Her) Majesty's Government</b>
<b>I O</b>	<b>India Office</b>
<b>IOR</b>	<b>India Office Records</b>
<b>p. (pp.)</b>	<b>page (pages)</b>
<b>Pt.</b>	<b>Part</b>
<b>PRC</b>	<b>People's Republic of China</b>
<b>Proc.</b>	<b>Proceeding/Proceedings</b>

## Introduction

In the long and chequered annals of India's North-eastern Frontier, the years that have elapsed since the breakdown of the Simla Conference, with which this study is principally concerned, fall broadly into three parts: 1914-19, 1919-33 and the aftermath. The first phase, embracing the five years immediately following the Simla Conference, is perhaps of the greatest moment providing as it does an insight into the Chinese mind and of those among the British who viewed McMahan's manners as overbearing. The former, it would appear, were keen on reaching an understanding, but on their own terms; the latter found fault with the British Plenipotentiary's allegedly pro-Lhasa stance. It may be only fair to point out that Lonchen Shatra had been no less anxious that all the three parties stick to the letter of the Convention, if not indeed improve upon it, to secure his country's advantage. To the exclusion of the other two, the British throughout these years appeared to be pre-occupied with an academic exercise, staged necessarily behind the scenes, and involving a critical, if agonizing, re-appraisal, of the Simla confabulations.

Between Lu Hsing-chi in Calcutta, busily engaged in sabotaging a settlement that appeared to him to be detrimental to the honour and interests of his country, and Yuan Shih-kai in Peking no less determined that he would not yield on what he deemed to be essentials, the innermost recesses of the Chinese mind are starkly revealed. McMahan's veiled references to 'confidential sources' from which he gleaned his information were largely a euphemism for the dark machinations of Lu Hsing-chi, extracts from whose 'intercepted telegrams' have been incorporated in the preceding volume. It may be recalled here that Lu had a lot to do with Chinese intransigence and refusal to compromise, which characterize the negotiations all through, and especially in the final stages of the conference. Herein Peking's memoranda of May as well as June (1914), provide fascinating material for a refreshing analysis. Seemingly willing to yield, it yet took an intractable stand which left little room for a compromise. In its essence, the final Chinese position was that McMahan, and the British, should either accept what the Chinese wanted or else!

It may be conceded, however, that in taking this position both Lu Hsing-chi, and to a lesser extent Ivan Chen, were true to form. In

Peking, Jordan who was close to the hub of things had formed much the same impression. In despatch after despatch to the Foreign Office, which were dutifully relayed to India, the British Minister made no secret of his conviction that the Chinese were unlikely to yield and if they did, would do so, with ill grace. Nor was this true of the hirelings of the Wai-chiao-pu alone, for Jordan who had the most intimate of relations with President Yuan Shih-kai, gathered much the same impression from the man at the helm of affairs. In his talks—some of which took place just between the two of them—Yuan not only invoked China's age-old connections with Litang and Batang, which under the McMahon dispensation were to form part of Inner Tibet, but expressed his inability to enforce a seemingly unpopular settlement, over provinces (Szechuan and Yunnan), which were tacitly hostile to his regime. It would thus stand to reason that the Chinese viewpoint was based on harsh political realities at home, and that Lu Hsing-chi was not so much out of step—Ivan Chen apparently was at times and in Peking, at any rate, even his personal loyalty appears to have been at a discount—as in fact fully in line with the thinking of his political masters back home.

The British Minister, whose knowledge of China and its affairs was second to none revealed a great deal of his own mind in his personal and private correspondence with Langley and others in the (British) Foreign Office. It is interesting that on the eve of the breakdown at Simla, Jordan confessed that

somehow the Delhi negotiations conveyed to us an impression of lack of reality. It looked as if the British and Tibetan representatives knew each other's cards throughout, and as if Ivan Chen was not too loyal to his own government. The methods of the Government of India are similar to those which Russia and Japan have tried but have found of so little service that they seem fit to abandon them.<sup>1</sup>

It was a grave charge to level and yet Jordan's views not only did not undergo a change but found an even more forceful expression in the years following Simla. Thus, in 1916, he bemoaned the fact that Delhi did not take his advice and 'meet the Chinese half-way', when the 'opportunity offered'; in 1918, it was a 'huge blunder' not to clinch a deal when Yuan Shih-kai was in power and 'most friendly

<sup>1</sup>Jordan to Langley, 28 June, 1914, in the author's *The North-Eastern Frontier*, vol. 1, pp. 202-3.



disposed towards us'. But then, he noted, his was a 'cry in the wilderness' and India 'went her own way'.<sup>1</sup>

In Lhasa the position appeared to be no whit better; as a matter of fact, it was much worse. To the Dalai Lama and his Government, the concessions made to the British, and the Chinese—in terms of the cession of Tawang and territory that comprised Inner Tibet—however unpalatable in themselves, became downright unthinkable, even inexcusable, the moment it was known that China had refused to append its signatures to the Convention. And this, above all, underscored the personal tragedy of the Tibetan Plenipotentiary. For Shatra, a shrewd judge of men and affairs, who had played his cards at Simla with a rare acumen, spent the evening of his life under a heavy cloud of dark foreboding and suspicion. The Dalai Lama distrusted him while his contemporaries in Tibet's 'political' life hated him, if only for the reason that he had risen high on the traditionally slippery, and in Tibet's case additionally shaky, hierarchical pole. It is not without significance that it was only when Bell visited Lhasa in 1920-1 that the Dalai Lama seemed, for the first time, to comprehend the significance and appreciate the relevance of 'Inner' Tibet and the gains which his country had made at Simla.<sup>2</sup> The Lama's lack of political maturity may also be gauged from his futile endeavours, which predictably misfired, to seek a rapprochement with Russia as a counter-weight to the British. No wonder that such friendly critics as Hardinge referred to his handling of affairs with a certain measure of condescension as 'tin-pot' diplomacy!

In the years following the breakdown at Simla, the Chinese made three distinct attempts to revive the stalemated talks and pick up the threads where they had snapped earlier. The most important of these, in terms both of the seeming seriousness of its intent as also in providing a realistic basis for the talks, was the May 1919 offer. Essentially, the Chinese now accepted the Simla basis with some territorial adjustments in regard to the boundary of Inner-Outer Tibet. A major gain was the concession of Chamdo to the Dalai Lama's kingdom while the much fought-over Litang, Batang and Tachienlu were to be part of Szechuan. The only bit which the British, and the Indian authorities, found hard to swallow—and the earlier experience of dealings with Chang Yin-tang and Kuo-yin had been too recent to be

<sup>1</sup> Jordan to Butler, 11 April, 1916 and Jordan to Macleay, 16 April, 1918. For the texts, pp. 1-2.

<sup>2</sup> Charles Alfred Bell, *Portrait of the Dalai Lama*, London, 1946, pp. 206-7.

easily forgotten—was the posting of Chinese commercial agents at the trade marts. While opposing the Chinese agents, Whitehall was no less keen that part of the tripartite Convention in respect of the British Trade Agent at Gyantse be modified to the extent that the following be inserted (after the main clause):

Should the British Government hereafter decide, with the consent of the Tibetan Government, to station a permanent British representative at Lhasa, there will be no objection on the part of China.<sup>1</sup>

The above notwithstanding, it is necessary to emphasize that both Whitehall and Delhi were prepared, in the last count, to give way to Chinese importunities in achieving what they viewed as a final settlement of the Tibetan question. So indeed would have Lhasa. And, sensibly, the British had refused to give the latter a veto over the terms that Peking now offered.

What is important about the May 1919 initiative is the fact that, despite a lot of cogitation at the highest levels of government and a hectic exchange of notes between Delhi, London and the Minister in Peking, the British were prepared to accept, without much ado, China's proffered terms in the hope that these might bring about a 'permanent settlement' of the Tibetan question, 'safeguard' India's frontiers in the East and 're-adjust' Delhi's own relations with the Lhasa Government. It is true, India had its reservations and Lhasa, understandably, wanted to stick to the letter of the Simla compact. And yet it is easy to see that Delhi would not press its opposition to a point where a breakdown became inevitable. Nor would Lhasa for, in the final count, it would have been bull-dozed into submission. It is revealing that the Tibetan authorities were consulted only *after* Jordan had handed down a reply to the Wai-chiao-pu in Peking.

In sum, the real significance of the May 1919 offer is two-fold. One, it defined the terms on which China was prepared to settle; two, it revealed that the stalemate at Simla, which persisted in the years that followed, was due principally to Peking's fiat. Thus it were the Chinese who for a variety of domestic compulsions completely backed out of terms which they had, on their own initiative, originally proffered. Nor did any amount of coaxing or cajoling avail, for once Peking's masters realized that they had obtained an upper hand in

<sup>1</sup>For details see Memorandum by Secretary, Political Department, India Office, 14 July, 1919, pp. 11-14.

Outer Mongolia, they were loath to yield any ground in Tibet. For even as the situation in Urga had been transformed, might it not change for the better in Lhasa as well? After all the Mongols, even though the Bogdo Hutukthu had refused to fall in line, had ardently petitioned that their autonomy be revoked.<sup>1</sup> Was it beyond the bounds of reason, therefore, to argue that eventually the Dalai Lama and his cohorts too might change their mind and return to the fold of the great Motherland?

Interspersed with Chinese initiatives in the years following the Simla conference lie two developments concerning Tibet. One was a 'Memorandum' drawn up by the British consular official Eric (later Sir Eric) Teichman in May 1917; the other, a truce arranged, in August 1918, through the same initiative, in the fighting that had raged intermittently all the years since 1913, between Tibetan forces and the levies of Szechuan-Yunnan. The 'memorandum' is an interesting document, powerfully expressive of what Sir Beilby Alston called the 'Peking point of view', on McMahan's performance at Simla, as seen through the eyes of a British official 'well up' in the Tibetan question. Teichman held that the bane of the British plenipotentiary's handiwork was the concept of 'Inner' Tibet which needs must be demolished, entailing in the case of an eventual settlement, the reversion to China of the Kokonor territory, and large parts of the March country. More, it was

difficult to see (Teichman wrote) what anyone gains by the artificial creation of 'Inner' Tibet in which China is apparently at liberty to make what military dispositions she pleases. . . . Unless it be that China's irritation and loss of face is considered of advantage to Tibet.<sup>2</sup>

Teichman further reasoned that if the notorious Chinese penchant for procrastination and delay was allowed to have its way, there was an 'ever-increasing risk' of the Tibetans giving way and negotiating independently with China. This alone, he warned, should make the British use the opportunity presented by the elimination of Chinese power, as a result of the revolution of 1911, to create an autonomous Tibet while the time was still 'favourable'.

<sup>1</sup>For a detailed analysis see the author's, 'Tibet and Outer Mongolia vis-a-vis China', *Journal of Indian History* (Trivandrum), XLII, 3, December 1964, pp. 727-61.

<sup>2</sup>For the text of Eric Teichman's 'Memorandum' datelined Peking, 24 September, 1916 see Sub-Encl. 2 in Alston to Balfour, 19 May, 1917, pp. 15-20.

Nor did a new tripartite conference, the British official emphasized, appear necessary for a fresh settlement could be negotiated through normal diplomatic channels. Simla failed, Teichman argued, because McMahon took an extreme pro-Tibetan stance. One wonders though whether, in turn, Teichman's was not an exercise, and he bent over backwards, in projecting a decidedly pro-Chinese point of view?

## II

It may be recalled that during the months the Simla negotiations were taking place, there had been continuous, and sometimes even loud complaints now by China and then Tibet, about each pushing the other out in Kham and deciding issues through the use of *force majeure*. British protests in Peking, and pressure on Lonchen Shatra did however, to a degree, restrain the two combatants. The breakdown at Simla nonetheless took away such constraints as existed and the years that followed were witness to a sharp recrudescence in the fighting. Civil war in China which had begun to claim a heavy toll both in men and material, even before Yuan Shih-kai breathed his last, further complicated a fairly complex political situation. Szechuan and Yunnan had loosened from Peking's hold and local warlords, swayed by what looked like profitable ventures, were often enough only too keen to fish in troubled waters.

General Peng was one such adventurer. In his overweening pride and vaulting political ambition to march on to Lhasa he had, it would seem, reckoned without his hosts. He was, however, soon disillusioned and discovered, to his great chagrin, that since Chao Erh-feng's days the situation in the March country had undergone a complete metamorphosis. Thanks to British arms and drill, Lhasa's levies were now better trained and equipped. No wonder, the Tibetan commander Kalon Lama's rejoinder to General Peng's bluff and bluster was a studied silence whose meaning was clearly revealed when it came to an open clash of arms. The Chinese were completely routed and the Tibetans so far successful that they not only recovered areas to which they held a measure of legitimate claim but marched deep into what was indubitably a part of Peking's domain.

It was this striking, if also unchecked, progress of Tibetan arms that Teichman now sought to arrest. With the unexpected, dramatic fall of Chamdo, and the arrest of General Peng that followed, Tibetan levies appeared to be carrying all before them. The British

consular official argued, and convincingly, that it was necessary to call a halt to the fighting for fear of the dread consequences that might befall Lhasa's clean sweep. For any such gains, at the expense of what was admittedly Chinese territory, would lead to a reaction that may prove disastrous—and not least to the peace of the March country. Its ramifications were bound, Teichman felt convinced, to envelop large parts of West China, Tibet, as also the peace of the Indian frontier. The latter, if not the former, was his immediate concern and hence the uninvited, if also self-imposed role of a mediator.

Both the Chamdo agreement and the Rongbatsa truce, concluded in August and October 1918 respectively, are a standing tribute to Teichman's resilience and skill as a negotiator, against the heaviest of odds. Briefly, these may be summed up as strong Tibetan opposition, sustained Chinese indifference and, based thereon, Jordan's considered view that the British Consul's time and effort could have been better utilized elsewhere. Teichman's arguments, Jordan wrote in a private letter

about the possibility of the Tibetans advancing upon Batang, Litang and Tachienlu, unless he had undertaken to mediate, have not the slightest weight upon the Central Government who, having lost Szechuan, do not care a brass farthing what happens to these outlying frontier regions.<sup>1</sup>

Jordan's however was a simplistic view. The fact is that given the circumstances in which the parleys took place viz., precipitate Tibetan gains as against headlong Chinese retreats, the two settlements offered a fair, and one may add a reasonably objective, solution to the March imbroglio. It may be recalled that the Chamdo Agreement was an attempt at establishing 'peaceful relations' and delineating a 'provisional frontier'. Besides, as Teichman sought heavily to underline, it was of a

temporary nature and shall only remain in force until such time as the Governments of China, Tibet and Great Britain shall have arrived at a final and permanent tripartite settlement; but in the meantime it cannot be modified in any way except with the unanimous consent of all three contracting parties.<sup>2</sup>

As at Simla, so at Chamdo, and later Rongbatsa, on the British

<sup>1</sup>Jordan to Macleay, 24 October, 1918, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup>For the text of the Chamdo Agreement, dated 19 August, 1918, pp. 5-8; the citation is from Clause 2.

fell the self-imposed and thankless task of the 'arbitrator and middleman'. It is hardly necessary to add that the Rongbatsa truce concerned 'mutual withdrawal of troops and cessation of hostilities' as between China and Tibet, and foreswore all responsibility for a 'definite settlement' of the questions at issue.<sup>1</sup>

In sum, it is only fair to add that the Yangtse boundary and the neutralization of Derge, despite Lhasa's long and loud protests, stood the test of time and, barring slight adjustments, remained practically undisturbed for more than a quarter century. The peace that reigned on the frontier was a tribute at once to the British Consular official's patience, and persistence.

### III

Between the end of 1919 when the Chinese offer, made earlier that year, to resume the Simla negotiations proved abortive and 1931-2 when Peking, unequivocally and indeed categorically, repudiated any intent whatever to hold that basis as valid, intervene some momentous events. At the outset, in the opening months of 1920, there is the visit to Lhasa of a mission from the far western Chinese province of Kansu. From all that can be culled from circumstantial evidence, it is clear that the Peking regime was keen to use the mission as a sounding-board to gauge the Dalai Lama's views on a direct, bilateral deal between the two countries—to the exclusion of the British. The Lama, however, was circumspect and, despite the Kansu mission's four months in Lhasa, refused to yield ground on essentials. He harked back to the terms concluded at Simla and stated that the British should play the role of guarantors for a bilateral, Tibet-China, deal. The Kansu mission, it was thus evident, was likely to draw a blank. Was it any wonder then that Peking hastened to disown it and dismissed as unauthorized, whatever negotiations it may have conducted?

Despite its repudiation at home, the Kansu mission proved to be an eye-opener for the British. Perhaps because Peking disowned it, Whitehall no less than Delhi was convinced that it was playing a clever game, and that behind their backs the Chinese were ingratiating themselves with the Lama's regime. Since all these years, after failure at Simla—and despite repeated and indeed fervid

<sup>1</sup>The 'supplementary agreement' regarding the provisional frontier was signed at Rongbatsa on 10 October, 1918. For the text, pp. 9-10.

promises to the contrary—the British had not supplied Lhasa any arms, might it not, weaned away from them, fall securely into the Chinese lap?

Opinion in Whitehall over the question was sharply divided. The India Office, reflecting the strong and powerful advocacy of the Government in Delhi, recalled that in 1914 Tibet had been solemnly assured of 'reasonable assistance', in munitions of war; that the country was in danger of 'being overrun' by frontier raids; that HMG had pledged 'all possible assistance' in resisting Chinese aggression; that the arms were intended to control 'forces of disorder' over which the Chinese, left to themselves, could exercise no control. To counter this, the Foreign Office urged that arming the Tibetans would be a breach of an international covenant; that once armed it may be difficult 'to restrain' them 'within' the limits of an international frontier; that in arming Tibet, the British would be helping to push China into the fold of Japan and simultaneously give them (the Chinese) a handle in their propaganda campaign against the perfidy of the British. The whole issue was keenly debated with the India Office, all out for arming Tibet, and in battle array against the Foreign Office, traditionally Sinophile.<sup>1</sup>

Bell's visit to the Tibetan capital, which came not long after the arms debate had raged, and at white heat, was an attempt to find a way around the dilemma that now faced British policy-makers. If Lhasa was to be armed so as to be able to stand up against Peking's importunities and clever tactics, a thorough re-appraisal of the policy that had been pursued hitherto was necessary. It followed that Bell's major tasks in Lhasa were to attempt an overall assessment of Tibet's political landscape, gauge the extent to which the latter might go it alone with China and finally, offer a cogent alternative to the hitherto pursued objective of sterilizing the country.

Initially planning to stay no more than a month, Bell tarried on in Lhasa for a whole year (1920-1). The Political Officer enjoyed a unique position, indeed some rare advantages: his relations with the Dalai Lama were of the most intimate; his opportunities to assess the situation, the most unrivalled; his movements in and around the capital, and meetings with men of affairs, completely uninhibited. Additionally, even though his pro-Lhasa bias was

<sup>1</sup>For an excellent summary of the rival arguments and how these were sought to be resolved, see Foreign Office Memorandum, 13 May, 1920 and Lord Curzon's minute of 27 June, 1920, pp. 24-30 and 30-1.

widely acknowledged, Bell was held in great respect in the official hierarchy in Delhi. What was more, Beilby Alston, then British Minister in Peking, not only strongly supported the visit, but also gave his fullest backing to its repeated extensions. Thus more than Delhi or London, Bell's lukewarm sponsors, and supporters at best, it was Alston who insisted that the Political Officer's stay was useful and that he be given a free hand in formulating his views.

Essentially what Bell recommended was to pull Tibet out of its isolation and help gradually build it up into a small, albeit viable, political and economic entity. It followed that its strength needed to be buttressed; hence, his emphasis on the sale of arms and ammunition, on training and equipping a small, but select, army and police force. More, the country must be opened up, a fact that would largely explain his stress on the establishment of telegraph and postal services, on mine and mineral prospecting. Above all, Tibet was to be assured of Britain's full diplomatic support, should the Peking regime try to push it around or disturb the peace of its eastern frontier.

'Lama-struck' and full of himself, Bell was optimistic about the results of his mission. *Inter alia*, he felt that it 'had increased' the 'probability' of China negotiating a tripartite treaty with Britain and Tibet. To use the proconsul's own words—and they capture the mood faithfully:

one may perhaps say without exaggeration that the Tibetan question has been settled as it can be settled at present. This settlement should last for several years and promote very greatly our own interests as well as the interests of Tibet and further—in the truest sense—the ultimate interests of China.<sup>1</sup>

Whitehall endorsed Bell's new policy and Delhi was only too willing to give it a trial. This was the more significant insofar as the author of this policy had superannuated from government service and dissolved into anonymity after his return from Lhasa. It is interesting to reflect that both Bell and McMahon had precious little to do with the actual execution either of a policy in one case or with giving concrete shape to a boundary-line in the other.

The 13th Dalai Lama, in the initial stages at any rate, had been sold on Bell's ideas and took them up enthusiastically. By the mid-

<sup>1</sup>For details see excerpts from Bell's 'Final Report', dated 29 November, 1921, pp. 32-4



twenties, however, a serious rift in the lute was noticeable. The first rumblings of the approaching storm could be heard in December, 1923, when the Panchen Lama fled from his seat of authority at Tashilhunpo, ostensibly with a view to collecting enough funds to meet Lhasa's imperious demands, but in reality to register a strong protest against its new-fangled passion for modernization. Soon it was clear that other powerful monasteries, in and around the capital, shared the Panchen's views. In any case, they were loath to part with such checks as they were wont to exercise over the Potala's unbridled authority; what was more, they faced a new challenge to their traditional rights and privileges from its freshly organized armed forces, and its police.

The challenge of monastic reaction to his new-fashioned and, in the context of Tibet, undoubtedly revolutionary ideas of modernization proved a little too powerful for the Lama to face. For a time, especially after the flight of the Panchen, it seemed that he would rally around. This phase, however, was woefully short-lived. The new army and police proved costly adjuncts; more, they made numerous enemies. And all the while, British support, far from steady at the best of times, was a broken reed to lean upon.

The British Political Officer, Captain (later Colonel) Bailey's one-month sojourn in Lhasa, in the summer of 1924, was a significant event. Among other things, he succeeded in capturing the atmosphere on the eve of what turned out to be a *coup d'état*. Reading between the lines of his report, it is evident where precisely the rub lay. Tibet's finances were in a bad way and the Shapas complained that

what was urgently needed was relief from the present unbearable expenditure, which had been met by special taxation much to the discontent of the people.

Nor was the story different on the military front. Here again the Shapas pinpointed that theirs was a

poor country but very religious, and they were accustomed to spend large sums on their religion, and were finding it very difficult to maintain a large army on the Chinese frontier. The soldiers also wanted to go back to their homes. Could the Chinese be persuaded to come to an agreement?<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Excerpts from Colonel Bailey's report, dated 28 October, 1924 are at pp. 35-9.

This was like begging the question. Had not the British bent over backwards in seeking a solution? Bailey did his best to assuage anxiety but could offer nothing more concrete than verbal promises of diplomatic support.

The 1925 coup in Lhasa was, characteristically, sharp and swift. The Lama struck unmistakably against all those that had dared disturb the peace of his realm. Tainted with the heresy of modernization, British-trained personnel were dismissed from service, exiled; the police, cut down to size; Tsarong, who more than anyone else exemplified in his person an obsessive if also perhaps uncritical fascination for these importations, was summarily cast off.

All in all, it was an interesting coup. To start with, the Dalai Lama survived it and, as before, managed to remain on top, even though in the process he had completely shifted the base on which he stood. In happier days this would be a godsend, and Peking would fain have fished in troubled waters to its obvious advantage. In 1925, however, times were very much out of joint and the land racked by an ugly civil strife had been parcelled out among its rich crop of warlords. No wonder, viewed from Lhasa, China seemed distant, if also perhaps indifferent.

Delhi was a study in contrast. Not unlike its Political Officer, it felt deeply agitated, as also vitally concerned. Bailey who held charge had even suggested that he should repair to Lhasa to remonstrate. This, however, was overruled by Whitehall as far too precipitate a step. All that it eventually agreed to was the visit to the Tibetan capital of Norbu Dhondhup, Bailey's Assistant and trouble-shooter. The purpose too was now different, not so much to lodge a protest against what the Lama had done/undone, as to assess the then prevailing situation. No wonder, even though deeply concerned, the British felt unable, nay perhaps unwilling, to intervene. They nonetheless realized that the Lama was playing at high stakes and with a single stroke of the pen had demolished all that Bell, and the succeeding years, had so laboriously helped to build up. In the final count, he had managed to stay at the helm of affairs and yet successfully reversed the gears on modernization. Some heads rolled. Laden La and Ludlow disappeared from Tibet's political landscape, followed by an understandable cooling off in the Lama's relations with their British masters.

## IV

Broadly speaking, in the long and fascinating story of Tibet, the decade following Bell's visit to Lhasa is a period of relative quietude. The Teichman line gets more or less to be the accepted boundary with China and the Rongbatsa truce of 1918, even if initially valid only for a year, is not seriously violated by either side. Inside Tibet, barring the coup of 1925, briefly referred to in the preceding paragraphs, the country is at peace and although there is a considerable lack of warmth in relations with India, there are no signs of a noticeable strain. Contrary to popular belief that the British ruled the roost in Lhasa, the latter visibly demonstrated its sturdy independence of any extraneous control by refusing, in 1929, to extend to the then British Political Officer, Colonel Weir, an invitation to visit the Tibetan capital. This much-sought for summons was a matter of deliberate policy and it is interesting, and indeed revealing, that New Delhi studiously played down the implications of the Dalai Lama's action. It ruled that Lhasa's point-blank refusal could be based on a 'genuine misapprehension' and that Weir's reply, far from threatening in tone, should positively eschew any 'diminution' of 'friendly relations' with Tibet.<sup>1</sup> Whatever the tone and temper of the exchanges, the episode is nonetheless eloquent of the Lama's new stance of a distinct lack of enthusiasm towards India's British rulers.

A year later, however, things had changed—and, from New Delhi's point of view, for the better. Thanks to effective British mediation in Lhasa's quarrel with the Gurkhas, which well-nigh landed it into an open breach of the peace, the Lama was now much more amenable and, on his own, extended an invitation. Weir for his part assuaged Lhasa's genuine fears. *Inter alia*, he underlined the fact that in New Delhi's considered judgment, while a detailed settlement of the Tibetan question must await the return of more favourable conditions in China, in the interregnum pending its fruition, the maintenance of the status quo was the best that could be hoped for.<sup>2</sup>

The status quo, however, was soon disturbed. What initially

<sup>1</sup>For the texts of telegrams from and to Weir, dated 19-20 July, 1929, see p. 40.

<sup>2</sup>For instructions to Weir on his visit to Lhasa in 1930 see text of Minute by Secretary of State, dated 28 July, 1930, pp. 41-3.

began as a minor skirmish between rival monasteries on different sides of the (1918) truce line, soon developed into a see-saw of hostilities in which larger numbers, and higher authorities, got inextricably mixed up. For a time, and all through 1931, confusion reigned supreme with contradictory reports, often exaggerated, of rival gains and losses by the opposing sides. By early in 1932, however, it was clear that the Chinese were on the offensive and, what was more, carrying all before them. In July, news arrived of the fall of Rongbatsa; in August, Derge was re-captured.

Understandably these developments upset Lhasa and in a move strongly reminiscent of the dark days of 1910, the Dalai Lama proposed to the British conclusion of 'secret treaties'. Though temporarily shaken by the gravity of the situation, Indian reaction in 1932 was no whit different from what it had been nearly a quarter century earlier. Then, as now, New Delhi would hate to add to its responsibilities and was positively averse to any binding entanglements. The response to the Lama's urgent 'S O S' was, therefore, no more than a promise to apply diplomatic pressure in Nanking and help restore normalcy on the frontier, while at the same time working towards a permanent settlement.

In doing all this, it was soon apparent that the British had reckoned without their hosts. For Kuo-min-tang China's reaction to their intercession on the Lama's behalf, proved to be an eye-opener. Ingram, the British Charge d'Affaires was reminded that there could be no question of a 'frontier' dispute in the same country and that the root of the trouble lay in the British supply of arms to the Tibetans. It followed, Nanking argued, that the earlier this supply ceased, the more speedily would peace return to the frontier. More pointedly, the Wai-chiao-pu was emphatic that HMG's intervention—Ingram took pains to explain that he meant mediation, or even 'friendly' good offices—was unsolicited: neither necessary, nor called for. The issue, as Nanking sought to spell it out, concerned China and Tibet; the British, in any case, were outsiders.<sup>1</sup> Ostensibly unwilling to promise to do anything, Nanking yet directed its local commanders on the Yangtse to cease hostilities, which they eventually did. This, however, was a result not so much of obedience to a superior command from headquarters as an aftermath of the outbreak of a local civil strife.

<sup>1</sup>Minute of meeting with Hsu Mo at Waichiaopu on 31 August, 1932, pp. 47-8.

Long simmering underground, it now burst into an open revolt with rival factions in Szechuan, not unnaturally, thinking it more expedient to settle scores nearer home than with the Dalai Lama. He, in any case, was far in the distance.

Blunting the edge of British initiatives by referring to them as unwanted interlopers was easy enough for Nanking. And yet its inevitable corollary in terms of a direct, bilateral, settlement with Tibet proved far harder to achieve. In this, however, there had been, over the years, a number of feelers which each side had thrown to the other. For the most part, the initiative had been taken by the Chinese and the beginnings went as far back as the Kansu mission of 1920, briefly referred to in the preceding paragraphs. Refusing to be overly daunted by its lack of success, the Chinese in 1930—and in the meantime, it may be recalled, the Lama's relations with the British had appreciably cooled after 1925—sponsored the missions of Liu Man-ching and Yuggon Dzasa. The Chinese lady, half-Tibetan by birth, was a functionary of the Kuo-min-tang's much-publicized Committee for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs<sup>1</sup>; the Tibetan head of the well-known Lama monastery in Peking, was ostensibly an appointee of the Lhasa regime, even though, somewhat oddly on the pay-roll of the Nanking government.

Liu Man-ching was not a great success, except perhaps on the social plane; Yuggon was, but then he was cast in a different role. It is necessary to emphasize that he was the Dalai Lama's high-placed functionary in China, who in this case was the bearer of a special message from the KMT regime. No wonder both in Lhasa, as well later on his return to Nanking, he was the recipient of special honours and of a great deal of attention. His political mission, however, and this despite the Lama's much-publicized answers to the questions he had brought from the Nationalist regime, or perhaps because of them, was a conspicuous failure. At best, the Dalai Lama had been discreet; at worst, evasive—for his replies, more than anything else, had underscored a basic difference in approach on the two sides. This notwithstanding, the feeling had gained ground, and not least among the British who for a time (i.e. during Weir's visit to Lhasa in 1930) had felt convinced, if also perhaps concerned that

without doubt (there was) a strong undercurrent of feeling among several officials that Tibet will not be able to retain her independence of China indefinitely and that steps should be taken to make

<sup>1</sup>Better known by its abbreviation, 'CMTA.'

friendly overtures to China. If such overtures are made, they anticipate that a semi-independence at least will be achieved which would be preferable to complete absorption by China.<sup>1</sup>

A practical test as to whether a broad understanding did, in fact, exist or could be put to use came in 1931, at the time of the Hsikang-Tibet fighting. It is evident, and the subject has already been briefly touched upon in the preceding paragraphs, that the Dalai Lama was not too sanguine about being able, on his own, to persuade the Chinese to cease hostilities or come to a workable settlement on the frontier dispute. His hectic messages to Colonel Weir, containing more than a broad hint about 'secret treaties', and later imploring the Political Officer to extend his stay until news of a cessation in the fighting could be confirmed, bear eloquent testimony to the Lama's unsettled state of mind. These also lay bare, if indirectly, both Chinese ambitions as well as the Lama's own inability to make them see reason. And yet it would seem that, towards the close of 1932, the two sides did make an effort for a direct understanding.

The reason for this change of stance lay, if partly, in the KMT's anxiety to prove that, as between itself and the Lama, matters could be settled 'without the intervention of the outsider'; that it rated it 'most inappropriate' to place 'another person of [a] different nationality' as an intermediary 'between ourselves'.

It is significant that the Lama, even though he too paid lip service to some of these pious platitudes demanded, in reply, that the Simla Convention of 1914 be 'immediately concluded', that as between him and the Chinese, the British act as an intermediary! It is evident that what displeased the mandarins in Nanking was his further hint that for the British representative, the then Political Officer, Colonel Weir be nominated, as he was 'acquainted with the full facts' of the Tibetan case.

These high-level exchanges between Lhasa and Nanking did little to save Tibet from the Chinese onslaught in the east; if anything, they revealed the wide chasm that separated the respective positions of the opposing sides. Tibet was eventually saved, as has been briefly alluded to earlier, by the outbreak of a fierce civil war which soon held Szechuan in its grip. The result was that a purely 'local' settlement of sorts was worked out in June, 1933 and the British learnt, on the authority of the Lama himself, that its terms had been carried out by both sides, including a mutually-agreed withdrawal of troops.

<sup>1</sup>Para 12 in Weir's report dated 18 November, 1930, pp. 43-6.

Meanwhile, behind the scenes, a heated, and at times even acrimonious, debate had raged between New Delhi, Whitehall and the latter's envoy in Peking as to the attitude which the British should adopt towards direct China-Tibet parleys. At best, New Delhi was cool to the idea, while its Political Officer was openly hostile. In the final analysis, what it would lend its countenance to was British diplomatic pressure on the Chinese so as to persuade them to negotiate a permanent settlement with Tibet, while Whitehall played the not-unfamiliar role of the honest broker. To this course of action, the then British Minister in China was unalterably opposed. Sir Miles Lampson felt convinced that the Chinese would never agree to British mediation, that their attitude towards Tibet best resembled that of a preoccupied parent towards a mulishly obstinate, an impossible child who, sooner or later, was bound to return to the mother's fold. Tibet too, Sir Miles argued, would eventually come back to China and the British role should be to help, rather than hinder, this consummation.<sup>1</sup>

After weighing the pros and cons carefully, Whitehall finally decided upon what looked like the golden mean. The Lama was 'encouraged' to discuss frontier matters direct with the Chinese but while engaged in these parleys, and even after they had concluded, the British assured him of 'friendly advice'. Additionally, they undertook to tender 'diplomatic assistance' so as to make the Chinese accept any treaty or agreement that might result from direct Sino-Tibetan talks.

Not that such an eventuality ever came to pass—at any rate not during the lifetime of the 13th Dalai Lama. On the eve of his death, Williamson, then on a visit to the Tibetan capital, revealed that the Lama

was very frank in his views on the frontier situation. He told me that the Chinese Government had appointed one person after another to come to Lhasa to discuss outstanding questions but that all had been afraid and had made excuses. In any case he did not want a Chinese official ever to visit Lhasa, as all that the latter would want to do would be to pave the way for the renewal of Chinese domination.<sup>2</sup>

Thus it was that at the time of the Lama's passing away, in Decem-

<sup>1</sup>For details of Chinese, Tibetan and British attitudes see 'British Mediation in Tibet: 1932', pp. 52-60.

<sup>2</sup>Williamson's interview under reference took place on 21 September, 1933. For excerpts, see p. 63.

ber, 1933, the Tibetan question was exactly where it had been these twenty years since the Simla negotiations—unsettled, hanging about in mid-air.

## V

The 'retirement to the heavenly fields' of the 13th re-incarnation of Chenrezi upset a lot in Tibet. A regime that depends, at the death of its ruler, on the discovery, installation and growing into manhood of a new-born god-king may not be exactly distinguished for strength. The latter quality was now at a further discount with the then Regent, and the Kashag, openly arrayed against the old Lama's favourites. As if this were not a grim enough prospect, there was, overhanging Lhasa, the sinister shadow of the Panchen Lama who, long in self-imposed exile, now found in the KMT regime powerful support.

To add to the embarrassments of Lhasa's new masters, the Chinese decided upon sending, ostensibly as official mourners, a high-powered delegation, headed by General Huang Mu-sung, then Chairman of the powerful CMTA. The real aim Nanking had in view was to persuade Lhasa—now that the commanding personality of the 13th Dalai Lama no longer dominated the political stage—to accept a measure of Chinese hegemony. In this objective, and despite his six months (April-October 1934) and seemingly unlimited supplies of gold, the Chinese functionary nearly, yet not quite, succeeded. Thus it is known that Lhasa did make what in Nanking's view was a 'sufficiently definite' commitment watering down appreciably its hitherto complete independence, in practice, of Chinese control. From what appeared in the press, both in India and China, it was clear that Lhasa had given Huang 'a written acknowledgment' of Chinese suzerainty while, as for Nanking, it viewed Tibet as a 'part of China', if only 'an outlying one'.

General Huang's mission aroused the British to a fever-pitch of counter-action culminating in the despatch of Williamson, then Political Officer, for an extended sojourn in Lhasa in the latter half of 1935. Apart from concessions in making payments for munitions, and permission to buy additional arms, Williamson's brief made it plain that should a permanent Chinese representative make an appearance in Lhasa, the question of appointing his British counterpart would be 'seriously considered'. It was true, Whitehall argued, that the re-establishment of Chinese control in Tibet would not pose an actual military danger, yet surely it could, from British India's



point of view, be 'a source of constant irritation and annoyance'. For in any case from China, 'a difficult neighbour' with a powerful (Kuo-min-tang) regime in control, New Delhi argued, the military threat could become a live reality. Significantly, a clear distinction was now sought to be drawn between guaranteeing the defence of Tibet against the Nanking regime, 'whose suzerainty' Lhasa itself had acknowledged, and aggression by forces 'hostile' to the Chinese government (viz. Russian/Chinese communists).<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile, thanks to the travels of the botanist Kingdon-Ward and an unseemly row between Bhutan and Assam as to where their common frontier lay, New Delhi was suddenly awakened to the grim realization that the McMahon Line, ratified by Tibet in 1914, had been observed more in its breach than acceptance. At the Whitehall end, the documents reveal an amazing tale of hyper-sensitive scruples, a stark casualness, now fear of treading on Russian, now Chinese corns. No wonder that year after year, and decade after decade, the publication of the Simla convention, and the Trade Regulations, not to mention the boundary agreement, and the maps, was held up—on one pretext or another. Nor were things, nearer home, in India, any the better: New Delhi had all but forgotten about McMahon and his line; its Political Officer, whose chief preoccupation it ought to have been, was far from sure; Assam had been kept completely in the dark on the (McMahon) frontier; Burma, but barely, knew. The revised edition, in 1928, of the well-worn Aitchison compendium of treaties made no mention of the Simla parleys, much less of what happened there.

All out of the blue, on 9 April, 1936, New Delhi sought Whitehall's permission to publish the 1914 compacts and rectify its maps so as to show the correct frontier. Failure to do so, it pointed out, would make China argue, plausibly enough, that as between itself and India, there was 'no ratified' agreement concerning the frontier. Besides, the new instalment of constitutional reforms, adumbrated in the Government of India Act, 1935, necessitated a more accurate definition of the tribal areas of Assam. More, the impending separation of Burma made a precise description of the boundary imperative. Additionally, there was the uncomfortable truth that, all through the years since the tripartite meet in 1914, the delineation

<sup>1</sup>For the Indian reaction to Huang's Mission see Matcalfe to Williamson, 17 September, 1934, Williamson to India, 6 October, 1934 and India to Secretary of State, 28 June, 1935, pp. 65-9.

of the frontier on the maps, in India and outside, was shown wrongly, as though it lay along the foothills.

It is characteristic, and indeed revealing, of the then resolute fickleness of the India Office that, after a great deal of debate, it could discover 'no strong balance' of argument either for, or against, publication of the (1914) Convention and the maps. It ruled, however, that *if* the Foreign Office were willing, New Delhi 'might perhaps' decide to publish. The Whitehall viewpoint, as recorded in its 'minutes' and 'memoranda', makes interesting reading and bears an eloquent testimony to its notorious lack of decision. It noted for instance that New Delhi's proposal was by no means 'free from doubt' and though

the risk of attracting unwelcome Chinese notice has been the reason for non-publication, we have not felt very strongly about it so far as the Government of India and this office is concerned.

To publish it was finally decided, even though there were many a 't' to cross and an 'i' to dot. Whitehall ruled that there was to be no fanfare (for 'ostentatious publication' was to be scrupulously avoided); that the joint Indo-Tibetan Declaration of 3 July (1914) was to be withheld; that New Delhi might await a re-issue of Aitchison's compendium to insert the treaties; that maps, however, may be rectified without much ado. Within the four corners of its brief, New Delhi hastened to correct the maps and instead of waiting for a new edition of Aitchison's, which, it reckoned, might take another 15-20 years, decided upon a re-issue of the relevant volume XIV.<sup>1</sup>

Publication was only one facet of the question; the other, perhaps more vital, was to make good the frontier as laid down (in 1914). A major stumbling-block here had been the long-standing Tibetan encroachments south of the McMahon Line, more pronouncedly in the area around Tawang. Initially, New Delhi favoured a firm assertion of its rights, more so as it was made to believe that in the Kingdon-Ward case, briefly referred to earlier, Lhasa had re-affirmed its acceptance of the 1914 Red (viz. McMahon) Line. Later, however, during Gould's visit to the Tibetan capital, in 1936-7, it was discovered that the Kashag's reported admission had been anything but clear or unequivocal; that there would be insuperable difficulties in obtaining a written re-affirmation; that Tibet felt that the 1914 settlement of its boundaries would be valid only to the extent that

<sup>1</sup>For further details see 'India Re-discovers the McMahon Line'. pp. 91-9.

China accepted its part of the Sino-Tibetan territorial alignment in the east.

In the initial stages, Gould advocated—and he was the man who alone had first-hand knowledge of men and affairs—a firm line of action. Thus his report on the Lhasa Mission (1936-7) underlined that, in respect to Tawang the

only possible policy is to take a firm line particularly in view of the consideration that, were China again to become dominant in Tibet, she might proceed to claim both Tawang and territories to the east of it. . . . Vis-a-vis the Tibetan Government the line which it is necessary to adopt, and which I have adopted in conversation with the Kashag, is that since 1914 everything to the south of the McMahon Line has definitely been British, and that, if there were a matter of *quid pro quo*, Tibet has had value in the form of support both in arms and in the field of diplomacy.<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi, however, took time to decide its line of policy. Nor was it an easy one to map out. For one thing it was exposed to rival pressures: from Assam, touchy on Tibetan encroachments, for early action to make the boundary line effective; from Norbu and Gould, in touch with existing realities in Lhasa, to be less hasty, more deliberate. Finally, after Gould had conferred with the Assam Governor, it was decided that Captain Lightfoot, then Political Officer, Balipara, should undertake a 'preliminary and exploratory' mission to Tawang in the spring of 1938. His brief was characteristically vague, in itself a faithful reflection of New Delhi's own vacillation and irresolution.

Lightfoot found the Monbas misgoverned to a degree and wrote at length about the high-handedness of local Tibetan functionaries. The inhabitants, he reported, lived in mortal dread of Lhasa's freebooters and felt far from sure if the British meant business in affording them protection. He, therefore, recommended a gradual take-over of the administration—including that of the powerful (Tawang) monastery—and, as a first step, the creation of a 'control area' around Tawang. Lightfoot's recommendations received the powerful support of the Governor in Shillong who now categorically proposed that New Delhi should

assume full responsibility in this area, and that subject to the exigencies of the relationships which at present subsist between the

<sup>1</sup>Para 30 in Gould's report on the 'Lhasa Mission, 1936-37', pp. 78-9; for more excerpts, see pp. 75-89.

Tibetan Government and the Government of India steps will be taken at an appropriate time, the earlier the better, to relieve the Monbas from the grievous oppression to which they are now subjected.<sup>1</sup>

Pressures from Assam notwithstanding, New Delhi refused to be hustled into early action, if partly, because its Political Officer counselled a policy of deliberation, of caution, of delay. Gould argued that the Monbas were a remarkably docile lot who may be hard to stir in their own cause; that local conditions needed a more thorough investigation before any action was decided upon; that interference with the Tawang monastery would be completely unjustified. Adverting to financial stringency, of which New Delhi often complained, he advocated putting off any decision for, whatever the course of action, some financial outlay would be unavoidable. 'Let the whole position simmer for the time being', was the Political Officer's firm conclusion. This tied up, and admirably, with New Delhi's own thinking of letting sleeping dogs lie. And lie they did—until the very last day of British rule.

## VI

Apart from Tibetan encroachments into Mon-yul, south of the McMahan Line, the Chinese had trespassed into chunks of tribal territory on India's north-east frontier, including a portion of northern Burma. These facts came prominently into view in the early thirties when the boundaries of the newly-carved province of Hsi-kang (Western Kham) were sketched out by Chinese map-makers, from whom they came to be widely copied elsewhere. In drawing Whitehall's attention to these acts of cartographic aggression, New Delhi was quick to point out that even though China's claim did not include Tawang, the exercise of jurisdiction by Tibet might, at a later date, enable China to stake its 'prescriptive rights'. The situation, as New Delhi viewed it, admitted of no complacency, for the position

briefly is that the cartographical activities have set up a claim to absorb in China a very large stretch of Indian territory, while in a portion of India just west of the area claimed by the Chinese as part of Sikiang province, namely Tawang, the Tibetan government over whom the Chinese claim suzerainty, are collecting revenue and exercising jurisdiction on the Indian side of the international frontier. China's claim does not actually include Tawang

<sup>1</sup>For the text of Assam's recommendations on Lightfoot's report see Assam to India, 7 September, 1938, pp. 101-4.

itself, but there can be little doubt that it will be extended to Tawang, and even to Bhutan and Sikkim, if no steps are taken to challenge these activities.<sup>1</sup>

The British Government's rejoinder to the Indian note was a strong counter-argument in favour of a 'do nothing' policy. China, it reasoned, was not responsible for the acts of private cartographers, nor was it alone guilty—after all the (London) *Times* too had published similar maps! Besides, the Nanking regime had at no stage recognized the 1914 Agreement. Why then, Whitehall argued, in making these protests, arouse China's ire, incur its wrath, its deep displeasure?

Unexpectedly, New Delhi discovered an ally in the person of the then British envoy in Nanking. While conceding that the Chinese were not a party to the Simla Convention, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen yet saw no reason why it should not be pointed out that the boundaries of their new province were not acceptable, and insofar as these encroached upon Indian territory, not recognized by HMG. Whitehall, however, was difficult to persuade and stubbornly, if foolishly, stuck to its earlier position that there was no occasion for a protest—unless the Chinese sought to translate their paper claims into reality.

Nor did the British confine themselves to a determined refusal to lodge a protest. For when, after a great deal of delay, and some polite-impolite reminders, the new Survey of India map, 'Highlands of Tibet and the Surrounding Region', finally issued in January 1939, Whitehall ruled that the correct frontier should be 'unobtrusively marked'—so sensitive was it on arousing Chinese susceptibilities! No wonder, knowledgeable India hands viewed its attitude as being typical of British apathy in all that affected India's north-eastern frontier.

It had long been evident that questions relating to this frontier were inextricably mixed up with Sino-Tibetan relations which had, since the death of the 13th Dalai Lama, been greatly disturbed. For even if it were accepted that General Huang Mu-sung's mission was a success, as made out by throatful Chinese propaganda, there is no doubt that his pushful diplomacy had aroused a deep distrust, and suspicion, in Tibetan breasts. This would largely explain Lhasa's decision to stay neutral in World War II when, to its great surprise, it found the British allied with China!

<sup>1</sup>Foreign Secretary (India) to Under Secretary (London), 17 August 1936, pp. 93-5.

Part of the price for this alliance had to be paid by Tibet. Deeming the war a godsend, Chungking demanded the opening of an alternate supply-route, after the fall of Burma to the Japanese had made the Rangoon-Lashio road inoperative. The new link suggested was to connect Assam, through the north-eastern tip of the Lohit and the Tibetan province of Zayul, with south-western Szechuan. In pursuance thereof, and in a characteristically high-handed manner, Chungking—without consulting Lhasa—despatched a large retinue of its 'surveyors' into Tibetan territory. Lhasa, however, refused to be pushed around, stood its ground firmly and, before long, made the Chinese beat a retreat. As the then U.S. Ambassador in Chungking informed his superiors, on 13 July, 1942, the Chinese

have abandoned whatever plans they may have had for constructing a motor road and for stationing troops in Tibet, the former because the road would have no early value to the war effort due to the time required for construction and the latter because Tibetan opposition would certainly be encountered.<sup>1</sup>

Another Chinese effort, much in the same direction, was to press into service the traditional Tibetan trade-route to Szechuan, via Lhasa, for pack-animal transport of its badly-needed supplies. Even to achieve this end, a great deal of high-level British, and American, pressure was needed before Tibet finally acquiesced. And yet it did successfully resist Chinese efforts to station their men, and put up their agencies along the route. Thus the American President's Personal Representative in India informed his superiors, early in 1943, that the Chinese Commissioner, then recently back from Chungking,

believes that after allowing for essential Tibetan traffic, the actual annual capacity of this route, so far as through shipment to China is concerned, would be nearer 1,000 tons than the 3 to 4,000 originally estimated. Political difficulties are also involved. Tibetans are uncooperative, apparently distrusting intentions of both India and China and fearing undue expansion of their influence. India lays blame for this attitude on China and vice versa. Tibetans apparently made difficulties over proposed stationing of British Indian and Chinese officials along route to check shipments and for a time consideration was given to possibility of turning goods over to ordinary caravans for unsupervised transportation to Chinese border.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Ambassador Gauss to Secretary of State, 13 July, 1942 (in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1942), pp. 127-8.

<sup>2</sup>Phillips (Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to India) to Secretary of State, 26 January, 1943 (in *Foreign Relations*, 1943), p. 133.

It may perhaps be relevant to point out that it had been made clear in the initial stages that only non-military goods were to be transported. Thus as early as August, 1942, the British informed the Americans that Chungking had accepted Tibetan stipulations

in regard to the despatch of 'non-military supplies' (which would include petroleum, but not arms, ammunition and explosives); that they have accepted the Gyalam as the supply route with Batang as delivery point; and that they appeared to think that contract with Tibetan transport firm must be negotiated.<sup>1</sup>

In sum, the whole exercise is clearly revealing of Chinese motives and motivations which were suspect *ab initio*. Thus early on, the British Foreign Office had concluded that the Chinese seemed 'more anxious' to extend their influence in Eastern Tibet than 'to obtain supplies'. Nor was Lhasa slow in drawing its own conclusions. In any case, failing to achieve their major objective, Chinese interest, it may be recalled, both in the alternate route through the Lohit as also in pack-animal supply, via Lhasa, was singularly short-lived.

In another direction, however, the KMT regime scored a major victory. This was largely a result of the visit to Lhasa, in 1940, of Wu Ching-hsing, then Chairman of CMTA, on the occasion of the installation of the child, barely a few years old, 14th Dalai Lama. Conscious of exploiting this opportunity to the full, Wu would fain have established in Lhasa the office of a Chinese High Commissioner, yet had to be content with formalizing the 1934 office of the two wireless operators, left by General Huang Mu-sung, into the high-sounding 'Regional Office of the CMTA'. Four years later, Chungking upgraded the post by appointing Sheng Tsung-lien, then working on the personal staff of the Generalissimo.

As the war progressed, KMT China, thanks to the fortunes of its Allies, and more especially their role in the Pacific theatre, found itself elevated, if by proxy, to the status of a Big Power. Nor was it slow in making use of its new-gained importance. It is significant that at the Allied summit meetings in 1943, the Americans, out of touch with the harsh realities of the Tibetan situation, and thus the more gullible, were exceedingly friendly to Chiang's cause. No wonder, with Washington's tacit support, Chungking took the British severely to task for what it called their ambivalence on the question. The then

<sup>1</sup>British Foreign Office to Embassy in Washington, 15 August, 1942, delivered to the Department of State, 27 August, 1942 (in *Foreign Relations*, 1942), pp. 130-2.

Chinese Foreign Minister Soong claimed that Tibet was 'a part of China', while the considered British reply to persistent Chinese needling underlined Whitehall's own dilemma. For while on the one hand it was

bound by a promise to the Tibetan Government to support them in maintaining the practical autonomy of Tibet, which is of importance to the security of India and to the tranquillity of India's north-east frontier, on the other hand Great Britain's alliance with China makes it difficult to give effective material support to Tibet.

Finally in the oft-cited (Eden) Memorandum of August, 1943, Whitehall spelt out a reasonably succinct statement of the position as it was understood at the time. Shorn of the usual frills and verbiage which are a necessary concomitant of State documents, it amounted to this: Britain recognized Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, but 'only on the understanding' that Tibet was regarded as 'autonomous'. More, it pledged that

neither the British Government nor the Government of India have any territorial ambitions in Tibet but they are interested in the maintenance of peaceful conditions in an area which is coterminous with the North East Frontier of India.<sup>1</sup>

Additionally, in furtherance of a bilateral understanding between Tibet and China, HMG undertook 'gladly [to] offer' any help desired by both parties towards this end.

It was soon apparent that the Eden Memorandum did not suit the Chinese book. The result was that the deadlock persisted. Later, in 1945, when, in return for what promised to be durable peace with the Soviets, Chiang signed away the *de facto* independence of Outer Mongolia, the much-trumpeted facade of a plebiscite notwithstanding, all that he could offer Tibet was 'a very high degree of autonomy'. Not that it deceived anyone. Nor yet did China's other clever ruses as for instance the alleged manoeuvring of Tibetan delegates' presence at the meetings, in 1946, of the National Assembly in Nanking or staging of a violent demonstration against an apparently innocuous map at the unofficial Asian Relations Conference, in New Delhi, in 1947. Distrust grew apace and the gap continued to widen.

<sup>1</sup>The Eden Memorandum incorporated in a 'personal letter' from Mr. Eden to Dr. Soong was dated 5 August, 1943. For the text (in *Foreign Relations*, 1943), pp. 146-7.



## VII

In the years immediately preceding India's independence, New Delhi had to face the problem of continued Tibetan, and Chinese, encroachments across the north-eastern frontier. Insofar as these violations of territory were no longer a secret, steps had to be devised to meet the challenges they posed. Unfortunately, in so doing, Indian authorities showed their characteristic lack of decision coupled with an amazing refusal to safeguard the country's frontiers. Two of their principal considerations appear to have been: *one*, an all-out appeasement of China, so that anything likely to disturb or upset the apple-cart in the slightest degree was to be avoided; *two*, treading warily on Tibetan corns lest Lhasa kick up a row that might attract outside, more specifically Chinese, attention. Finance continued to bedevil more sensible if also more realistic approaches, although the attention given to it was by no means as compelling as in the years preceding World War II.

In dealings with Tibet, Tawang and the Monbas still occupied the centre of the stage. Early in 1943, Lhasa despatched thither a band of officials, with an escort, to hold some non-descript enquiry, besides taking up direct with Bhutan the question of a number of persons of Tibetan extraction. On both issues, New Delhi made it abundantly clear to the Regent and his coterie that it was far from happy about the way things were being done. The warning did not go unheeded and before long Lhasa folded up its enquiry and beat a retreat.

Earlier, on the eve of the outbreak of World War II, both in New Delhi as well as Shillong renewed attention was being given to the question as to whether, in the light of known Tibetan opposition, the (1914) boundary alignment in the Kameng division was really necessary. It has already been noticed that in the previous year New Delhi had soft-pedalled Lightfoot's recommendations, even though these had been powerfully endorsed by his principals in Shillong. In March 1939, a new Acting Governor there called for a change in tune and in so doing cast serious doubts on the validity of the British claim on Tawang. *Inter alia*, Twynam argued that humanitarian considerations for the welfare of the Monbas

alone would scarcely be sufficient to justify a 'forward' policy as similar grounds could be urged for other areas of Tibet. It is true that last year's expedition may have excited hopes and raised claims, but it is possible that much could be done to fulfil expecta-

tions without going so far as to occupy an area which has always been oriented towards Tibet ethnographically, politically and in religion and is even now in Lightfoot's words 'dominated by representatives of the Tibetan Government' . . . The crux of the whole question apart from the financial aspect appears to lie in Lhasa's reactions to a forward policy and the extent to which these should be allowed for . . . .<sup>1</sup>

A few weeks later, the Governor went a step further to underline that taking over of Tawang would 'inevitably alienate' Lhasa 'without any particular advantage' to New Delhi. The then Governor General, Lord Linlithgow was not unimpressed by Twynam's line of reasoning and confided in the Secretary of State that

there is much to be said for his [Twynam's] proposal both on general and financial grounds particularly as he thinks that a boundary on the Se La would only cost about one-fourth of the expenditure estimated to be necessary if we were to decide eventually to go right up to the McMahon Line and include Tawang . . .<sup>2</sup>

An additional argument now pressed into service was that the Monbas may, in reality, make poor 'Wardens of the Marches' and that the best about the 1914 boundary was that it looked well on a map! Not long after, in August, 1940, a high-level meeting of officials in Shillong ruled that

commonsense demands that we should not press our claims on Tawang, but tacitly assume that a more suitable line than the McMahon Line would be one farther south, either at the Se La or farther south in the neighbourhood of Dirang Dzong.<sup>3</sup>

Partly, if not wholly, the above line of reasoning was characteristic of a bureaucratic frame of mind that must justify to itself its lack of action, or decision, on an issue of such vital importance. There could be no doubt that it was afraid of upsetting the Chinese, afraid lest any attempt at resisting Tibetan incursions create a hullabaloo in Lhasa. This, it was argued, would be grist to the Chinese propaganda mill in drumming British imperialist aggrandisement at a time when Chungking was engaged in a life and death struggle—indeed fighting with its back to the wall. Faced with a harsh choice, the British dithered, soft-pedalled and swept controversial questions under the carpet as it were.

<sup>1</sup>Twynam to Linlithgow, 17 March, 1939, in *IOR*, L/P&S/12/36/23, Part I.

<sup>2</sup>Viceroy to Secretary of State, 24 August, 1939, in *IOR*, L/P&S/12/36/29, Part I. For further details see the author's *McMahon Line and After*, pp. 453-5.

<sup>3</sup>Assam to India, 5 August, 1940, in *IOR*, L/P&S/12, External Collection 36/23, Part I. For details 'McMahon Line', p. 456.

Road-building activity in NEFA, however, continued through the World War II years and, increasingly, in the Lohit, Subansiri and Mon-yul divisions new posts were being established. It is thus evident that by the time British rule in India was reaching its fag-end, New Delhi's viewpoint had crystallized to the effect that it was not really necessary to offer Tibet any boundary rectifications. If deemed fit, however, territory north of Se-la may be used as a bargaining counter to make Lhasa accept the rest of the 'Red' Line, without qualification.

As the War drew to a close, a question of some complexity came up in regard to the precise constitutional position of NEFA. The 1919 Act had treated it as part of what were called the 'Excluded and partially Excluded Areas', yet the position was far from clear under the Government of India Act, 1935. Paradoxically thus while NEFA was situated to the north of Assam, it was not a part of the territory over which the writ of the government of that province ran. Again, its administration was a charge on central revenues. Partly to tide over these constitutional hurdles, the years immediately preceding the end of the war proliferated in proposals for the creation of a 'North-eastern Protectorate', or a 'Non-regulated area'. These trial balloons were, however, soon overtaken by events. For with the impending transfer of power to Indian hands, it became difficult to project proposals that were, in essence, tantamount to a continued British presence in or hold over an area which, however strategically important, formed an integral part of the subcontinent.

It may also bear notice here that on the eve of the British withdrawal from India, the Tsongdu in Lhasa had fully affirmed its acceptance of the Simla Convention and the Trade Regulations of 1914. Thus as early as October 1944, the Tibetan Foreign Office had informed Gould 'by direction of the Kashag', that it 'did not wish' to dispute the validity of the McMahon Line as determining the limits of territory in which India and Tibet respectively (subject to such minor adjustments as then contemplated) are entitled to exercise authority! Nonetheless in view of the 'territorial and political settlement' with China, then pending, and which was 'a matter of overwhelming importance' for Lhasa, it was requested that 'extension of their [British] regular administration up to the Line [should] be postponed'.<sup>1</sup> By much the same reasoning it may be

<sup>1</sup>India to Secretary of State, 4 November, 1944. For details *McMahon Line*, p. 458.

argued that the Tibetan cable of October 1947, claiming large chunks of Indian territory in the north, was essentially an exercise in counter-balancing a similar claim which Lhasa had lodged in Nanking—for return of territories occupied by the Chinese which it legitimately regarded as part of its domain. What needs to be underlined is the fact that before many months had passed, Lhasa accepted the change-over in New Delhi, without any known reservations.

### VIII

As a cursory glance at the table of contents would reveal, the last two sections in this volume rest on a base which is materially different from all that precedes them. Until about 1940 it is now possible to have access to government archives in London and, to a limited extent, nearer home in New Delhi. This fact, however, certainly does not hold valid for the years that follow. The result is, and this despite a vast plethora of white papers, officials' reports, and plagiarized, if also garbled and incomplete, versions of important, secret, state documents, that it is not possible to arrive at any degree of finality. It follows that, of necessity, such conclusions as have been drawn must remain tentative, nor for the matter of that, could the summary treatment attempted in the following paragraphs bear an imprint of being original, much less definitive.

On the eve of the British withdrawal from India and, logically, the countries of its landward periphery, there was an abortive *coup d'état* in Lhasa in which, allegedly, the Kuomintang Chinese were directly involved. Not long after, Chiang's China was badly beaten at home—it had won the war against Japan, by proxy as it were, as a U.S. ally—and took refuge, along with the Generalissimo himself, in Taiwan. The new Communist regime's interest in Tibet was in no way less pronounced than its predecessor's, albeit with one vital difference: whereas the KMT had confined itself to paper protests, however loud, Mao's China matched its strident proclamations with the use of *force majeure*. Nor did it take long to translate its threats to 'liberate' Tibet into an actual physical onslaught to give shape and content to its cherished goals.

The 'liberation' of Tibet, and the process spilled over from October 1950 into May of the following year, marks a veritable watershed, and not only in relations between the two countries. For New Delhi too, as the next-door neighbour, felt deeply, even intimately,

involved. The wordy duel in which it now engaged with the new regime in Peking reveals the harsh truth that Communist China did not pay much heed to promises, or commitments, much less to the niceties of accepted norms of diplomatic usage or behaviour. To start with, New Delhi's note of 28 October (1950) is revealing of what was at stake. After heavily underlining the fact that with the invasion of Tibet underway, negotiations could only be 'under duress', it further stressed that in the then

context of world events, the invasion by Chinese troops of Tibet cannot but be regarded as deplorable and, in the considered judgment of the Government of India, not in the interest of China or of peace. The Government of India can only express their deep regret that in spite of the friendly and disinterested advice repeatedly tendered by them, the Chinese Government should have decided to seek a solution of the problem of their relations with Tibet by force instead of the slower and more enduring methods of peaceful approach.<sup>1</sup>

In sharp, if striking contrast, the tone and temper of Peking's notes and memoranda was couched in words and phrases that left a lot to be desired: its action in marching troops into Tibet, despite stern warnings and protests, laid bare the uncomfortable truth that its peaceful professions to the contrary notwithstanding, it would resort to brute force whenever, in the interest of achieving its goals, this was deemed necessary. In sum, new China made it unmistakably clear that

regardless of whether the local authorities of Tibet wish to proceed with peaceful negotiations, the problem of Tibet is a domestic problem of the People's Republic of China and no foreign interference shall be tolerated. . . [further] with regard to the viewpoint of the Government of India on what it regarded as deplorable, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China cannot but consider it as having been affected by foreign influences hostile to China in Tibet and hence express their deep regret.<sup>2</sup>

Peking's new tone and temper did not go un-noticed. For India apart, the Dalai Lama and his people too awakened to the grim realization that, above all else, China's new masters meant business. In the final count, to its immediate neighbours, no less than to the world at large, the 'liberation' of Tibet served notice that the 19th

<sup>1</sup>Embassy of India to China, 28 October, 1950, pp. 156-7.

<sup>2</sup>Reply of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, 30 October, 1950, pp. 158-9.

century Manchu China which, masquerading as a phantom republic had spilled over into the 20th, was dead as a dodo, a thing of the past.

The 'liberation' itself may be said to have been achieved in two stages. The first, in May 1951, was formalized by the conclusion of the 17-point 'Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet'. *Inter alia*, Peking assured Lhasa that

all nationalities within the boundaries of the Chinese People's Republic are equal and that they shall establish unity and mutual aid and oppose imperialism and their own public enemies, so that the CPR will become a big family of fraternity and cooperation, composed of all the nationalities.<sup>1</sup>

Even a cursory glance at the 'Agreement' would reveal that the Dalai Lama, and his regime, which had fled from its seat of authority on the morrow of the news that Peking had launched its assaults both in the east as well as the west, had knuckled down to Red China's armed might. Perhaps the more relevant question would be whether, in the context of the prevailing situation, it really had an alternative. It may be noted however, if in extenuation, that in the initial stages at any rate the behaviour of the People's Liberation Army in its encounters with the territories, and the people, it over-ran was exemplary. This was in such sharp contrast to previous regimes in China that it evoked a great deal of favourable comment; nay, even a measure of sympathy and understanding for the 'liberators'. There was the added fact that the May 1951 'Agreement'—the Dalai Lama later (1959) alleged that the seal used on it for and on his behalf, was a fake one, thereby invalidating it *ab initio*—contained a lot which, if faithfully and honestly implemented, would have ensured a goodly measure of Tibetan autonomy. All in all, the Lama and his entourage, confident that a new page had been opened in the chequered annals of their relations with a powerful neighbour, felt sufficiently reassured and repaired home from Chumbi, in a spirit of robust optimism.

The second phase in Tibet's 'liberation' which at the same time marks the opening of a new and friendly era in Sino-Indian relations was the conclusion of the April 1954 Agreement on 'Trade and Intercourse' between the 'Tibet Region of China' and India. There

<sup>1</sup>For the text, *Hsinhua*, 23 May, 1951. In *Concerning the Question of Tibet* (Peking, 1959), pp. 14-16, the text of the 'Agreement' is given without its preamble; the citation in the text is from the latter source.

was a lot in the 'Agreement', and the notes exchanged on the occasion, which smacked of a unilateral surrender: the character of the Indian mission at Lhasa was abruptly, if materially, changed from a diplomatic into a consular entity; New Delhi withdrew its small military escorts, stationed for over half a century, at the trade marts of Gyantse and Yatung; it handed back, without demur, its postal, telegraph and telephone facilities, not to mention the rest houses it had put up on the road to Lhasa. As against the tangibles it thus gave up, its gain was the largely intangible goodwill enshrined in the five high-sounding principles (or platitudes!) of 'Panch Shila' which were loudly proclaimed as laying down the bases for the new relationship between the People's Republic of China and India. The Preamble spelt them out as

- i) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
- ii) mutual non-aggression;
- iii) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
- iv) equality and mutual benefit;
- v) peaceful co-existence.<sup>1</sup>

With the new agreement concluded, Tibet's 'liberation', to employ the then current Chinese jargon, now seemed to be complete and, on paper at any rate, it met the basic desiderata which a regime in Lhasa, or for the matter of that the British in India had long demanded: a guarantee of Tibetan autonomy within the framework of the larger whole of Chinese suzerainty.

It is a matter of no small significance that the ink on the April 1954 agreement was barely dry when important, if more intractable, issues opened up. As the larger study lays bare, as early as October 1954, the Indian Prime Minister, then on a visit to China, raised the question of maps which Peking had published and which showed the (Indian) frontier in the western, as certainly in the eastern sector, completely erroneously. Chou En-lai evaded a direct answer and pleaded for time to rectify contours which, he claimed, his government had but copied from the Kuo-ming-tang regime. Two years later, the issue was raised afresh, during the Chinese Prime Minister's return visit to India. Once again broad generalities were discussed, largely because, as Chou was to explain later, 'time was not yet

<sup>1</sup>For the text of the Agreement, pp. 165-8.

(deemed) ripe' for detailed discussions. Nor is it necessary to recount here that long, and sordid, tale except perhaps to underline that, shortly afterwards, Peking called into question the entire basis of the Sino-Indian boundary which, it affirmed, had 'never been formally delimited'.

The long, repetitious and argumentative despatches which now passed between New Delhi and Peking were marked by growing acrimony and bitterness. By 1958, superficially at any rate, the enthusiasm and euphoria of the 'Hindi Chini Bhai-Bhai' phase of two years earlier appears to have ebbed away yielding place to a certain disillusionment, lack of warmth, and even coolness, in the relations between the two countries. It is at this stage, early in March, 1959, that the Rebellion in Lhasa, which itself appears to have been a spontaneous outburst, born of a long series of flagrant breaches of the May, 1951 agreement, led to a number of complications, and not only in relations between Lhasa and Peking. To be sure, in more ways than one, the Rebellion marks a distinct, and indeed an important, watershed in the relations between India and China. In its wake, a long trail of hapless refugees headed by the Dalai Lama himself, poured into India, and with that Peking's posture took on a decidedly hostile stance. *Inter alia*, it now openly charged New Delhi with giving succour and sustenance to an insurrection in a neighbouring and friendly land. It was a grave accusation which left a deep imprint on the relations between the two countries for the breach that now occurred was never healed and, in actual fact, continued to widen with every day that passed. The border, and not only in the eastern sector, grew tense and hot blood marked the trail of the diplomatic exchanges whose colour and content grew ever more ominous.

For India, after the March (1959) Rebellion, the situation became especially more difficult. Most of what had happened in Ladakh, or across the Aksai Chin, not to talk of Wu-je or Bara-hoti, or even Longju, the then Prime Minister Nehru had kept scrupulously to himself. But with the Lama's flight from Lhasa, public pressures mounted considerably, resulting in the publication of the first White Paper which revealed the sad tale of growing discord over the years since 1954. This was to serve as the starting point for an unceasing lava of notes and memoranda which has, over the years, known no end. As the cold, unpalatable facts became common knowledge and the implied, if half-hidden dimensions of the problem came to



be realized more fully, popular reactions began to harden while the possibility of a compromise, receded farther and farther into the distance.

The 1962 war, with the deep thrusts which the Chinese made into the western sector no less than in the Kameng and Lohit districts of what is now Arunachal Pradesh, is still a live subject of controversy, with rival protagonists arrayed powerfully on either side. Thus it has been held that, after 1956, the two countries were set unerringly on a 'collision course', that India's 'forward policy' so-called was misconceived and indeed an open invitation to disaster. Nor, as events turned out, was retribution long delayed. The contrary view—that the road across the Aksai Chin was Peking's stab in the back of a friendly, trusting, neighbour, through territory to which New Delhi had a powerful claim; that the flag posts in Ladakh, and across the Thag La ridge, as no doubt Prime Minister Nehru's not always discreet utterances, were thin pegs on which to hang the well-rehearsed, massive onslaughts of October 1962—is held equally strongly. Above all, a student of the frontier has to face the uncomfortable truth that, for a variety of reasons, relations between the two neighbours worsened to a degree where any worthwhile discussions became well-nigh impossible. Nor is it difficult to deduce that the present imbroglio is bound to persist as long as public postures are not materially modified in a meaningful give and take across the table. Stalemates in themselves offer no solutions, nor for that matter need they be taken as immutable.



# I

## Jordan and Tibet

### *Selections from his private papers, 1915-19*

#### 1. *Jordan<sup>a</sup> to Langley<sup>b</sup>, 10 June, 1915*

The Chinese have sounded me several times recently about Tibet and the President expressed his anxiety to see the question settled. I have told them that they have nothing to do but to sign the Tripartite agreement, but they always insist that there must be some modification of the frontier line before they can do so.

I wish I could follow their example [viz., of men enlisting in the Army for war service] instead of spinning ropes of sand in China.

#### 2. *Jordan to Alston, 21 December, 1915*

Here I am living once again my old Corean [*sic.*] days. The whole thing is a repetition of my experience there on a much larger scale. We have a President of a Republic who is creating Princes, Dukes and all kinds of nobility and nobody seems to see the Opera Bouffe<sup>c</sup> of it all. It reminds me of a time when the weakling King of Corea created himself an Emperor and sent a message to me on the other side of the Palace Wall to see where he ought to rank in the Imperial hierarchy of the World.

#### 3. *Jordan to Butler (in India), 11 April, 1916*

Apart from active external influences, the (monarchy) movement has now taken a decidedly anti-Yuan<sup>d</sup> complexion and, of course, in present circumstances, we are not in a position to take an independent line in China. It is very difficult to form any forecast of the future but I think you are fortunate in Burmah having your Pein-ma and other frontier questions settled. The Government of India may yet regret that they did not take my advice and meet the Chinese half-way over the Tibetan question when the opportunity offered. If Tong Shoa-yi<sup>e</sup> and his party came into power at Peking, the settlement of all these questions will become increasingly difficult and the foreign policy of China may be dictated from another capital. That would hardly suit India I imagine.

4. *Jordan to Langley, 16 April, 1916*

I have in fact acted upon the plain assumption that China had to be subordinated and, if necessary, sacrificed to the main object of winning the war but in some respects things have gone further than I anticipated.

5. *Jordan to Langley, 13 June, 1916*

As to Yuan, you will not accept a balanced opinion from me at this moment. I had a great personal liking for the man and feel both his loss and the manner of it acutely. . . to his last day he remained a firm friend of Great Britain. He could not speak a word of English . . . (and yet was) on very friendly terms with Englishmen since his early manhood. . . and that he had learnt to trust and like them (as is illustrated by). . . the appointment of British advisers, the engagement of British teachers and tutors for his children, by sending three of his sons to school in England, by contributions to British War funds, and in general by his admiration for British ideals.

I could go on reciting acts to the credit of my dead friend. . . He fell in an unequal struggle and to me he was greater in his bitter adversity than he had been even at the height of his power.

6. *Jordan to Macleay, 16 April, 1918*

I have been puzzling over your Tibet telegram and am still uncertain as to the best course to pursue. I see very little hope of securing a settlement and yet I am reluctant to abandon the attempt altogether as question will remain an open sore and may some day prove very serious.

The Chinese here have no interest in it. Szechuan is in absolute confusion from end to end and the Chinese Government are only too pleased to let it have the odium of managing or mismanaging Tibet. We made a huge blunder in not coming to terms with China when Yuan Shih-kai was in power and most friendly disposed towards us. But our advice was then a cry in the wilderness and India went her own way.

7. *Jordan to Langley, 7 May, 1918*

Opium, Tibet and other questions continue to engage such desultory attention as a miserably weak government can spare from absorbing preoccupation with a multiplicity of embarrassing Japanese negotiations. Japanese loans follow each other in rapid succession

and everywhere there is usual outcry that the country is being sold to Japan.

8. *Jordan to Langley, 29 May, 1918*

China is in the melting pot and the country is being practically put up to auction, with only one bidder at the sale. Yuan died two years [ago] and under him the writ of Peking [ran] to the borders of Tibet on the west, and Canton in the south. . . . Now not even a farthing of revenue is received from Szechuan, Yunnan or Canton and all the country south of the Yangtse is a law unto itself. Military autocracy at Peking [was] as efficient then [under Yuan] as inefficient now. The great difference [is] that the latter is supported by foreign money.

9. *Jordan to Langley, 2 August, 1918*

Tibet is still a thorn in the flesh and we can make no headway against the apathy of the Chinese who seem to have lost interest in the question. I am afraid, Teichman's mission will not have improved matters as it seems to have antagonized provincial opinion. However I shall continue to watch for an opportunity. . . (sooner or later there is bound to be a) recrudescence of Chinese activity on the frontier.

Our Foreign Minister went to the seaside six weeks ago and refuses to return! I wish some of us could follow his example.

10. *Jordan to Macleay, 14 August, 1918*

The Foreign Minister, Lu Cheng-hsiang, after spending six weeks at Peitaoho<sup>a</sup> came up for two days and went off for another spell of the seaside! And one is expected to get these people to attend to business in such circumstances.

11. *Jordan to Macleay, 24 October, 1918*

I do not like the turn the Tibetan question has taken and wish Teichman were safely out of Chiamdo. Hewlett<sup>b</sup> who knows Szechuan well, thinks that the whole thing is merely a Chinese device to gain time. Teichman's arguments about the possibility of the Tibetans advancing upon Batang, Litang and Tachienlu, unless he had undertaken to mediate, have not the slightest weight with the Central government who, having lost Szechuan, do not care a brass farthing what happens to these outlying frontier regions.

*12. Jordan to Tilley, 24 September, 1919*

I have purposely not touched upon Tsingtao<sup>a</sup>, Tibet or any of the other political questions. You will have had enough and to spare about them in the despatches. All I would care to add is that I am deeply grateful for the support I have received. At last we have come into the open with the Japanese and spoken frankly with them. Every word I have telegraphed about Tibet has been carefully weighed and represents the convictions not only of myself but of Harding and Teichman who were present at all the interviews and made careful note of the proceedings.

## II

### The Chamdo Agreement, August 1918<sup>1</sup>

*Agreement for the restoration of peaceful relations and the delimitation of a provisional frontier between China and Tibet*

1. Whereas a state of hostilities arose last year between Chinese and Tibetans owing to an attack by Chinese troops on Tibetan troops on account of a trifling dispute near Leiwuchi<sup>a</sup> and Chiamdo; and whereas the leaders on both sides are now desirous of a restoration of peaceful relations on the general basis of both sides retaining the territories they now occupy; and whereas the British Government has consented to mediate in the dispute; the following arrangement for a complete cessation of hostilities has been agreed upon between the undersigned, namely,

General Liu Tsan-ting, commanding the Chinese troops at Batang, and acting on behalf of China,

The Kalon Lama, commanding the Tibetan troops on the frontier and acting on behalf of Tibet, and

Mr. Eric Teichman, of His Britannic Majesty's Consular Service acting on behalf of the British Government.

2. This agreement is of a temporary nature and shall only remain in force until such time as the Governments of China, Tibet and Great Britain shall have arrived at a final and permanent tripartite settlement; but in the meantime it cannot be modified in any way except with the unanimous consent of all three contracting parties.

3. It is agreed that the provisional boundary line between Chinese and Tibetan controlled territory shall be as follows. The districts of Batang (Baan), Yenching (Tsakalo), Itun (Sanpa or Taso), Tejung, Litang (Lihua), Kantze, Nyarong (Chantui or Chanhua), Luho (Changkou or Drango), Taofu (Taowu), Hokou (Nyachuka or Yachiang), Tachienlu (Dartsendo or Kangting), Tanpa (Romidrango), Lutingchiao (Jazamka), Chiulung (Jezerong), Hsiangcheng (Tinghsiang), and Taocheng, and the country lying to the East of them,

<sup>1</sup>IOR, L/P&S/10/714 (3260/1917 Pt. 2).

shall be under the control of the Chinese; no Tibetan troops or civil or military officials being permitted to reside therein; while the districts of Riwoche (Leiwuche), Enta, Chiamdo<sup>a</sup> (Changtu), Draya (Chaya), Markam<sup>b</sup>-Gartok (Chiangka or Ningching), Gonjo<sup>c</sup> (Kungchueh), Sangen (Sangai or Wucheng), Tungpu, Tengko, Seshu (Shihchu), Derge<sup>d</sup> (Teko), and Beyu (Paiyu), and the country lying to the West of them, shall be under the control of the Tibetans; no Chinese troops or civil or military officials being permitted to reside therein. As soon as the Governments of China and Tibet shall have formally accepted this agreement, all the Tibetan troops and civil and military authorities engaging not to oppress or in any way maltreat the natives of those parts, including the lamas of Dargye Gomba and other monasteries, after the withdrawal of the Tibetan troops. The existing boundaries of Yunan<sup>e</sup> Province and of the Kokonor (i.e. the territory at present under the control of the Signing officials) shall remain for the present unchanged.

4. It is agreed that, apart from local constabulary necessary for the maintenance of law and order, no Tibetan troops shall be stationed to the East of the river Yangtze (Dre Chu or Chin Sha Chiang); and it is likewise agreed that, with the exception of one hundred local constabulary, the Chinese troops stationed on the South and North Roads shall not cross to the West of the Yangtze and Yalung rivers respectively; both sides engaging to withdraw their troops in accordance with the above arrangements as soon as the Governments of China and Tibet shall have formally accepted this agreement.

5. It is agreed that the control of all the monasteries in the above mentioned Chinese governed districts, as well as the right of appointing high lamas and other monastic functionaries and the control of all matters appertaining to the Buddhist religion, shall be in the hands of the Dalai Lama; the Chinese authorities not interfering in any way therein; but the lamas on the other hand, shall not interfere in the territorial authority of the Chinese officials.

6. The Chinese and Tibetan authorities on both sides of the border shall be responsible for and shall take all possible steps to prevent raids by members of their forces or by others under their respective jurisdictions across the temporary boundary line laid down in Article 3; and will render one another reciprocal assistance in the maintenance of order, suppression of brigandage, and apprehension of evil-doers. Peaceful traders and travellers, however, shall be permitted to cross the border without interference.



7. When the Governments of China and Tibet shall have formally accepted this agreement, all the Chinese prisoners in the hands of the Tibetans, and all the Tibetan prisoners in the hands of Chinese, shall be released and permitted to return home if they so desire.

8. It is agreed that no Tibetans or Chinese will be punished or in any way maltreated for having adhered to or supported the Tibetan or Chinese cause in the past before the conclusion of this agreement, a general and complete amnesty in this respect coming into force immediately. The Tibetan and Chinese authorities further undertake that all Chinese in Tibetan controlled territory, and all Tibetans in Chinese controlled territory, whether lamas or laymen, agriculturists, merchants, or others, shall be properly protected, well and fairly treated, and in no way oppressed.

9. In the event of any dispute arising between the Tibetan and Chinese authorities on the frontier after the conclusion of this agreement, there shall be no recourse to arms; but both sides agree to refer the matter in dispute to the British Consul for his arbitration. In order to enable the British Consul to carry out satisfactorily his duties of arbitrator and middleman under this agreement, the Chinese and Tibetan authorities engage to render him all possible assistance in visiting the frontier officials and travelling through the frontier districts.

10. Inasmuch as the natives of Eastern Tibet have suffered greatly of recent years from the large numbers of troops stationed in the country, and since now that peace has been arranged under this agreement there is no longer any need for soldiers beyond those necessary for the maintenance of law and order, the Chinese and Tibetan authorities express their willingness to reduce their frontier garrisons; and in accordance with this policy it is agreed that not more than two hundred Chinese troops shall be stationed at Batang and Kantzu respectively, and that not more than two hundred Tibetan troops shall be stationed at Chiamdo and Gartok (Chiangka) respectively; but the authorities on either side shall be at liberty to take what military action they please in case of disturbances of the peace in their respective territories.

11. It is agreed that no Chinese troops shall be stationed in the districts known as Hsiangchang (Tinghsiang) and Nyarong (Chantui or Chanhua) so long as the natives of those regions remain peacefully within their own borders and abstain from raiding other parts; but in the event of their causing trouble, the Tibetan authorities shall

not interfere with any action the Chinese authorities may take.

12. When the Governments of China and Tibet shall have formally accepted this agreement, its provisions shall be widely made known by proclamations in Tibetan and Chinese throughout the districts on both sides of the frontier with a view to pacifying the minds of the inhabitants of the border after the recent years of fighting and unrest.

13. Eighteen copies of this agreement having been drawn up and signed, six in Chinese, six in Tibetan, and six in English, each of the three signatories shall retain two Chinese, two Tibetan, and two English copies. As the British representative has acted as mediator in the matter the English text shall, in the event of disputes arising, be considered authoritative. Each signatory engages to report the provisions of this agreement to his Government with the least possible delay for their approval. Both Chinese and Tibetan authorities engage not to move troops or to open hostilities pending the receipt of the decisions of the three Governments.

Signed and sealed at Chiamdo, this Nineteenth Day of August, Nineteen hundred and Eighteen.

Liu Tsan-ting<sup>a</sup>

Eric Teichman

Chamba Denda<sup>b</sup>  
(The Kalon Lama).

### *Note*

In order to convert this agreement into a Yangtze boundary settlement, deduct the four districts Tengko, Seshu (Shihchu), Derge (Teko), and Baiyu from the Tibetan controlled area; and, as there would then be no Tibetan territory East of the Yangtze, delete Article 4.

But it must be understood that it would be impossible to induce the Tibetan Frontier authorities to surrender these districts except under the most explicit instructions from Lhasa.

In order to provide for a neutral and independent buffer state of Derge, substitute following for Article 4.

'It is agreed that that portion of the old state of Derge lying to the East of the Yangtze, comprising the whole of the recent Chinese districts of Tengko, Seshu (Shihchu), Derge (Teko), and Baiyu, shall be completely restored to the control of the former native

chiefs and officials, including the Derge and Lintsung chiefs, whose scale shall be restored to them, under the supreme authority of the Chinese Government; no Tibetan or Chinese troops civil or military officials being permitted to reside therein.'

If the above mentioned four districts of Eastern Derge are to be wholly restored to Chinese control, the Chinese Government should give some sort of guarantee against mis-government, such as permission for the natives to file complaints with the British Consul.

E.T.<sup>a</sup>

Chiamdo,  
August, 1918.

## 2. *The Rongbatsa truce, October 1918*<sup>1</sup>

Translation (from Chinese and Tibetan texts) of supplementary agreement regarding mutual withdrawal of troops and cessation of hostilities between Chinese and Tibetans.

1. The Chinese and Tibetan leaders are equally desirous of peace. The Chinese troops will withdraw to Kantze, the Tibetan troops will withdraw to within the boundary of Derge district. Both Chinese and Tibetans undertake not to advance their forces along either the Northern or Southern Roads and to cease all hostilities for a year from the date of the mutual withdrawal of troops pending the receipt of the decision of the President of the Republic and the Dalai Lama regarding the Chiamdo negotiations.
2. This Agreement only concerns the mutual withdrawal of troops and cessation of hostilities, and is not a definite settlement of the questions at issue.
3. The mutual withdrawal of troops to commence on October 17th (12 day of 9th Moon) and to be completed by October 31st (26th day of 9th Moon).
4. This Agreement is concluded between Han Kuang-chun and the Chala Chief, special representatives of the Szechuan Frontier Commissioner, on the one hand, and the Kenchung Lama and Chungrang

<sup>1</sup>IOR, L/P&S/10/714 (3260/1917 Pt. 2).

and Drentong Depons, representing the Kalon Lama of Tibet, on the other, and is witnessed by Mr Eric Teichman, British Vice-Consul, as middleman. The signatories engage to report the matter to their respective Governments as soon as possible.

Signed and sealed by the Chinese, Tibetan, and British representatives at Rongbatsa, October 10th, 1918.

*Additional article*

The Chinese troops shall withdraw to Kantze, but they shall be at liberty to occupy the strategic point of Beri—beyond which they must not, however, advance during the cessation of hostilities.

(Signed by the three parties)

### III

## A Tripartite Settlement Revived

### *China's May 1919 Offer: British attitude<sup>1</sup>*

6. The present overtures of the Chinese Government give an opportunity of effecting a permanent settlement of the Tibetan question which will (1) safeguard Tibet from further menace on her eastern frontier; and (2) readjust our own relations with the Lhasa Government, by regularising a position from which the logic of events has made it impossible for us to recede. For this purpose the heads of agreement discussed in Sir J. Jordan's telegram No. 305 of the 31st May provide a suitable basis for negotiation, and it seems clearly desirable that discussions should be opened at Peking with as little delay as possible. Certain points of detail are discussed in the next paragraph.

7. (a) *The Boundary Question.* The distinction made in the 'Tripartite Agreement' of 1914 between (1) 'Outer' or autonomous and (2) 'Inner' or non-autonomous Tibet needs a brief notice. It was first proposed by Sir H. McMahon, in the course of the Simla negotiations, as a means of compromising the conflicting claims of the Chinese and Tibetan delegates. The Department is not concerned to argue that the arrangement is an ideal one, or that, if the whole question were being raised *de novo*, it might not be preferable to fix a single line of division between Tibet, as one autonomous entity, and the rest of the Chinese Empire. But such as it is, the compromise has been accepted by both parties (with reservations on the part of China as to the precise frontiers), and there seems little to be gained by reopening the boundary question on a revised basis. For practical purposes the boundary of 'Outer' Tibet will represent the limits of Tibet. 'Inner' Tibet, despite the provision prohibiting its conversion into a province of China, will look towards Peking and not towards Lhasa, and will in all essentials be subject to Chinese influence and authority. The boundary of 'Outer' Tibet, as now proposed, is in one respect at least more favourable to Lhasa than that of the Tripartite Agreement, in that it gives Tibet the district of Gonjoh, which

<sup>1</sup>Excerpts from Memorandum dated 14 July, 1919, by Secretary, Political Department, India Office in *IOR*, Political and Secret Memoranda, L/P&S/18/B. 324.

stretches east of Chiamdo as far as the Yang-tse Kiang. The provisional frontier of 1918 was based on temporary Tibetan successes in the field, and affords no sound precedent for a permanent settlement. One effect of the new proposals is to transfer Litang and Batang from 'Inner' Tibet to China proper (Szechuan), and apparently to eliminate the southern section of 'Inner' Tibet altogether. This does not appear open to serious objection. As Sir J. Jordan points out, Tibetan claims will obtain substantial satisfaction by the acquisition of Chiamdo, Draya, Ma-kham, and Gonjoh. The re-adjustment of boundaries in the barren Koko-nor region ought not to cause difficulty, assuming that it leaves the passes of the Tang La range in Tibetan hands—a point which is not quite clear and which Sir J. Jordan might be asked about.

(b) *Chinese Trade Agents.* The Department fully shares the objections of the Government of India to the readmission of Chinese trade agents to the existing 'trade marts' (established under the Younghusband Convention of 1904), viz., Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok (in Western Tibet). All these places lie between Central Tibet and the Indian frontier—Yatung, indeed, is only just over our border—and are far removed from the sphere of Chinese commercial interest. The history of the years 1906–10, during which it was our avowed policy to act through the Chinese in all Tibetan matters, was one of prolonged wrangling with the Chinese trade agents, whose methods reached the extreme limits of obstruction and exasperation.\* The situation was both ridiculous and intolerable. We cannot in any circumstances allow it to recur. We could only agree to the reappearance of Chinese agents on the distinct understanding that their functions were to be strictly confined to questions of Sino-Tibetan trade, and that they must in no circumstances concern themselves in administrative matters or attempt to interfere between the British trade agents and the local Tibetan authorities. But it appears very desirable not to readmit them at all to any trade marts in the direction of the Indian frontier. In the event of new marts being opened in Eastern Tibet (e.g., at Chiamdo) the same objections would not apply.

(c) *British Representation at Lhasa.* The Department is in favour of raising this question quite apart from its value for purposes of bargaining over the Chinese trade agents. The Government of India hold

\*The Tibetan Blue Book of 1910 contains the whole story. It is not an edifying one.

that the advantages of representation at Lhasa 'are considerably outweighed by the disadvantages'. They do not give their reasons for this view. But supposing them to be right for the moment, it does not follow that circumstances may not arise hereafter that will compel them to modify their opinion. Many indications point in that direction. As already shown, the Tibetans are tending more and more to turn to us for advice and assistance. There seems every reason to anticipate that, whether we desire it or not, our relations with the Lhasa Government will grow more and more intimate, and that a situation may develop in which the absence of British representation at the Tibetan capital will become both inconvenient and anomalous. There is advantage in acquiring the *right* to such representation even if we make no immediate use of it; and it would seem a pity to miss the opportunity of clearing up the point vis-a-vis the Chinese Government. The Tripartite Agreement (Article 8) already empowers the British trade agent at Gyantse to visit Lhasa under specified conditions. It is suggested that an amended version of this Article should be incorporated in the new Convention in some such language as follows:

The British Agent who resides at Gyantse may visit Lhasa, whenever necessary, for the purpose of consulting with the Tibetan Government. Should the British Government hereafter decide, with the consent of the Tibetan Government, to station a permanent British representative at Lhasa, there will be no objection on the part of China.

This amplification of an Article which the Chinese Government has accepted in principle would entail no substantial concession on the part of China, and it ought to be possible to secure its acceptance without giving way on question of Chinese trade agents. Our engagements with Russia\*—for what they may be worth—would not, of course, be affected.

(d) *Question of Procedure.* There is a difference of opinion on this point between Sir J. Jordan and the Government of India. The latter wish to obtain Tibetan consent before opening negotiations; the former urges that we should negotiate at once, merely informing the Tibetans of what we are doing. There are obvious objections to bargaining with other people's goods without their leave. We have

\*See paragraph 3.

object lesson in the Afghan Section of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which was negotiated without the Amir's knowledge or assent, and which he afterwards refused to accept. But Sir J. Jordan's arguments in favour of early action are difficult to resist. We are on much stronger ground than in the Afghan case, seeing that the Tibetans have frequently appealed to us to intervene between them and the Chinese. It should, perhaps, suffice if we place the facts frankly before them, and explain the reasons that have made it impracticable to await their formal consent. This would involve the addition of a sentence, in the sense suggested in Sir J. Jordan's telegram, No. 357, of the 1st July, and the draft letter proposed in the Viceroy's telegram No. 946 S., of the 27th June<sup>a</sup>.

8. To sum up, the Department recommends—

- (i) That Sir J. Jordan should be authorized to open negotiations forthwith with the Chinese Government for a final settlement of the Tibetan question on the basis proposed in his telegram No. 305 of the 31st May, subject to (a) the non-admission of Chinese trade agents to existing trade marts in Tibet, and (b) the modification of Article 8 of the Tripartite Agreement on the lines indicated above;
- (ii) That the Government of India should be authorized to address the Tibetan Government in the terms proposed in the Viceroy's telegram No. 946 S., of the 27th June, subject to the addition of a sentence explaining the necessity for immediate action.

Political Department,  
India Office,  
14th July 1919

J.E.S.  
(J E Shuckburgh)<sup>b</sup>



## IV

### Simla: a Post-mortem

#### *1. Memorandum on Tibetan question<sup>1</sup>*

When the Simla Convention was formally adopted by the representatives of Great Britain and Tibet on July 3, 1914, it was confidently expected that, after some slight delay and the exercise of further persuasion and pressure in Peking, China would fall into line and record her adherence also. More than two years have since passed, and it is now evident that no Chinese Government will adhere to the Convention in its present form. The present unsatisfactory state of affairs if continued indefinitely, can have but one ending, the submission of the Tibetan to the Chinese, and consequently the loss of an opportunity for a satisfactory settlement of the Tibetan question which is never likely to recur.

We know that ever since the close of the Conference in India the Chinese Government have been endeavouring by persuasion and threats to induce the Tibetans to enter into separate negotiations with them. These overtures have, according to information received by the Government of India from the Tibetan Government, always been rejected by the latter, though intelligence from the Chinese side is not so conclusive on this point. But in spite of the slight assistance afforded by us in the shape of a small gift of arms and ammunition, the Tibetans cannot indefinitely stand the strain of maintaining a comparatively large force on their Eastern frontier facing the Chinese. They are already feeling the strain very much and will understandably give way sooner or later; sooner, if China remains friendly, stable and capable of exercising increased pressure; later, if internal disorder continues. The influence of the pro-Chinese party in Lhasa must also be taken into account.

During the past two years the Chinese have been restrained from making a forward move against Lhasa by the influence exercised by Sir John Jordan over Yuan Shih-kai and by internal unrest culminating in the anti-monarchical rebellion. A new Government has now

<sup>1</sup>For the text, Sub-Encl. 2, No. 31, in Alston to Balfour, 19 May, 1917 in *Foreign*, October, 1917, Procs. 1-51.

come into existence which, while far weaker than Yuan Shih-kai's administration, is less susceptible to British influence, and conditions in the West are gradually reverting to the normal. Provided the Chinese are free from domestic troubles, the Tibetans can no more stand against them now than they were when Chao Erh-fung<sup>a</sup> and Chung Ying<sup>b</sup> carried out their successful raid on Lhasa in February 1910. The smooth despatch of a well-equipped and organised expeditionary force of twenty to thirty thousand Northern soldiers to Szechuan on the outbreak of the rebellion last spring demonstrates the ease with which Tibet could be reduced if the Peking government desired to do so. Indeed Chen Yi's Northern army of more than ten thousand men which was in Szechuan before the Rebellion broke out would have been ample for the purpose. It is not probable that a forward move against Tibet after the complete restoration of order in Szechuan was part of the programme initiated by sending Chen Yi to West China accompanied by this Northern army in May 1915, and that this development was only frustrated by the rebellion.

All the Chinese require to do to recover Tibet is to raid Lhasa with a couple of thousand Northern soldiers, and there are at present more soldiers than the Government knows what to do with. This accomplished, there is an immediate reversion to the state of affairs existing before the revolution of 1911, and the opportunity for a satisfactory settlement of the Tibetan question is lost for good. The great superiority of modern Chinese troops over the Tibetans has of course been demonstrated again and again of recent years. After the revolution of 1911, it took the Tibetans a year or more to get rid of Chung Ying's small Chinese force in Lhasa, cut off as it was from all intercourse with China, and even then the Chinese were not eliminated but were evacuated via India after negotiation. The feeble efforts of Yin Chang-heng's<sup>c</sup> ill-organised Szechuan levies to reconquer Eastern Tibet in 1912 are not criterion of what a similar force of well-equipped Northerners, or even Yunnanese, could accomplish.

It is not to be expected that the Chinese Government will ever adhere to an instrument so unfavourable to themselves as the present Treaty, unless it is so radically modified as to become a new one. It is true that through the revolution of 1911 they have lost their former position in Tibet; but they must know that, if they dare incur our displeasure, or if they thought we were sufficiently preoccupied not to interfere, they could recover their whole former position by force of

arms whenever their domestic troubles leave them free to do so.

The radical defect of the Convention is the arrangement whereby in return for being allowed back into Tibet to a very limited extent, China is expected to sign away the Tachienlu-Batang portion of Szechuan and the Tsaidam part of the Kokonor as 'Inner Tibet'. China is apparently willing to swallow the autonomy of Tibet in return for the privilege of getting her representatives back to Lhasa, but nothing short of an ultimatum to Peking would induce her to give up this stretch of Szechuan territory. Even if Peking could be induced to do so, Szechuan would not acquiesce. In modern times this region has always been unreservedly recognized by Chinese, Tibetans and foreigners as forming a part of Szechuan, and Chinese authority therein is far more firmly established than in the corresponding Tibetan inhabited tracts in Kansu south of the Yellow river. The Chinese claims to this portion of Szechuan were combated at Simla with the argument that Chao Erh-feng's campaigns were wanton acts of aggression in Tibetan territory. But the Tachienlu-Batang country was part of Szechuan long before Chao Erh-feng began to pacify it. Chao's campaigns were not, as is sometimes stated, exclusively conquests of Tibetan territory, but were in the first instance undertaken to suppress Tibetan rising in Chinese territory. The Lama rebellion which started all the trouble in the March country of Yunnan and Szechuan broke out in 1905 after the murder of Feng Chuan<sup>a</sup>, and for the next five years the Chinese were mainly occupied in re-establishing their rule in this region on a firmer basis. Having been successful in this they then undertook their advance into Kham, South-East Tibet and eventually to Lhasa.

As regards the Tibetan region of the Kokonor that is inhabited not by Tibetans but by Mongol tribes, who unlike the Tibetan tribes in Eastern Kokonor give the Chinese authorities at Sining no trouble.

The insurmountable obstacle to a settlement on the lines of the Convention is therefore the division of Tibet into 'Inner' and 'Outer' zones, the 'Inner' zone being comprised of territory which admittedly forms part of Szechuan and the Kokonor. It is difficult to see what anyone gains by the artificial creation of this 'Inner' Tibet, in which China is apparently at liberty to make what military dispositions she pleases but may not set up a provincial administration, unless it be that China's irritation and loss of face is considered of advantage to Tibet. The proposal of zones was an imitation of the Russian agreement regarding Outer Mongolia. But 'Inner' and 'Outer' Mongolia

have always been well-known geographical terms to the Chinese, whereas 'Inner' Tibet is something quite new as applied to the territory in question. Moreover the Russians made no stipulations about Inner Mongolia and to include in it Kueihauncheng, Kalgan, Jehol<sup>a</sup>, which would be comparable to the inclusion of Tachienlu in Inner Tibet, they would have been as successful in their negotiations with the Chinese as we were. If we limit ourselves in Tibet to what Russia has done in Mongolia, we should at least be equally successful; for in one important respect we are in a stronger position than Russia, in that in the past they have never had independent Treaty relations with Urga as we had with Lhasa.

If the present policy of waiting is continued there is an ever-increasing risk of the Tibetans giving way and negotiating independently with China, or of the Chinese deciding to take active measures against Tibet. The uncertainty of the present political outlook in China, the recent remarkable increase in the power and prestige of the Yunnanese and the possibility of their one day standing at the head of an independent confederacy of the South-western Provinces and the likelihood of the whole country falling more and more under Japanese influence, appear to make it more than ever essential that the opportunity created by the elimination of Chinese power in Tibet through the revolution of 1911 should not be allowed to pass, and that the matter should be settled for good by the creation of an autonomous Tibet while the time is still favourable.

It is therefore submitted that we have waited long enough and that the time has now come to settle the Tibetan question once and for all by the conclusion of a new tripartite agreement on a scale more liberal to the Chinese and more in harmony with the existing facts, namely:

1. Complete autonomy of Tibet under Chinese suzerainty.
2. The boundaries of autonomous Tibet to follow the lines fixed in the Convention map for 'Outer Tibet' which correspond what has in modern times been popularly considered to be the dividing line between China and Tibet (Batang boundary pillar, watershed between Yangtse and Mekong, watershed between sources of Yellow river and Yangtse, range south of Tsaidam swamps etc.), the entire frontier to be exactly delimited later on by a British-Chinese-Tibetan boundary commission.
3. British and Chinese representatives of equal status with escorts

of equal size (not to exceed three hundred men) to be stationed at Lhasa for the purpose of looking after the interests of their respective nationals and, in the case of Chinese representative, of seeing that the autonomous government of Tibet does not by its acts violate the suzerain rights of China.

4. British and Chinese Trade Agents, or Consuls, of equal status to be stationed at the Trade marts, which shall include Chiam-do, for the purposes of looking after the interests of and exercising jurisdiction over their respective nationals (which in the case of the Chinese would not include Tibetans), and of maintaining consular relations with the local Tibetan officials.
5. Apart from the above no British or Chinese troops, or civil or military officials to be allowed in Tibet except with the concurrence of all three contracting parties; Chinese garrisons to be withdrawn from East Tibet and Kham within three months. Neither Great Britain nor China to interfere in any way with the internal administration of Tibet, nor to found colonies of their nationals in Tibet.
6. Extraterritorial rights for British and Chinese nationals in Tibet; British subjects to have the same rights of freedom and trade as Chinese; most favoured nation clause for British and Chinese commerce.
7. Tibet not to be represented in the Chinese Parliament.
8. Provisions in existing conventions etc., inconsistent with or repugnant to present conventions to lapse.
9. Treaty to be published at the Trade Marts through Tibet and Chinese Tibet. Great Britain engages to keep China fully informed of any negotiations or agreement she may enter into with Tibet.
10. China to adhere to the new Trade Regulations.
11. Religious rights of Dalai Lama over monasteries in Kokonor, Kansu and Szechuan to continue.
12. English text to rule.

The Chinese would almost certainly accept the Treaty on the above lines (compare their various offers including the last one made in...)\* which should prove equally satisfactory to us and to the Tibetans. The only considerable concession which China would be called upon to make in advance of her last offer would be the cession of the eastern portion of the Chang Tang (Northern Plain of Tibet)

which is an uninhabited waste between the Kunlun and Tangla mountains. In return for this concession, 'Inner Tibet' would be abolished and the Kokonor territory and the March country of Szechuan given up completely to the Chinese. The Government of India object strongly to Chinese Trade Agents; but if their authority were purely consular and limited to Chinese, they would be harmless, and this is a concession by which China sets great store. The whole subject has been so thoroughly argued out with the Chinese Government in the past that a new Conference would be a waste of time. China having agreed in principle to most of the above provisions, might be privately sounded through an intermediary, say a British Adviser, and the whole question settled with a minimum of negotiations. It is unfortunate that a Parliament is again in existence in Peking, since it would probably prove the chief stumbling block on the Chinese side.

Peking

September 24th, 1916

## 2. *China, India and Tibet: memorandum by Eric Teichman*<sup>1</sup>

The attitude of the Wai Chiao Pu towards the Tibetan question appears to be that it must await a settlement of the Shantung issue before it can be dealt with: Great Britain having let China down over Shantung,<sup>a</sup> there is no reason why China should go out of her way to make concessions to Great Britain over Tibet, nor why the Central Government should give the pseudo-patriots of the independent South West a pretext for agitating against them by coming to an agreement with us on the question. The Wai Chiao Pu are in all likelihood sincere in their attitude, and, as far as they are concerned, the present position will be maintained and a settlement reached in due course after the Shantung affair is over.

But there are other elements in the Chinese Government which are probably working for a recovery of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet as in the case of Mongolia. They hope that if the Central Government does nothing, either (1) the Tibetans will in the end get tired of the

<sup>1</sup>Encl. in F.O. to I.O., 18 May, 1920 in *IOR*, L/P&S/10/716.

situation, and be persuaded by means of promises of favourable treatment, bribes to individuals, and perhaps a show of military force from the direction of Kansu, to enter into direct negotiations with China and to return to Chinese allegiance, or (2) some irresponsible local leader in Yunnan, Szechuan, or Kansu will make a raid into Tibet and occupy Lhasa again: in which case the Central Government would reap the advantages of such action if successful, and repudiate it if unsuccessful. The militarists in the Chinese Government are no doubt quite capable of playing us false, and are probably quite ready to apply military coercion to Tibet if they were in a position to do so successfully and sufficiently rapidly to accomplish their object before any intervention on our part could become effective.

The Legation in Peking cannot make bricks without straw; and as we have never been authorized to do anything but beg the Chinese to come to a settlement, they not unnaturally refuse to do so; seeing that our attitude leads them to believe that they have nothing to lose and perhaps much to gain by indefinite procrastination.

But there is one thing the Chinese do fear (as is shown for instance by a perusal of the telegram sent out to the Provinces by the Central Government on the subject last year): and that is a modification of Great Britain's attitude towards the Tibetan question. (Our formal declaration to the Chinese Government in 1914 that we would give the Tibetans material support in resisting Chinese aggression resulted in the Chinese remaining strictly on the defensive from 1914 up to the end of 1917).

Unless therefore the Government of India are content to wait for China to come to a settlement of her own accord, which may be soon or never, and run the risk of the Tibetans losing faith in us and being cajoled or coerced by the Chinese into returning to the Chinese fold (which would, to say the least, have disastrous results on our prestige on the North East frontier, and inevitably lead to the resurrection of Chinese claims to Nepaul etc), the situation should be re-considered in the light of last year's events. The abortive negotiations of 1919 have at any rate resulted in a very great improvement in our position from a League of Nations and International Arbitration point of view, and a corresponding weakening of China's case. The Draft Convention of 1914 was not a fair offer to China, and savoured too much of Russia's former methods in Mongolia. But in supporting a settlement based on China's offer of May 30th last, modified if

necessary by the abolition of 'Inner Tibet' and the inclusion of De-ge, Nyarong, and the whole of Kokonor in China, we should have an unassailable case before the League of Nations or American Arbitration. By the single fact of our being prepared to submit our case to Arbitration (which we could not possibly have done while adhering to the 1914 Convention Map) we would be able to torpedo the whole anti-British agitation.

If we give the Chinese passive encouragement to procrastinate indefinitely, they will undoubtedly endeavour to go back on the whole principle of tripartite negotiation.

How can we protect our interests against the dangers of indefinite delay, without unduly offending Chinese susceptibilities?

Answer: By (1) entering openly into closer relations with Tibet, while at the same time (2) continuing to offer China a settlement on the basis of her own offer, or, as an alternative, international arbitration.

The policy of sterilizing and/or monopolizing Tibet is now out of date, and only plays into the hands of the Chinese. We shall have to throw the country open sooner or later, and it would be much better to do so now. It is immoral to continue a policy which has for its object the checking of all progress in Tibet, when the Tibetans themselves are waking up and looking to us for assistance in their development. Owing to the great advantages we enjoy through the geographical situation of Central Tibet, which looks out on India and turns its back on China, it can be guaranteed that we can safely throw Tibet open to all comers. We should be in a position to control all traffic with the country, and once the novelty of the thing had worn off none would want to go there but Indian traders and wool buyers.

It is therefore suggested that, if after a further lapse of time China shows no intention of carrying out her obligations to us, we should address a Note to the Chinese Government, expressing great regret that China is unable to conclude the negotiations on the basis of her own offer, and announcing that we have no option, in view of our commitments to the Tibetans, but to enter into closer relations with Tibet independently of China, send a representative to Lhasa, and proceed to offer the Tibetans any assistance they require in the economic development of their country; at the same time offering China the choice of resuming tripartite negotiations or of submitting the question to the League of Nations or American Arbitration. The



Note should be published with an explanation that Great Britain is only carrying out her commitments to Tibet in respect of the latter's autonomy, and has no intention whatsoever of interfering with or monopolising the country.

As regards submitting the matter to the League of Nations, if a British Dominion can join the League and sign the Arms Convention, while remaining a part of the British Empire, why should not Tibet do the same, without prejudice to Chinese suzerainty?

The example of Egypt is ever before the Chinese in connection with the Tibetan question i.e. the fiction of Turkish suzerainty maintained while we administered the country. We should therefore be prepared to give the most categorical assurances in this respect, and also to make various further face-saving concessions to China; such for instance as deleting from the Convention any reference to Tibetan representation in the Chinese Parliament one way or the other; the Chinese like to live in an atmosphere of make-believe with regard to Tibet, and to pretend that Mr. So-and-So is M.P. for Tibet: there is no harm in their doing so. We can absolutely trust the Tibetans to keep the Chinese at arms length, once we get off the fence and show that we are really prepared to assist them to develop their resources.

It seems incredible that action such as that suggested above, if properly carried out, not as an ultimatum to China, but merely as a logical development of our policy resulting from China's own breach of faith, would re-act unfavourably on British trade in China or on Anglo-Chinese relations.

As to its increasing our obligations to Tibet: we are already (though of course the public do not know it) very deeply committed to the Tibetans by the assurance given to them by the British Plenipotentiary in 1914, which amounted to a guarantee of their autonomy. We would now only be placing ourselves in a position to carry out our commitments. If the Chinese raid Lhasa now, we should either have to break faith with Tibet or declare war on China. But after a British representative has been installed at Lhasa, and the country developed and thrown open to foreign enterprise, the danger of Chinese aggression would be a thing of the past. We should never be called upon to send a single soldier into Tibet: for the Tibetans, with free access to India to get whatever they required, and their economic resources developed with our assistance, would easily stand on their own legs and have nothing to fear from China or anyone else.

Above all, once the Chinese say we meant business in Tibet, they

would in all probability come to terms without delay; with their position in Tibet growing steadily worse as our relations with the Tibetans grew closer, and with the disappearance of any chance of Tibet turning voluntarily from us to China, the chief reason for further procrastination on the part of the Chinese would disappear. If, on the other hand, China still refused a settlement, we could set our minds at rest and accept the situation until such time as she chose to come to terms. (We cannot comfortably do so now).

E. T.

(Eric Teichman)

Peking

February 29th, 1920

### *3. Memorandum by C. H. Bentinck on the question of arming the Tibetans<sup>1</sup>*

India Office,  
October 15, 1919.

The India Office are pressing us for an immediate decision on the question of arming the Tibetans.

As far back as last August the question was raised by the Government of India. The India Office were informed by the Foreign Office on the 23rd September that, as Tibet was not a party to the Arms Traffic Convention (signed the 10th September 1919), the supply of munitions to the Tibetan Government would be contrary to its provisions. The India Office asked reconsideration of the question, and pointed to the exceptional circumstances of the case, as the inability of the Peking Government to control the aggressive tendencies of local officials compelled Tibet to put herself in a state of defence. The India Office were informed on the 23rd October that the question had been submitted to an interdepartmental meeting on the Arms Convention, which had decided that such action 'would be most em-

<sup>1</sup>Encl. in F.O. to I.O., 6 July, 1920, in *IOR*, L/P&S/10/716.

phatically a violation of the convention'.

We were then told by Mr Wilton<sup>a</sup>, Consul-General in China, who has had special experience of questions affecting Tibet and is an authority on these matters, that there was no need to give the Tibetans arms, as there was no real danger of the Chinese attacking them.

India Office,  
March 12, 1920.

On the 12th March the India Office returned to the charge, declaring that some means must be found to enable the Tibetans to obtain arms to protect their frontiers against attack. They then suggested inviting Tibet to adhere to the Arms Convention, and declared that they were prepared to face the difficulties involved rather than acquiesce in what the Tibetans would regard as a betrayal by His Majesty's Government. It was pointed out in a minute that Tibet could not become a signatory, as she was not a sovereign and independent State. We had assented to various derogations from this strict principle to facilitate the supply of arms to countries adjacent to Bolshevik Russia on the plea that the arms were 'to combat the forces of disorder'. It was considered difficult to use this excuse in the case of Tibet, as the arms were for protection against China—one of the signatories.

India Office,  
March 22, 1920.

The Government of India and His Majesty's Minister at Peking have now come forward with a suggestion that, as Tibet has always been looked upon as autonomous, we should invite her to adhere to the Arms Convention in like manner as Canada is a party to it; that we should tell the Chinese openly what we propose to do, and invite them to come to a friendly settlement; that we send a Resident to Lhasa and open Tibet to trade, & c.

India Office,  
April 28, 1920.  
Peking telegram  
No. 232 of  
April 27, 1920.

India Office,  
April 28, 1920.

From the point of view of our treaty with Russia of 1907, we have no objection to sending an officer to Lhasa, but the British Politi-

To India Office,  
April 9, 1920.

India Office,  
May 11, 1920.

Peking telegram  
No. 240 of  
May 3, 1920.

Peking telegram  
No. 237 of  
April 28, 1920.

India Office,  
May 11, 1920.

India Office,  
May 10, 1920.

India Office,  
August 25, 1914.

Peking despatch  
No. 245 of  
June 26, 1914.

cal Officer in Sikkim, Mr. Bell, points out that it is useless to send one unless he can bring the Tibetan Government some assurance as regards ammunition to relieve their dangerous situation.

Meanwhile, Mr. King,<sup>a</sup> our agent on the Tibet-Szechuan frontier, considers a collision inevitable between the Chinese frontier commissioner and local Tibetan troops unless the commissioner can be restrained. Against this Mr. Alston refers to the categorical assurances from the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs that Chinese troops would not advance against the Tibetans. The Central Government have telegraphed to restrain the Frontier Commissioner. The authorities of Yunnan and Szechuan entertain no hostile designs upon Tibet. The Kansu Mission, whose anti-British influence we feared at Lhasa, has left the capital.

#### *For Arming*

1. The need of arming the Tibetans is said to be urgent by the Government of India and the India Office.

2. We told the Tibetans in 1914 that they might depend on the diplomatic support of His Majesty's Government and on reasonable assistance in the way of munitions of war in the event of continuation of aggression on the part of the Chinese.

3. We told the Chinese in 1914 that if the Tripartite Convention were not signed the Chinese would lose all privileges and advantages which the Tripartite Convention secured to them, including the recognition of their suzerainty and His Majesty's Government would render Tibet all possible assistance in resisting Chinese aggression.

4. Tibet is now said to be in danger of being overrun by frontier raids, over which the Cen-

India Office,  
April 28, 1920.

tral Government at Peking is apparently able to exercise but little control.

5. She has appealed to us for assistance, and the India Office and the Government of India feel that we should be betraying her if they were to turn a deaf ear to her appeals. They fear that in that event there will be a real danger of her losing faith in us and capitulating to China.

6. China has refused to sign the Convention, so that the contingency mentioned in (3) has arisen.

Minute on Peking  
telegram No. 222 of  
April 21, 1920.

7. Sir J. Jordan has urged that, if the Peking Government cannot assure the maintenance of order (they claim to be able to do so) on the frontier, we should then be justified in affording the necessary material assistance to the Tibetans to protect the frontier as outlined in the written offer made to us by the Chinese on the 30th May, 1919.

8. It might be urged that the arms were 'to control forces of disorder' over which the Chinese could exercise no control.

India Office,  
May 10, 1920.

9. It is considered desirable to have a Resident at Lhasa who could advise and exercise some control, but it is said that his presence would be useless unless he were able to promise material support.

### *Against Arming*

1. It has been clearly shown that to arm the Tibetans would be a breach of treaty.

2. It would be difficult to restrain the Tibetans within the limits of the 1919 frontier and keep them from aggressive action.

3. If we throw over the restrictions of the convention on the grounds of expediency, our example may be followed by other signatories. As has been pointed out, the French and Italians are not above selling arms to all and

sundry (e.g., France to Abyssinia) as long as they only make trouble for us, not for themselves.

4. It would be impossible to keep the matter dark. Japan would surely get to know of it and make a further excuse for propaganda against us in China. She would, besides, have a good excuse for breaking the agreement of May 1919 not to supply China with arms whilst things are in this unsettled condition. (She has already threatened to do so). She would no doubt gladly seize the occasion for further aggression in Manchuria and Shantung.

5. From our point of view, the most important consideration of all is that we should risk forfeiting the goodwill of China and throw her into the arms of Japan at this critical moment in the Far East. Capital would be made out of it as in 1917 and 1918, and a boycott of British goods on the lines of the boycott of Japanese goods might be one of the results.

There are great issues at stake, and the consequences may be far-reaching. It is a question whether, apart from the questions of right and wrong, we should be wise to take such very great risks.

India Office,  
May 10, 1920

Mr. Montagu's letter  
of May 12, 1920.

Minute on Peking  
telegram No. 232 of  
April 27, 1920.

### *Solutions*

1. The India Office do not entirely favour the solution suggested by Mr. Alston and the Government of India of Tibet joining the convention as Canada has done, nor do they see much use in deputing a British officer to Lhasa; in their opinion the question of immediate urgency being the supply of arms.

Sir J. Jordan does not favour the 'self-governing' solution. He thinks it unlikely that an intimation to China as suggested would bring her to terms. China would show deep

resentment, and we might expect a violent anti-British agitation which would react on our trade. The military party at Peking would receive the full sympathy and active support of the Japanese. We should accept a grave responsibility if we entered upon a new departure which would add to the existing confusion and set an example which Japan would not be slow to imitate. The analogy between Tibet and Canada did not appear likely to appeal to the Chinese.

The price appeared to be too high to pay for the doubtful advantage.

Packing telegram  
No. 232 of  
April 27, 1920.

2. At the end of his telegram No. 232 Mr. Alston says 'only alternative to adoption of some such forward policy . . . is to wait passively until Chinese come to terms of their own accord. In view of categorical assurances recently received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs I do not believe that there is any immediate danger of Chinese aggression'. Sir John fully believes that the Chinese will be ready later on to reopen the negotiations, but not until the Shantung question<sup>a</sup> has been settled.

3. Another solution already suggested and now revived by Mr. Alston would be to submit the matter to arbitration (? of the United States of America or League of Nations). We should have a strong case. Our suggesting such a thing would no doubt further strengthen our position and might prove attractive to China as a precedent for the settlement of the Shantung question with Japan and avoid the delay otherwise entailed if we had to await the settlement of the latter question.

India Office,  
May 10, 1920.

4. It has also been suggested that we should show the Chinese that we do not intend to wait passively for them to reopen negotiations, but that we should tell them that we intend to send a representative to Lhasa to look after

our interests pending re-opening of negotiations, and see what attitude they then assume. We should at the same time submit the question to arbitration and leave the question of arms to be developed later.

5. A further tentative suggestion is to see if we can make some attractive offer to the Chinese either to induce them to settle the question or not to make a fuss if we adopt the self-governing solution.

Foreign Office,  
May 13, 1920.

C.H.B.  
(C. H. Bentick)

#### *4. Minute by Lord Curzon<sup>1</sup>*

The question itself is not merely one of giving arms to Tibet for her protection against unprovoked attack, it involves a multitude of other issues, e.g., (1) the desirability of sending a representative to Lhasa, either temporarily or permanently, (2) the effect of such a step upon our treaty obligations and position, (3) the application of the Arms Convention, (4) the frontier situation as between Tibet and China, (5) our relations with China, (6) the attitude and policy of Japan. Upon all these subjects the most diverse views are expressed.

Broadly speaking the India Office and the Government of India are in favour of sending a representative to Lhasa (whether temporarily or permanently I am not quite clear), of authorizing him to offer arms to the Lhasa Government and generally of taking a strong line to safeguard the autonomy and territorial integrity of Tibet.

The Foreign Office are rather aghast at the apparent indifference to treaty obligations which this may be held to involve; they are disposed to think that the perils of the local situation have been exaggerated, and they do not want to raise the question in a form that might on the one hand alienate China and on the other give a handle to Japan.

Sooner than do this, arbitration (on the frontier issue) has been proposed.

<sup>1</sup>IOR, L/P&S/10/716.



The only way out of these difficulties is I think to have a conference at which they shall all be thrashed out; a sort of Far Eastern Committee. I am quite agreeable.

Something turns on the local situation. At an earlier date the India Office were rather afraid about this. They feared the activities of the Kansu mission at Lhasa, and the expected aggression of the Chinese frontier forces.

The Kansu Mission has retired, as it is thought, *re infecta*,<sup>a</sup> and the Chinese frontier troops are reported to be required for the internal situation in China, rather than for external advance.

To this extent the situation is alleviated.

On the other hand the negotiations with China re Tibet are indefinitely suspended, and are not likely for the moment to be resumed.

There are several possible solutions: (a) the bold India Office solution viz an envoy at Lhasa, arms, guns, and the like (for which the justification appears to be hardly sufficient), (b) the arbitration solution which I do not quite like—for I would sooner settle it ourselves, (c) some intermediary plan. If action of some sort be indispensable, I am rather favourably impressed with Sir J. Jordan's suggestion, which I understand to be this. Tell both the Chinese, and, if we like, the Tibetans, that if the Chinese attempt to cross the frontier as accepted<sup>1</sup> by them when they proposed to re-open the negotiations in 1918<sup>2</sup> we will arm the Tibetans to resist. Whether this policy could or could be mixed up with the question of a British representative at Lhasa I am not quite clear, nor can I find in these papers a discussion of the latter point either on its merits or on its compatibility with Treaty stipulations.

I would suggest that we send to the India Office a copy of the Foreign Office memorandum giving the history and the arguments, and of this Note from me, and that we invite them to a Conference at an early date, at which Sir J. Jordan should assist.

(Intlld) C. (Curzon)  
27/6/20.

<sup>1</sup>Offered.

<sup>2</sup>May, 1919.

## V

### Sir Charles Bell in Lhasa, 1920-1

#### *Final Report<sup>1</sup>: excerpts*

7. It appeared to me then that our good relationship with Tibet had suffered something of a set-back. Various signs indicated this, among these being the permission granted by the Tibetan Government to the Chinese Mission from Kansu to visit Lhasa, a course of action diametrically opposed to their previous, repeated refusals to have any direct dealings with China. The danger that this Mission might lead to an agreement between China and Tibet was not inconsiderable. Had it been effected, we should have been faced with unrest along the whole northern frontier of India, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and the Assam frontier tribes being especially affected.

8. The Kansu Mission arrived in Lhasa about the same time as I returned to the post of Political Officer in Sikkim<sup>a</sup>. A month or two later the Tibetan Government consulted me as to what reply they should give to this Mission, and accepted the answer which,—with the consent of the Government of India,—I suggested. Immediate danger was averted, but we still needed to strengthen the friendship and confidence of the Tibetan Government in us.

9. I pressed that,—in accordance with the previous promise of His Majesty's Government,—the import of ammunition to a reasonable extent should be again allowed. His Majesty's Government did not see their way to permit this. But in October 1920 I was instructed to visit Lhasa,—the Dalai Lama having often invited me to visit him there,—with a view to bringing about friendly relations as far as possible. Meanwhile the Chinese Mission had stayed three or four months in Lhasa. The Mongolian Governor of the Province of Ili was at Lhasa with the same object, when I arrived. And these and other Chinese agents were steadily drawing over to their side influential members of the National Assembly of Tibet.

20. Over and over again, the Dalai Lama, his Ministers and other officials kept saying that, if and when there were negotiations with

<sup>1</sup>Bell to India, 29 November, 1921 in *IOR*, L/P&S/10/718.

China, I must conduct them. Towards the end of our stay such remarks became increasingly frequent. At my farewell interview the Dalai Lama's last words to me were "I pray continually that you may return to Lhasa." When we left, he abandoned the seclusion that has always fenced off his sacred person from others to such an extent as to watch our departure from the roof of a neighbouring house. The longer we remained, the more freely did all communicate to us their thoughts and wishes on political and other matters. In this the great army of priests were not a whit behind their lay brethren. It was generally believed that in my last life (Buddhists, like Hindus, believe in transmigration) I was a Tibetan, who had prayed that he might be reborn in a powerful country so as to be able to benefit Tibet. The late Gan-den Ti Rimpoche, Regent of Tibet, made a similar prayer on his deathbed.

21. These signs of friendliness and these beliefs are a considerable asset to our country in its future dealings with Tibet. I do not think friendliness could possibly have been greater. The adverse influence of the Kansu Mission was more than counteracted.

24. In addition to the establishment of cordial relations with the Tibetan Government and Tibetan people, it appeared to me desirable to place our relations with Tibet on a firmer basis, so as to obviate future causes of misunderstanding. Accordingly,—when I had been three months in Lhasa and was thus able to test in the capital my previous fifteen years' experience of Tibetan politics,—I formulated proposals for our future policy towards Tibet. After full consideration, these were accepted in their entirety both by the Government of India and by His Majesty's Government. My suggestions in respect of subsequent proposals from His Majesty's Minister at Peking were similarly accepted. During the consideration of all these proposals I remained in Lhasa and, before leaving, communicated to the Dalai Lama the main outlines of this new policy

25. Putting it briefly, we agree as follows:

- (a) To let Tibet import through India a defined and reasonable quantity of mountain guns, machine guns, rifles and ammunition on their giving a written assurance that such will be used solely for self-defence and the maintenance of internal order.
- (b) To assist in the training of the Tibetan forces to a limited extent.

- (c) To give the technical aid necessary for constructing a telegraph line from Lhasa to Gyantse, so that thenceforth Lhasa will be in direct telegraph communication with India and the rest of the world.
- (d) To help further in the protection and development of Tibet, such help being probably directed in the main towards the manufacture of munitions, the development of the mineral resources of Tibet, and the opening of a school in Lhasa or Gyantse.
- (e) To despatch a British officer temporarily to Lhasa, whenever the British and Tibetan Governments desire this.
- (f) My suggestion agreeing in part with one from our Minister at Peking, that an advance should be made in throwing open Tibet, as far as Gyantse, to British and other foreign visitors, is under the consideration of Government.

26. There is no question of monetary help in the above; such has neither been asked for nor promised. And, in thus strengthening herself, Tibet will add very greatly to the protection of the long northern frontier of India, a distance of nearly two thousand miles, from foreign pressure.

*Summary of results obtained by the Mission*

27 (a). The confidence of the Tibetan Government in us has been thoroughly restored. The friendship they feel towards us is probably greater than ever before.

(b) The policy, which I proposed for regulating our future relations with Tibet, has been accepted in its entirety. The probability of China negotiating a tripartite Treaty with Britain and Tibet has been increased. In fine, one may perhaps say without exaggeration that the Tibetan question has been settled as far as it can be settled at present. This settlement should last for several years and promote very greatly our own interests as well as the interests of Tibet, and further,—in the truest sense,—the ultimate interests of China.

28. Among other indications of the good effects of our Mission, I may note articles in the Japanese and Manchurian Press. A Japanese paper writes recently, "The prestige of England in Tibet at the present time is rapidly growing and the Tibetan question is being decided more and more in favour of England". The political arrangement now concluded marks a new step in the relations between Britain and Tibet.

# VI

## Colonel Bailey in Lhasa 1924

*Report, 28 October, 1924<sup>1</sup>: excerpts*

### 1. *Tashi Lama*

I consider that as regards the former<sup>a</sup> they are unduly perturbed. I do not think that in the present state of China, the Lama will long be welcome there; at the same time the people of Tibet are getting used to his absence; but any calamity which may occur in Tibet will be put down to his absence, and it would be a very good thing if he could be persuaded to return. I had several discussions separately with the Dalai Lama and the Prime Minister on the subject. They claimed that the Tashi Lama was originally of small importance and was given his rank, power and land by a former Dalai Lama (this is of course open to dispute). For his maintenance the Tashi Lama was given the districts of Kamba Dzong, Lhatse and Penzoling, all in the province of Tsang, and also a district of Cho-ko Gye, north of the Tsangpo, in Takpo. He also receives revenues of many small estates in different parts of the country. The arrangement has always been that he pays one quarter of the Tibetan Government's expenses in time of war; in time of peace he pays nothing. In the same way the large and powerful monasteries of Sera, Drepung and Ganden also pay a proportion of war expenses to the Central Government. At the time of the war with the Sikhs in Ladak, and in two wars with Nepal, the Tashi Lama of that day paid up his share. In this more recent fighting with the Chinese the large monasteries paid their shares, but the Tashi Lama repeatedly asked for more time in which to make the payments. The Dalai Lama always agreed until the Tashi Lama became 8 years in arrears. Being unable to pay the large accumulation of arrears he has "taken bad advice" and left the country.

2. I do not think that the Tashi Lama will trust to promises made by the Lhasa authorities and, if steps are taken to persuade him to return, I think that the terms of his return should be guaranteed by the Tibetan Government to the Government of India. The Tibetan Government would not be likely to try to get behind such a guarantee

<sup>1</sup>IOR, L/P&S/10/1113.

and the Tashi Lama would trust to it. I do not think he will trust any promises made direct to him by Lhasa, and I think that if the Government of India would consent to act to this extent as an intermediary, there would be a better prospect of the Tashi Lama's returning, and of removing a means of Chinese and Bolshevik intrigue in Tibet. This suggestion of mine was not discussed or even mentioned to the Tibetan Government. On his departure the Tibetan Government sent troops under the command of Rupon Tsoko, 27 days journey to the north in pursuit but they failed to overtake him. These troops suffered great hardships and were obliged to live on the meat of their baggage yaks and many of their ponies died.

## II. *Finance*

3. I had a long discussion with the 4 Shapes shortly before I left Lhasa. From discussing the military situation on the Chinese frontier we were led to the question of finance. They said that what was urgently wanted was relief from the present unbearable expenditure, which had been met by special taxation much to the discontent of the people. I said that it seemed to me that they were very wasteful in the way in which they collected their revenue. No one knew what the revenue of the country was. In Sikkim with a population of under 90,000 33 lakhs of revenue were collected. The population of Tibet must be 20 times that of Sikkim, and admitting that much of the land was poor they ought to be able to collect say 50 lakhs. They said that if they got a quarter of that their troubles would be over. I said that without increasing taxation, but by reforming the methods of collection, they ought to be able to overcome many of their difficulties, but such reforms would require education and experience among their officers. They said that they wished to levy export and import duties on goods, and I reminded them that that would be contrary to the treaties with us, and they said that they proposed to write about this. I suggested that they might make money by taxing liquor of which a great deal was drunk in the country.

## III. *Military*

4. On 8th August the 4 Shapes discussed with me among other things the military situation on the Chinese frontier. Tibet, they said, was a poor country but very religious, and they were accustomed to spend large sums on their religion, and were finding it very difficult to maintain a large army on the Chinese frontier. The soldiers them-

selves also wanted to go back to their homes. Could the Chinese be persuaded to come to an agreement? I said that the Government of India had done their best in this matter but China was so disunited that no agreement could be arrived at. It was unlikely that any treaty signed in Peking would be recognised by the provinces; and the Chinese Government at Peking would not sign a treaty which they knew they had no power to enforce on their subjects in the provinces. They then suggested that they should make a treaty with Ssechuan direct. I said that, apart from the improbability of Ssechuan agreeing to anything that would satisfy the Tibetans, the same thing held good, a treaty made by Ssechuan could easily be repudiated by the Peking Government. They said that it was hard for them to keep the Teichman line, knowing full well that the moment the Chinese had composed their differences and were united, they would cross the line and attack them. I reminded them that the munitions were obtained from the Government of India on condition that they did not attack the Chinese. I said that I did not see any prospect of the Chinese composing their differences for years, and that in the meantime they should organise themselves for defence and in particular make their Government popular on the eastern frontier so that the inhabitants would prefer Tibetan to Chinese rule which I understood was not universally the case now. If the Chinese saw that they were organised, determined and united they would be more likely to come to terms. In the event of a successful repulse of a Chinese advance they should restrain themselves and not try and push on into China, but take up a reasonable frontier, easy to hold and inhabited by Tibetans anxious to be under the Government at Lhasa, and above all take the advice of the Government of India in this matter. This was only way to establish permanent peace. If their demands were moderate they would have the sympathy of the world. They asked me whether I could inform them of any Chinese advance from Tachienlu. If I did that they would in the interests of economy reduce the number of men on the frontier to 1,500 and hurry up reinforcements as soon as they heard of a Chinese advance. I said I would do my best to give them warning of any serious advance of Chinese troops in force from Tachienlu.

#### IV. *Police*

5. Sardar Bahadur Laden La<sup>a</sup> has organised a very creditable police force for Lhasa city. The men are smart and dressed in thick khaki

serge in winter, and blue with yellow piping in summer. They are stationed in different parts of the city. The fact of their presence has reduced crime in the city considerably and the inhabitants appreciate this. Some of the officials complain of the expense and the Dalai Lama told me that the police were apt to interfere with the duties of the magistrates in Lhasa. These reforms he said must be brought in very gradually. I gave Mr. Laden La a hint about this.

### V. School

6. So far very little has been done. The work on the school building only commenced on 17th October; very little can be done this year before winter frosts set in. The Prime Minister told me that they were having great difficulty with the parents of the boys, who argued that English to the exclusion of Tibetan education would be useless to boys who had to live and work in Tibet. I said that there was no question of excluding Tibetan education. Tibetan and the other subjects could be taught together, but that at present Mr. Ludlow was teaching the boys English, mathematics, geography and in fact everything but Tibetan, for four hours a day, and after this the Tibetan master took them for four or five hours a day in Tibetan alone; no boys could work so many hours a day. He eventually agreed to cut down the Tibetan to 3 hours a day. I said that I thought the objections of the parents might to some extent be overcome if the Tibetan Government would give good appointments, pay and rank to boys who had received a good education. I did not think that the boys who had been educated in England were sufficiently encouraged in these respects.

7. The Prime Minister also said that they were having difficulty in finding the money for the school. That, he said, was the reason in the delay in constructing the buildings. I showed him a newspaper cutting in which it was stated that Great Britain spent annually £74,720,000 amounting to Rs. 1,12,08,00,000 on education but such colossal figures conveyed nothing to him. The Prime Minister told me that the plans of the school prepared by Mr. Ludlow had not been sanctioned as the building was too large. In further conversation it transpired that they only wished to have 25 boys in the school, whereas, according to the first intention of the Tibetan Government the school had been designed for 100 and for some boarders. I telegraphed to Mr. Ludlow about this and before I left Lhasa I was able to show the Kasha a plan of a much less costly building for 30 day boys, of



which they approved.

#### VI. *Dr. McGovern*

8. I also spoke to the Telegraph Master, a Sikkimese lent by the Government of India. He told me that Dr. McGovern lived with him in his house during the whole of his stay in Lhasa. He said that no stones were ever thrown at the building. Dr. McGovern never saw the Dalai Lama or any one of importance except the Tsarong Shape. During the time when the monks were in charge in Lhasa he was advised by the city magistrates to keep indoors.

From the above enquiries I am forced to the conclusion that Dr. McGovern was ignored by the Tibetans, and that his account of his stay in Lhasa bears but little relation to the truth; and that his object in writing as he did was to obtain money by a sensational story.

#### VII. *General*

9. The Tibetan system of Government makes it very difficult to get things done. No one feels capable of taking any responsibility. Things of importance are referred to the Kasha—the cabinet of four Shapes—who have to submit a joint report to the Prime Minister. There may be interminable delays in this as, in the first place, it may be difficult to get the four Shapes together at all—when this has been accomplished they may not agree, or may put matters off for the collection of further information or for some such reason and it may take several days for all four Shapes to make it convenient to meet again. Then the Prime Minister may refer the matter back to the Kasha causing more similar delays. Finally when the Prime Minister has consented to submit a case to the Dalai Lama, His Holiness who is very busy with religious ceremonies may keep it a long time before giving a decision, or may refer it back to the Prime Minister and Kasha where it may again get caught up with further delays of the same kind. During the new year practically no work of any kind is done for a month and at other times important religious ceremonies at which all officials have to be present prevent any work being done for several days. All high officials have to go periodically and drink tea at the Dalai Lama's residence though they do not actually see His Holiness. All monk officials have to do this every day.

# VII

## Tibet, 1929

### 1. *Invitation to Weir<sup>a</sup>: Lhasa's viewpoint<sup>1</sup>*

Kindly consult my telegram No. 44-P/29 of the 11th instant.

Norbu Dhondup<sup>a</sup> is not finding it easy task to obtain invitation required.

He telegraphs today that Lonchen (Prime Minister) has sent him letter in which owing to uncertainty as to Chinese movements in Northern Tibet he requests me to postpone visit to Lhasa. Norbu Dhondup adds that he expects similar letters from Dalai Lama and from Tibetan Government.

He intends to ask them to reconsider their decision in view of our possible withdrawal of sanction to proposed customs tariff unless personal discussion can be arranged. A further reason is importance to Tibetan Government of their maintaining friendly relations with us.

Although rumoured lately from Lhasa that Chinese troops have arrived at or near Jyekundo I have heard no news so far of Chinese movements in Northern (gr.<sup>b</sup> omitted. Tibet?).

### 2. *Invitation to Weir: New Delhi's reaction<sup>2</sup>*

Reference your telegram of 19th instant. As soon as you receive Prime Minister's letter please post a copy with careful analysis of its wording and inner meaning. Attitude of Tibetan Government is disappointing but it seems not impossible that it is based on a genuine misapprehension. Norbu should therefore be more careful in the language he employs. Need for telegraphic compression has presumably given statement of his intended language in a more brusque form than he meant. He should avoid any language suggestive of the possibility of diminution of our friendly relations with Tibet or any other threat. Thus instead of talking about possibility of withdrawal of our sanction to tariff he should merely point out unfortunate loss to Tibetan revenues involved if necessary personal discussion of preliminary details is postponed.

<sup>1</sup>Weir to India, 19 July, 1929, in *IOR*, L/P&S/10/1113.

<sup>2</sup>India to Weir, 20 July, 1929, in *IOR*, L/P&S/10/1113.

# VIII

## Tibet, 1930

### *1. Instructions for Weir's visit to Lhasa, 1930*

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India<sup>1</sup>

In Cabinet Paper 118 (30) of 5th April, I circulated for the information of my colleagues a statement of the satisfactory solution of the difficulties which had arisen towards the end of last year between Nepal and Tibet. The Government of India subsequently received an invitation from the Dalai Lama to despatch a British representative to Lhasa for purposes of general discussion. After consultation with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I approved this proposal, and Colonel Weir, the Political Officer in Sikkim, is now on his way to Lhasa, which he is expected to reach on or about the 4th August.

2. After sanction had been given for Colonel Weir's visit, the Government of India asked for instructions as to the line to be taken by him should the Dalai Lama wish to discuss the question of the resumption of negotiations with China regarding Tibetan affairs. The position as regards this is that we have for many years been anxious to reach, in agreement with Tibet and China, a final settlement of relations between those two countries, and particularly as regards the Sino-Tibetan frontier. The general basis on which we have proceeded has been that Tibet should be recognised as an autonomous state under Chinese suzerainty. Negotiations, which were resumed in 1919 on the basis of a Chinese offer which appeared to afford a satisfactory prospect of settlement, broke down in 1921, and have not since been resumed, mainly for extraneous reasons.

3. The Government of India consider (and their view is accepted by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and myself) that no useful purpose is likely to be served at the present moment by endeavouring to revive the negotiations. (The principal difficulty is the absence of a strong Central Government and the fact that the Chinese Government are preoccupied by internal conditions). They indicate, however, that if we feel bound to advise the Tibetan Government to postpone the reopening of negotiations until there is greater prospect of their fortunate outcome, the Tibetans may counter with a request

<sup>1</sup>Cabinet Paper 280(30), July 1930, in *IOR, L/P&S/10/718*.

for facilities to obtain the material assistance necessary to maintain their present position in certain districts on the Chinese frontier the position of which is in dispute between China and Tibet, and the future of which can be decided only in formal negotiations. The Government of India remark: "In the event of our refusal, Tibet, we think, would be able to obtain what she wanted from other sources to our serious disadvantage, and subject, therefore, to your approbation we must, we consider, be prepared to meet reasonable requests for material, especially munitions, beyond the limits to which we are already engaged. Supplies would of course be on payment and subject to the same conditions as before." The "same conditions as before" were that "the Tibetan Government gives an assurance in writing that *such munitions will be used solely for self-defence and for internal police work*".

4. After discussion, and in agreement with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I propose, subject to the approval of my colleagues, to approve the Government of India's recommendation, but to couple my approval with an intimation that it remains the policy of His Majesty's Government to reach a friendly settlement between China and Tibet as soon as conditions make this possible; that it is most important that our representative should make this clear if the Dalai Lama raises the question, and that nothing should be said or done by our representative to justify any suggestion that Tibet is being supplied with arms to establish her position against her suzerain, or to expose us to criticism on grounds of international equity, and that facilities for the purchase of the supplies desired and the maintenance of the present position on the Chinese-Tibetan frontier should not be in any way linked.

5. In submitting this recommendation to my colleagues, I would emphasise (and my views are accepted by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) that His Majesty's Government have not only incurred certain general obligations towards Tibet in the matter of her relations with China, but that it is definitely to their interest that the present territorial *status quo* on the Sino-Tibetan frontier should be maintained until such time as a formal settlement of the frontier can be reached. In these circumstances, and having regard to the undertakings to be required from the Tibetans as to the use to be made of the arms in question, I have no hesitation in recommending the present proposal. I would only add that, while it is impossible at this stage to form any idea of the scale of a possible Tibetan demand, it is,

in my judgment, likely to be relatively exceedingly small. The Tibetan Government have not yet exhausted certain limited facilities for the purchase of arms granted them in 1921 by His Majesty's Government;<sup>a</sup> their country is a poor one, and the extent to which they are likely to want or be able to pay for supplies (and supplies are to be granted only on payment) will probably be very limited indeed.

W.B.

(Wedgwood Benn)

28th July 1930

## 2. *Weir in Lhasa, 1930*

Excerpts from report<sup>1</sup>

10. The following matters of a more secret nature were discussed with His Holiness alone:

- (a) *Return of the Tashi Lama.* Full reports of conversation on this subject have been made in my telegrams No. 12(3)-P./30, dated the 13th and 28th September. I am of opinion that the Dalai Lama will again open negotiations with the Tashi Lama to induce him to return to Tibet.
- (b) *Recent Russian emissary to Lhasa.* Vide my telegram No. 12(3)-P/30 of 13th September (second part).
- (c) *Resumption of negotiations with China.* The views of His Holiness have been given in my telegram 12(3)-P./30 of 2nd October. It will be observed that his views coincide with those of His Majesty's Government. He does not think the time is yet ripe for resumption or modification of the Tripartite Convention of 1914. I assured His Holiness that when the auspicious time comes, he might rely on the good offices and friendship of His Majesty's Government and the Government of India.
- (d) *Construction of new workshops and hydro-electric scheme.* During my first interview with the Dalai Lama, he mentioned these schemes. I expressed my readiness to put him in touch with firms who might undertake such work. I, however, pointed out to him the present difficulties of Tibetan finances and I said that I could undertake no responsibility in the matter.

<sup>1</sup>Weir to India, 18 November, 1930, in *IOR, L/P&S/10/1113*.

Since my return to Gangtok I have received a communication asking for estimates for certain machinery required. This has been passed on to the firm concerned.

11. *Chinese Emissary in Lhasa.* No suitable opportunity occurred for me to question the Dalai Lama regarding the recent visit of Yangong Dzasa<sup>e</sup> to Lhasa and the results achieved by him. Such a query, however diplomatically put, would only have roused suspicion and have diminished our friendly relations. It was not a question I could have asked any Tibetan official, and the subject was therefore not broached.

12. *Interest in Chinese politics.* There is without doubt a strong undercurrent of feeling among several officials that Tibet will not be able to retain her independence of China indefinitely and that steps should soon be taken to make friendly overtures to China. If such overtures are made, they anticipate that a semi-independence at least will be achieved for Tibet which would be preferable to complete absorption by China. The kaleidoscopic changes in the Chinese political situation are watched with interest and I was asked on several occasions for the latest news.

13. *Russian influence in Lhasa.* An interesting account was given to me of the non-success which attended the Bolshevik Mission to Lhasa in 1927. It appears that when the Dalai Lama fled to Urga in 1904 (rather than meet the Younghusband Mission), he met with high Russian officials to whom he gave a paper agreeing to accept a Russian representative permanently in Lhasa. In return he received various valuable presents. The leader of the Bolshevik Mission in 1927 brought this paper to the Dalai Lama and asked him to fulfil his previous promise. The Dalai Lama retained the paper which he said had been given to the Czarist Government now non-existent. The promise therefore was no longer binding on him and if the Bolshevik leader chose to take back the presents they were ready for him with the seals unbroken. The Bolshevik leader was non-plussed but took back the presents with him to Soviet Mongolia where he reported to his superiors his lack of success. He was promptly shot for his diplomatic blunders.

My informant is a Mongolian monk of the Drepung Monastery. He received the story at first-hand from a Russian speaking Mongolian Monk—a fellow inmate of Drepung Monastery—who acted as interpreter between the Dalai Lama and the Bolshevik Mission.

The recent Russian Emissary in Lhasa is alleged to be a Buriat

holding high military rank, who was despatched from Soviet Mongolia to investigate the situation in Tibet and to explore the possibilities of using motor transport for invasion from the north.

I could discover in Lhasa no signs of sympathy with Bolshevism and its tenets. Danger of an outbreak of Bolshevism is, I think, remote and need not at present be feared.

20. The Dalai Lama invited us to witness the annual theatrical entertainment given in his Norbu Lingka palace gardens. We were accommodated in a tent on his right, the Prime Minister having his tents on the left of the Dalai Lama's pavilion. The performance on both days lasted from 9 A.M. till 5 P.M. and refreshments were provided for us. His Holiness gladly acceded to my request that my wife, Lieut. Sinclair and I might see the famous gardens round his private residence in Chensa Lingka. We were shown round on two occasions by his favourite, Kusho Kumpe La, a youth of inexhaustible energy and natural acumen who would come to the fore in any country.

My interviews with His Holiness have been fully reported in previous telegrams. He usually received me in his private rooms at Chensa Lingka where he could cast aside formality. Our intercourse was marked with the utmost frankness. On several occasions he begged me to prolong my interview and he seemed to appreciate my frank unbiassed opinion on the many subjects under discussion. Such frankness is presumably denied him by his own Ministers who are fearful of their position. His spontaneous remarks on the subjects of the Tashi Lama and the eventual ratification of the Tripartite Convention with China would not have been made if he had not regained the utmost confidence in the friendship of the Government of India.

23. *Shigatse.* At Shigatse we were met by the DZONGPONS and the representative of Dzasa Lama Lobzang Rinchen, who has been appointed by the Tibetan Government to hold charge of Tashi Lhumpo Monastery during the absence of the Tashi Lama.

Accommodation was provided in the summer residence of the Kung—the nephew of the Tashi Lama. The house had been shut up since the imprisonment of the Kung in Lhasa in 1928. It was in bad repair but no better quarters were available. The Dzungpons and the representative of the Dzasa called shortly after my arrival with the usual gifts of grain, butter, eggs and dried carcasses of sheep. They were followed by the representative of the Nepalese Government and

the leading Mohammedan traders.

The next day we visited the Dzasa. He lives in the building formerly occupied by the Tashi Lama. His rank as senior Dzasa in Tibet places him high in Tibetan official circles. He is therefore anxious to return to Lhasa but bound by his duty to stay in Shigatse. He is a courteous old gentleman, popular with the people of Shigatse, and with the monks of Tashi Lhumpo. I expressed my pleasure at being enabled to meet him and to visit Shigatse, the second city of Tibet, and the famous monastery of Tashi-Lhumpo. He thanked me and told me he heard from Lhasa of our friendliness towards the Tibetans. He had also heard that our visit to Lhasa had been much appreciated by all classes.

We were then shown over the Tashi Lhumpo Monastery by the senior abbot. The greatest friendliness was apparent on all sides.

We also visited the bazaar which is held every day from 9 a.m. till noon in a large open space to the south of the Dzong where booths are erected.

No Political Officer has been seen in Shigatse since Sir Charles Bell's visit to the Tashi Lama in 1908.<sup>a</sup> No English lady has ever been there before. We were, as in Lhasa, the centre of a large and curious but friendly crowd who followed us wherever we went. Business in the bazaar did not seem brisk and the world wide depression in trade was obvious even here. Few articles of value were seen and much of the trade is done by barter. No work was being done in the village of Tashi Kentsa close to Shigatse which is famous for its metal work in copper, silver and gold.

After the activity of Lhasa, Shigatse appeared dead. An air of apathy hung over it. As is only natural, the inhabitants sullenly resent the sterner rule of the Central Government and are longing for the return of the Tashi Lama to his home.



# IX

## British Mediation in Tibet

### *1. Tripartite basis vanishes, 1932-7*

*Minute of meeting with Mr. Hsu Mo at Waichiaopu  
on 31 August, 1932<sup>1</sup>*

In accordance with Peking telegram No. 413, I saw Hsu Mo at the Waichiaopu on the morning of the 31st August, on the subject of the Sino-Tibetan issue. I opened the conversation by saying that, a few weeks previously, verbal representations had been made to me by a member of the European Department of the Waichiaopu to the effect that reports had reached the Chinese Government that the Government of India had been approached by the Tibetan authorities for supplies of arms. The official had expressed the hope to me that the Government of India would not accede to the request. Hsu Mo nodded assent. I then proceeded to explain to him that the arms which were at present being supplied to the Tibetan Government represented a portion of a consignment which had been promised to the latter in 1921, to be used only for internal defence and police purposes. I added that the Government of India would, of course, not supply further arms unless they were satisfied that the Tibetan Government were carrying out the conditions laid down for the employment of such arms. Hsu Mo replied that, although in theory the Government of India might have a strong case for supplying arms on these conditions to the Tibetan Government, being without any means of control they had no real guarantee that the arms would not be used for purposes other than internal defence and police work. Hsu Mo presumed that the Government of India were under no contractual or legal obligation to complete the 1921 supply of arms if it were discovered that the Tibetan authorities were employing them for purposes other than those agreed upon. He then informed me that information had reached the Chinese Government that some of the arms now being used by the Tibetan forces in the present hostilities with the Chinese on the Tibetan-Szechuan border were of British

<sup>1</sup>Encl. in Ingram (British Charge d'Affaires, Nanking) to Simon (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), 24 September, 1932, in *IOR, L/P&S/12/577*.

manufacture, although, of course, he was unable to adduce specific evidence that such arms formed part of the 1921 consignment supplied by the Government of India.

I then broached as discreetly as possible the question of the present hostilities between the Chinese and Tibetan forces. I pointed out that both His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of India were animated by the most friendly desire to do anything in their power to arrange an armistice and thus prevent the continuation of further fighting, and that they were quite willing to place their good offices at the disposal of both sides in whatever way might seem most effective to obtain that end. I added that the Government of India in particular, who were closely affected by events in Tibet, and were, further most desirous for peace, would through their competent officials, be prepared to do all they could at their end with the Tibetan authorities to secure the cessation of hostilities. I referred to the various occasions in the past in which His Majesty's Government and the Government of India had been of assistance to the Chinese Government in the question of the Sino-Tibetan frontier fighting, and emphasised the fact that the latter could rely on them both on this occasion to place their good offices at the disposal of both parties to prevent further bloodshed. Hsu Mo expressed appreciation at our offer of goodwill, but pointed out that, as Tibet was a part of China, there was really no question of a frontier. I suggested tactfully that possibly an administrative frontier might be required. He assented. He then stated that the best way that His Majesty's Government and the Government of India could assist in the dispute would be by refraining from supplying the Tibetan forces with further arms. In this way Tibet would speedily give up the struggle, and fighting would automatically cease.

As my representations had met with such cold response, and I was most anxious not to get drawn into any controversial matter, I then concluded the interview by expressing the hope to Hsu Mo that, in due course, he might think fit to talk the matter over with Dr Lo Wen-kan. He replied that he thought the matter too delicate a one to broach with the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Hsu Mo had no information regarding the details or purposes of the campaign, but said that the operations had the full support of the Central Government.

## 2. *India Office view*<sup>1</sup>

In the meantime Sir Samuel Hoare agrees with the Government of India that, in view of the Dalai Lama's appeal for the intervention of His Majesty's Government and the possibility of a Chinese advance on Chamdo, it is undesirable to refrain from further representations to the Chinese Government, and, since the question of the further advance by the Chinese troops is reported from Chungking to have been referred by Liu Wen Hui<sup>a</sup> to the Central Government, it would appear desirable to make further representations as soon as possible. If such representations are made at once they may weigh with the Chinese Government in considering the question of the further advance, which it seems desirable if possible, to forestall. For it appears to Sir Samuel Hoare that, if such an advance did occur, the question of taking further diplomatic action at Nanking, and even of providing further assistance in munitions to the Tibetan Government, would arise.

He would therefore suggest, for Sir John Simon's<sup>b</sup> consideration, that a stage has now been reached at which it is no longer possible or desirable to keep the question of the British interest in Tibet out of the discussion with the Chinese Government. The extent of our interest in Tibet, as is made clear in the Simla Convention of 1914, is the maintenance of the integrity and autonomy of Outer Tibet (that is, Tibet proper) and of an effective Tibetan Government, able to maintain peace and order in the neighbourhood of the frontiers of India and the adjoining States and free from the influence of any foreign power (excluding China from that term). This country is also under a certain degree of obligation to Tibet in the matter, in view of the fact that the Simla Convention is binding between the Governments of the two countries and it also has other treaty rights in Tibet resulting from previous instruments including the Convention between Great Britain and China of 1906 which confirmed the Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 1904. Sir Samuel Hoare would accordingly suggest that His Majesty's Representative, Peking, might be instructed, subject to any observations which he may have to offer, that it should now be made clear to the Chinese Government that we are interested in securing for Tibet a reasonable settlement of the present dispute; that they should be reminded of the

<sup>1</sup>I.O. to F.O., 21 September, 1932 in *IOR*, L/P&S/12/578.

nature of the British interest in Tibet, of the past offers of His Majesty's Government to mediate in the boundary dispute and of the communication addressed to the Chinese Government on 26th August 1921; and should be given to understand, in such language as may appear most suitable, that if China should challenge the autonomy of Outer Tibet, or appear to threaten the integrity of the country by an advance on Chamdo or otherwise, His Majesty's Government would be bound to take a most serious view of the matter.

### 3. *Chinese viewpoint*<sup>1</sup>

At an interview on the 25th October with Mr. Ingram, Dr. Lo reverted to the subject of Tibet. He said that he had seen General Chiang Kai-shek at Hankow and had had a long discussion with him. General Chiang had given strict orders that there was to be no more fighting on the frontier, and he, Dr. Lo, felt confident that these orders would be obeyed.

With regard to the question of the Dalai Lama's representatives, the difficulty was that there was constant trouble between the Panchan Lama and the Dalai Lama, but he would try and arrange for the Dalai Lama's representatives to be accepted and received in Nanking.

Mr Ingram enquired about the suggestion for an armistice, but Dr. Lo would not discuss the point. He said it would be better not to raise that question at all. The best thing was that they should put a stop to the fighting first, and when they had secured peace they would try and get things settled in such a way that there would be no further anxiety to the Indian Government. Mr. Ingram enquired what steps the Chinese Government proposed to take to this end, and, Dr. Lo replied that it was really very complicated, but as soon as he got a chance he would get all the people interested together and talk over the matter. Mr. Ingram reminded Dr. Lo that the British Government were ready at any time to assist in securing a

<sup>1</sup>Minute of Interview respecting Tibet, 25 October, 1932, Encl. in Ingram to Simon, 26 October, 1932, in *IOR, L/P&S/12/578*.

settlement, and he assured him that British help might be of very considerable assistance, as they had direct access to, and influence with, the Tibetan Government, and he reminded Dr. Lo that they were not disinterested spectators. Dr. Lo replied that, with regard to this last point, he had been referring to his papers and found that there was a great deal to be said on the Chinese side with regard to the position taken up by the British Government that the Chinese Government were bound by the terms of the Simla Convention except in so far as the frontier was concerned. This was, however, a question which could be argued indefinitely, and he was not anxious to raise it now. He did want to say, however, that any suggestion of British intervention might provoke serious repercussions in China. The Japanese were again making much play about British intervention in Tibet, and the Chinese press were making a fuss about it and becoming suspicious. Mr. Ingram said that this was the old game which the Japanese had played in 1919 and showed that there was all the more reason for getting the loose ends of the Tibetan situation tidied up and the position regularized to the satisfaction of all parties. The essence of the British suggestion was not intervention, but assistance in bringing two of the sides together and aiding them to compose their difficulties. Dr. Lo said he quite understood that himself, but it was difficult to explain it to the people, who were liable to be carried away by any suggestion of interference in Chinese affairs, and particularly now with the picture of Manchuria before them. He repeated that he and General Chiang had talked over the matter very seriously and that General Chiang was considering what could be done. He asked Mr. Ingram to explain to the Indian Government the present difficulties with which the Chinese Government was faced. Mr. Ingram said it was a pity the Chinese would not consider the question of an armistice along the lines which had been proposed and he hoped that the chance of reaching a final solution of the problem would not be lost sight of. Dr. Lo said that he was determined to deal with the matter during his tenure of office and that the Chinese Government were going, as soon as the fighting had come to a stop, to send one of their most important men—a man of the highest rank—to the frontier to try and settle the frontier question once and for all. Mr. Ingram replied that, so far as the Indian Government were concerned, he was sure they would be most gratified to hear that the matter was being taken up seriously. Dr. Lo indicated that he might be in a position to resume

discussions on the subject on Mr. Ingram's return to Nanking in the middle of November.

October 25, 1932

A. D. Blackburn

#### 4. *Chinese overtures; Lhasa's reaction*<sup>1</sup>

Received following telegram from our representative<sup>2</sup> at Nanking dated 4th January (1933). Begins:—

Have received a telegram from Chiang through Ministry of the interior to be transmitted to Your Holiness stating that he could not<sup>3</sup> received recent telegram from Your Holiness and the National Assembly to which replies had already been sent aaa China and Tibet had been united together for centuries like belonging to the same family and, China being now a Republic, there is every opportunity of free discussion of all matter between ourselves so that in his (i.e. Chiang's) opinion it is most inappropriate to place another person of different nationality<sup>4</sup> as intermediary as done heretofore aaa He maintains that this view is shared by Your Holiness and friendly relation continues to exist aaa He had ordered Kham and Kokonor authorities to desist attacking Tibet aaa With reference to Your Holiness previous request for a high official to be despatched to Tibet, they propose sending some accompanied by one of the Tibetan representatives in China, bearing friendly messages and to arrive at a permanent settlement in Sino-Tibetan question aaa As the Kham and Tibet question can be settled by ease when friendly relations are established, they (i.e. Chiang) had in the first place asked Tibetan representative<sup>5</sup> to refer this question of sending a representative to Your Holiness aaa As Your Holiness is ruler over the territories on the western frontier he (i.e. Chiang) is certain that Your Holiness will be able to ward off foreign enemies and the country enjoys peace and prosperity aaa He asks Your Holiness to explain to the people of Tibet the views of and attitude adopted

<sup>1</sup>Excerpts from Dalai Lama to Williamson, 8 January, 1933 in *IOR*, L/P&S/12/578.

<sup>2</sup>Dalai Lama's.

<sup>3</sup>presumably mistake for 'had received'.

<sup>4</sup>i.e. British.

<sup>5</sup>i.e. one of Dalai Lama's representatives in China.

by the Chinese Government and in a friendly spirit towards China inform the outsiders<sup>1</sup> that we do not require an intermediary aaa We will discuss all matter between ourselves by degrees aaa He (Chiang) requests for reply to above aaa Although we<sup>2</sup> have done our utmost to explain that in order to maintain permanent friendly relations it is beneficial to conclude Simla Treaty with British Government as an intermediary power there is no likelihood of their agreeing to same, so would like to know whether any reply had been received from British Government, intimating willingness to exert their influence on our behalf, to the letter sent from National Assembly aaa Failing amicable settlement Chinese Government propose to send Liuwenhui to Kham, who having been defeated in recent civil war is unable to remain in Szechuan aaa Mafuhsiung's son Malcolm and over 20,000 troops have been despatched to Kansu and Nyisha<sup>a</sup> which we suspect is in readiness in case of necessity to attack us aaa Therefore as I am not aware whether British Government would earnestly be ready to exert their influence on our behalf whatever course we may be obliged to adopt, so have postponed informing Chiang of latest telegram received<sup>3</sup> aaa If no reply had been received from the British Government please advise immediately what to say for the time being aaa ends.

<sup>4</sup>There is no mention whatever either from the Chinese Government or from Kham of the representation for peace in order to prevent needless sacrifice of life put forward by the British Government to the Chinese Government aaa Moreover if Liuwenhui is in Kham hostilities on a large scale is<sup>5</sup> bound to ensue please arrange to stop such an action aaa Although Chinese Government is not in favour of British Government as an intermediary, for the sake of permanency as per our representation to the British Government we will persist asking Chinese Government to conclude Simla Treaty and please ask British Government to bear pressure on the Chinese Government as soon as possible to do the same and advise us so that we may decide our future course of action aaa Also let me know what reply had been received from Tashi Lama to my letter.

<sup>1</sup>i.e. British.

<sup>2</sup>The Dalai Lama's representatives in China.

<sup>3</sup>presumably from Dalai Lama.

<sup>4</sup>The last paragraph is Dalai Lama's remarks.

<sup>5</sup>(are).

### 5. *Nanking's stance*<sup>1</sup>

While Dr. Lo Wen-ken went to Hankow, I took the opportunity to pay a visit to Shanghai, and it was not until the 26th October that I met him again in Nanking. I asked him what was the result of his discussions with General Chiang Kai-shek. He said that he had discussed Tibetan affairs very seriously with General Chiang; the latter had issued strict orders that there was to be no more fighting, orders which he had every reason to suppose would be obeyed. With regard to the Dalai Lama's representatives on the Mongolian and Tibetan Committee, the root of the trouble was the quarrel between the Dalai and Panchan Lamas, but he would try and get the matter arranged satisfactorily. Dr. Lo paused here, and I gathered that this was all he wished to say to me. However, I pressed him for a reply about the suggested armistice, and he answered that it would be better not to raise this question now, but when the fighting stopped, the Chinese Government would try and secure a settlement of the frontier problem which would remove all further anxiety on the part of the Indian Government. When I asked what steps it was proposed to take, he replied that the Government would first get all the interested parties together to talk things over, and would, as soon as possible, send one of their most influential members to the frontier to try and settle the matter once and for all. I reasserted our own interest and our desire to be of assistance. Dr. Lo replied that he had been looking into the past history of the question and, with respect to our contention that China had recognised our interest in Tibet, he thought there was a good deal to be said on the Chinese side; he did not wish to go into all that now, but he would like to say that any intervention on our part might have serious consequences, as the Japanese, in their usual way, were making capital of Colonel Weir's mission to Lhasa and of our alleged designs on Tibet, and the Chinese press was beginning to get suspicious. I said I realised that the Japanese were upto the old game they had played in 1919, but I thought this only showed the necessity for getting the loose ends of the Tibetan situation tidied up and the position of all parties regularized and placed on a proper basis; the essence of our representations was not intervention, but mediation. He replied that he understood this himself, but it was

<sup>1</sup>Excerpts from Ingram to Simon, 9 January, 1933, in *IOR, L/P&S/12/578*.



difficult to get the Chinese people to see the matter in the same light. In conclusion, he repeated his earnest intention of bringing about a satisfactory settlement and asked me to explain to the Indian Government the difficulties with which the Chinese Government were faced. (A minute of this conversation was transmitted in my despatch No. 158, Tour Series, of the 26th October).

In different words, and more polite phraseology, this was merely a reiteration of Mr. Liu's and Mr. Hsu Mo's words, that the Sino-Tibetan boundary question was a question of internal Chinese politics, and it seemed to me that we should not gain anything by pursuing the matter further for the moment. We had a definite assurance that hostilities were to cease, and all we could usefully do was to exert diplomatic pressure in the direction of having that assurance implemented. It was, besides, true that our relations with Tibet were receiving a very distorted and undesirable publicity in the Chinese and Japanese press, and there was always a danger that this publicity might be exploited to our detriment if we pressed the Chinese too hard. I have a number of press cuttings at hand which would support this statement, but I do not wish to overload this despatch, and I will merely remind you of Tokyo despatches Nos. 520 of the 28th September and 533 of the 6th October, which dealt with this very point, and of Dr. Lo Wen-kan's letter to me, a copy of which I transmitted to you in my despatch No. 1473 of the 11th November. My views were conveyed to you in my telegram No. 392, Tour Series, of the 26th October. The Government of India expressed their agreement that provided the Chinese Government's undertaking to prevent further fighting from the Chinese side was fully implemented and every opportunity was taken to impress the Government of India's point of view on the Chinese, there was nothing to be gained by further formal diplomatic representations until the situation became clearer. These views were endorsed in your telegram No. 272 of the 10th November, which, at the same time instructed me, as and when opportunity occurred, to continue to make it clear that His Majesty's Government did not acquiesce in the Chinese contention that the dispute was a purely domestic issue for China.

## 6. *Lhasa's request*<sup>1</sup>

The National Assembly of Tibet, including representatives of Drepung, Sera, Ghetan<sup>a</sup> Monasteries and the monk and lay officials of the Government and of the people of Tibet beg to inform Your Excellency that with reference to the settlement of the Sino-Tibetan boundary question the Chief Ministers of Tibet had fully put our case before Lieut. Col. J. L. R. Weir, Political Officer in Sikkim, during his recent visit to Lhasa and as asked in our previous note shall be much obliged if Your Excellency could arrange the following:

- (1) The Simla convention of 1914 between China and Tibet to be immediately concluded.
- (2) Convene a meeting of the representatives of China and Tibet and the British Government act as an intermediary power.
- (3) Lieut. Col. J. L. R. Weir be appointed as one of the representatives of the British Government to sit on the conference as he is acquainted with the full facts of the case.

Please assist us by representing the above matter very strongly to His Majesty's Government so as to bring about the immediate fulfilment of our desire.

Sending herewith a scarf of greeting, dated 9th of the 10th Tibetan month of the Water Monkey year.

Seal (of the three great monasteries and that of the officials and people of Tibet).

## 7. *Tibet's attitude to Chinese overtures*<sup>2</sup>

Reference recent telegram from British Government—Chinese Government made no mention with regard to cessation of hostilities as a result of British representation and although there is no open hostility in Eastern Tibet at present moment, should it break out again we will certainly advise you immediately.

<sup>1</sup>Tibetan National Assembly to Lord Willingdon (Governor-General, India), 6 December, 1932 in *IOR, L/P&S/12/578*.

<sup>2</sup>Excerpts from Dalai Lama to Political Officer, 27 March, 1933, in Williamson to India, 31 March, 1933, in *IOR, L/P&S/12/578*.

2. It is most gratifying to know that in view of the warm Anglo-Tibetan friendship it is the British Government's earnest endeavour to bring about a permanent settlement of frontier dispute.

3. Chinese Government expressing unwillingness to conclude Simla Convention of 1914 with British mediation suggest direct negotiations between China and Tibet but so far no opening of negotiations has been possible although our representatives have been sent for this purpose. Moment their manifestation prove to be sincere and they lay their aim clearly before us so as to bring about a possible solution of difficulty, Tibetan Government hope that British Government taking a keen interest in the discussion will help to conclude an agreement as we feel that such an agreement would then be more permanent.

### 8. *India Office minutes*<sup>1</sup>

Colonel Weir's telegram of the 1st November, repeated in the Government of India's telegram, 2451 (P.Z. 6685/32), suggests in paragraph 8 that it is desirable that we should not appear to acquiesce in any way in the Chinese contention that the present dispute is a purely domestic issue for China. Mr. Ingram has made it clear in his telegram that in point of fact he has never accepted this position, but, as all the negotiations have been conducted orally with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, there is nothing in writing except the *aide memoire* which he left with Mr. Liu on 13th October (see his telegram 372-P.Z. 6308/32), which contained extracts from the instructions sent to him by the Foreign Office which should make our interest in the matter clear to the Chinese. The Government of India appear to be satisfied with the representations already made, and it seems to be sufficient to add a sentence to the draft Foreign Office telegram instructing the Charge d'Affaires to lose no opportunity of making our position clear to the Chinese Government.

As regards the proposed instructions to Colonel Weir to return from Lhasa as soon as news from Chamdo has been received that hostilities have ceased, we should send a telegram to the Government

<sup>1</sup>J. P. Donaldson, 4 November, 1932 and 4 April, 1933 & J. C. Walton, 4 November, 1932, 15 February and 6 April, 1933 in *IOR, L/P&S/12/578*.

of India approving their proposal, but it will be desirable to obtain Foreign Office<sup>a</sup> a paragraph dealing with this matter.

A fresh draft letter to the Foreign Office is submitted for approval.

J. P. Donaldson

4.11.32

There can be no question of acquiescing in the Chinese contention that the dispute is a purely domestic issue for China, and Mr. Ingram should continue to assert our position at every opportunity. At his last meeting with the MFA<sup>b</sup> on 26 October he did reassert our own 'interest in all that concerned Tibet', so that the position seems—as the G. of I.<sup>c</sup> agree—to be safeguarded.

J. C. Walton

4.11.32

Since the above notes were written the telegram from the G. of I. of 14th February has been received. They have been somewhat disturbed by the unfortunate para. 6 of Sir M. Lampson's telegram of 6th February, in which the Minister (owing to an apparent misconception as to the nature of our policy towards Tibet) allowed himself to seem to advocate a radical change of policy.

There are now three alternatives for the substance of the reply to be sent to the Dalai Lama:

- (1) to advise him to refuse the Chinese overtures (trusting to a *de facto* maintenance of the *status quo* on the frontier);
- (2) to tell him, as the G. of I. propose, that he must decide for himself;
- (3) to give him some tentative and quite friendly encouragement (while leaving the decision entirely to him), in the direction of accepting a Chinese offer of direct negotiations, to the extent suggested in the draft below; telling him at the same time that if he should decide on this course, he could rely on our advice throughout the negotiations, and our support afterwards towards securing a satisfactory settlement.

It is submitted that it is undesirable for us to take the responsibility of advising a refusal of a Chinese offer of negotiations. As regards (2) above, this attitude towards the Dalai Lama, when he comes to us with appeals for advice and assistance, is far too nega-

tive and cold. In the circumstances, course (3) seems the best one to adopt and much less unhelpful and distant than course (2). It is difficult to see what harm could come of a Sino-Tibetan conference (perhaps at or near the frontier; perhaps at Lhasa) limited to the frontier question, and with the Dalai Lama turning to us for advice (as he doubtless would do) at each turn of the negotiations. He will be disappointed, of course, that we are unable to persuade the Chinese to agree to our mediation or presence at the conference. (It is not likely that the Chinese will even agree to the presence of a British observer, though it seems just worth while to consult Sir M. Lampson on this point). But if the question of direct negotiations is put to the Dalai Lama in the right light there can be no question, of course, of telling him that he must "make the best terms he can with the Chinese"—course (3) really seems to offer the best way of avoiding the consequence of loss of our influence and prestige at Lhasa feared by the G. of I. Similar consequences are portended by the Political Officer in Sikkim (Mr. Williamson) (P.Z. 897, just received, and added to the file), unless we press the Chinese to resume negotiations for a permanent settlement.

I have discussed the whole question with Sir D. Bray,<sup>a</sup> who agrees with these views, and concurs in the sense of the draft letter to the F.O. which is submitted.

J. C. Walton  
15.2.33

The Minister<sup>b</sup>, as might be expected, is opposed to making such a suggestion, but offers to put it in a personal letter to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, worded in such a way as not to offend Chinese susceptibilities. It is submitted that if the suggestion is to be made at all it should be put forward officially, based on our openly declared policy of interest in Tibetan tranquillity, and that it would be no use making a timid and half-hearted proposal of the kind suggested by Sir M. Lampson, which would be likely to meet with the snub which he anticipates in the first paragraph of his telegram.

If Sir Miles is disinclined to approach the Chinese Government officially at the present time, it would, it is suggested, be better to postpone the idea until we know rather more what is the outcome of the Government of India's latest reply to the Dalai Lama, and whether His Holiness's reaction to that reply will be to agree to

direct negotiations with the Chinese Government on the question of the Eastern frontier of Tibet. If it should turn out that the Tibetan Government now reply to the Chinese accepting in principle the offer of direct negotiations, Sir M. Lampson might find it less embarrassing than he does at present to make the request in the official form in which it was contemplated that he would raise the matter at Nanking.

It will, however, be desirable to ask the Government of India for their views on Sir M. Lampson's telegram and a draft telegram is submitted consulting them, but giving them a lead in the direction of waiting for further developments when the reactions of the Dalai Lama to the reply recently sent to him have been made known.

J. P. Donaldson  
4.IV.33

The *form* of the suggested communication (personal or official) could be left to Sir M. Lampson's discretion. But it will do little good for him to make it in too apologetic a manner, and in his efforts to soothe Chinese susceptibilities he might go too far in explaining away HMG's attitude. On the whole, therefore, it seems better that he should hold the suggestion in reserve for an opportunity when he may be able to make it with better heart and more effect.

J. C. Walton  
6.4.33

# X

## Tibet in 1932-3

### 1. *Weir's report*<sup>1</sup>

5. *Situation in Lhasa.* I found an undercurrent of panic prevalent in Lhasa. Except for the Dalai Lama and his immediate advisers the truth regarding events in Eastern Tibet was known to nobody. Rumours of the wildest description were widely spread. "Tibetan armies had been massacred wholesale, the Chinese had taken Chamdo, the Chinese were arriving in Lhasa in a fortnight, in ten days!"

Many of the inhabitants of Lhasa had secretly sent their valuables to outlying monasteries and villages to escape pillage by advancing Chinese troops.

There was certainly good reason for anxiety. The Tibetan troops were faring badly at the hands of the Chinese. Not only were they being defeated and driven back but many were surrendering. The reason given for the surrender was that they believed the Tashi Lama was helping their opponents.

Our presence in Lhasa and the even routine of our life went far to allay panic.

6. *Discussions with the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government.* My discussions with the Dalai Lama and with the Tibetan Government have already been reported fully by telegraph. They were directed towards—

(a) The restoration of peace between Tibet and China.

(b) The return to Tibet of the Tashi Lama.

The desire of the Tibetan Government for peace was urgent and they most readily agreed to any suggestions which would further a settlement.

I pointed out to them that they were at fault in their invasion of admittedly Chinese territory and that until they changed their attitude there was very little chance of peace. After some very straight talks, both with the Dalai Lama and with the Tibetan Government, instructions were issued to their frontier troops ordering them to

<sup>1</sup>Excerpts from Weir's *Visit of the Political Officer in Sikkim to Lhasa in 1932*, in *IOR, L/P&S/12/578*.

refrain from crossing the Yang-tse river and forbidding them to initiate any further hostilities. The Chinese Government had been simultaneously approached by our Legation in Peking and, after much unnecessary delay, the Chinese Government informed our representative there, that instructions had been issued to the Chinese frontier troops to cease hostilities.

7. *Cessation of hostilities.* The Dalai Lama would not allow me to leave him until he was satisfied that fighting had stopped. When I left Lhasa, although no definite news of peace had been received from the Tibetan front, the situation had so much improved that actual hostilities had ceased.

It is not however yet clear if the cessation of hostilities on the part of the Chinese troops was due to orders from the Chinese Government or to the recent outbreak of civil war in Szechuan, which necessitated the withdrawal by Liu-wen-hui of his frontier troops. In view of the insistence with which the Chinese Government maintain that their quarrel with Tibet is a purely domestic issue, I am of the opinion that the main factor which led to the Chinese cessation of hostilities is the civil war in Szechuan. The desire of the Chinese Government is undoubtedly to compel Tibet to return to her former state of subservience to China, before she is willing to make a lasting peace with Tibet.

At present there is cessation of active hostilities between the two countries—peace there is not. The situation is again one of stalemate eminently satisfactory to the Chinese Government who have consistently burked a definite settlement of Sino-Tibetan questions since 1914.

8. *Tibetan distrust of Chinese bona-fides.* The Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government have repeatedly expressed their complete distrust of Chinese *bona fides* and of any agreement made with China without our assistance as an intermediary power.

Their urgent desire is for the very early ratification and acceptance by China of the Simla Convention of 1914 with special reference to and modification of the boundary between Inner and Outer Tibet. Delay, as pointed out by them, may lead to a fresh outbreak of hostilities.

9. *Reasons for our intervention.* The desires of the Tibetan Government coincide with our own interests. The frontier between India and Tibet is 1,800 miles long. It should never be forgotten that a peaceful and contented Tibet is the cheapest and most effi-



cient safeguard to India's North-East Frontier.

We cannot regard unmoved the prospect of Tibet and another country entering into an agreement of which we have no knowledge and which might jeopardise the peace on our border. If action is not taken to convene an early meeting of Chinese and Tibetan representatives there is every fear of our losing again the friendship of the Dalai Lama and of his Government, a friendship which has been gained with difficulty. Inaction or delay on our part to implement the very reasonable wishes of the Tibetan Government would endanger this friendship and would be a grievous blunder.

## *2. Williamson in Lhasa, 1933: excerpts from report<sup>1</sup>*

21st September. I visited the Dalai Lama at 9.30 A.M. and stayed till nearly 12 noon talking and taking his photographs both in the reception room and in the garden. He was more cordial and friendly than ever. He said that he much appreciated the Government of India's friendly attitude over such matters as the levy of customs duties on his private imports and the arrangements for the payment for the present consignment of munitions. We also talked about the Tashi Lama. He was very familiar in his manner and patted me on the back constantly. He was very frank in his views on the frontier situation. He told me that the Chinese Government had appointed one person after another to come to Lhasa to discuss outstanding questions but that all had been afraid and had made excuses. In any case we did not want a Chinese official ever to visit Lhasa, as all that the latter would want to do would be to pave the way for the renewal of Chinese domination.

The rest of our party joined me at lunch with the Chi-kyap Khen-po in the grounds of Norbhu Lingka and we went on to dinner at 5 o'clock with Lang-chung Sha-pe.

<sup>1</sup>Williamson to India, 6 January, 1934, in *IOR, L/P&S/12/36/12*.

# XI

## Tibet and China, 1934-5

### *1. Chinese mission to Tibet<sup>1</sup>*

In continuation of my telegram No. 37 of today's date, I have the honour to report that Huang Mu-sung<sup>a</sup> arrived at Lhasa today. No details are known of his reception, except that he was received with much honour.

2. Rai Bahadur Norbhu Dhondup called on Tri-mon Sha-pe and Lang Chung-nga Sha-pe separately on the 22nd August. They both told him that they did not know the exact object of the Chinese Mission but that, if Sino-Tibetan relations were seriously discussed, the Tibetan Government proposed to take their stand on the Simla Convention of 1914. They said that, if the mission pressed the Tibetan Government to allow an Amban to be posted to Lhasa, the Tibetan Government would probably agree, provided that there was no attempt to interfere with the autonomy of Tibet. This latter would be insisted on under all circumstances.

3. Tri-mon Sha-pe remarked that the Chinese would probably object to the Simla Convention, particularly as they did not like to admit that the British had any concern with Tibet. He also said that, when Colonel Weir was in Lhasa in 1932, he had told the Tibetan Government that the Chinese Government refused to discuss Tibetan affairs with the British Government as intermediary, and that he advised them to settle matters direct with China, if possible. I do not know whether Colonel Weir actually said this. Advice to settle the frontier question direct was also conveyed by me to the Dalai Lama in March 1933, in compliance with the orders contained in your telegram No. 736 dated the 18th March 1933. Our attitude has probably led Tibet to believe that we can do little or nothing to help her. Lang Chung-nga Sha-pe, however, said that, if the independence of Tibet were threatened, the Tibetan Government would undoubtedly appeal to us for help.

4. It seems, therefore, that the attitude of the Chinese Government, and our own complaisant attitude towards their claim that they should negotiate direct with Tibet, have probably cut us out

<sup>1</sup>Williamson to India, 29 August, 1934, in *IOR*, L/P&S/12/36/14.

from having any say at all in negotiations which may now go on at Lhasa about the Sino-Tibetan question in general. The establishment of a Chinese Amban at Lhasa would be a development extremely unfavourable to us, but it is doubtful whether we could even protest against it, as we agreed to it in the Simla Convention. If matters go further than this and if the real autonomy of Tibet is threatened, we may be forced to take diplomatic action. But in view of the impossibility of taking any other kind of action, it is doubtful whether our protests will have any effect. The death of the Dalai Lama will probably prove to have been a great disaster for Tibet as, in his lifetime, no Chinese domination would have been possible.

## 2. *New Delhi on British policy*<sup>1</sup>

My dear Williamson,

Would you kindly refer to your official letter No. 7(8)-P/34, dated the 29th August 1934 regarding the Chinese Mission to Tibet. The Government of India observe with some concern your forecast that this visit may result in the re-establishment of Chinese Amban at Lhasa, which can hardly fail to be followed by an increase in Chinese influence in Tibet and may lead to a serious weakening of British influence in that country. The correspondence between His Majesty's Government, the Government of India, and the Peking Legation which took place in 1932 and 1933 ending with Foreign telegram No. 736, dated the 18th March 1933 to your address suggests that neither the Peking Legation nor His Majesty's Government will be prepared to proceed to any great length in bringing pressure on the Chinese Government, unless they are forced to do so by events beyond their control. There can be no doubt that they have valid reasons for this attitude, namely,

- (1) their large commercial interests in China proper which make it extremely undesirable for them to antagonise the Central Chinese Government.

<sup>1</sup>Metcalf (Secretary, Foreign & Political Department) to Williamson, 17 September, 1934, in *IOR*, L/P&S/12/36/14.

(2) His Majesty's Government as a Member of the League of Nations cannot afford to incur any suspicion that they are aiming at detaching Tibet from China in the same way as Japan have [*sic.*] detached Manchuria. Propaganda to this effect against His Majesty's Government has already been rife both in China and in Japan, the latter country being naturally anxious to distract attention at His Majesty's Government.

(3) the only real interest which we have in Tibet is the maintenance on the Indian Frontier of a friendly Government which is unlikely to create disturbance within our borders. This consideration is naturally of greater concern to the Government of India than it is either to His Majesty's Government or to the Peking Legation and neither of the latter authorities are likely to attach much importance to it as opposed to their own interest in retaining the goodwill of the Chinese Government.

2. It is, I think, obvious from what I have said above that the Government of India will have great difficulty in persuading His Majesty's Government to take a strong line with the Chinese Government over the Tibetan question, unless we can produce much more cogent arguments than we have been able to offer hitherto. Our hands are moreover to a large extent tied by the admissions made by us in 1914 with regard to the suzerainty of China over Tibet and, as you have pointed out, by our agreement at that time to the presence of a Chinese Amban in Lhasa. In spite of these difficulties it would seem to us desirable to place before His Majesty's Government some reasoned exposition of the policy which we think should be adopted and then to leave it to His Majesty's Government to decide from the larger point of view what it is worth while doing. We presume that the maintenance of the Government of India's influence at Lhasa in some form is essential, and it would seem necessary to attempt to convince His Majesty's Government of this fact by all the arguments which we can muster. Secondly, we should I feel suggest practicable means which can be adopted for retaining the friendship of the Tibetan Government in spite of the determined bid now being made by the Chinese on the other side. Would you give the whole matter your careful consideration during the next few weeks in the light of any further developments at Lhasa and send me your views demiofficially when you feel able to do so? My idea is that we might

discuss the whole matter in detail when we meet in Calcutta as I hope to do during the visit of the Maharaja of Bhutan in early December.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Daukes<sup>a</sup> at Katmandu, as it is possible that these developments may be of some significance from the Nepalese point of view.

Yours sincerely,  
H. A. R. METCALFE

### 3. *Williamson on Huang Mu-sung's mission*<sup>1</sup>

Rai Bahadur Norbhu had an interview with the Regent on the 23rd November<sup>b</sup> and stayed to lunch. The Regent repeated that these direct negotiations were the result of our own advice, but that Tibet had really given China very little. He expressed most friendly sentiments towards ourselves, and said that he would have preferred to have the Political Officer in Sikkim in Lhasa taking part in the negotiations, if it had been possible. He hoped that the British Government would not be disappointed with Tibet but would continue to extend to her their friendship and help.

The British Trade Agent has heard from Lhasa that the Tibetan Government gave Huang a written acknowledgement of Chinese suzerainty. He has also sent an extract from a newspaper published in China, in which the possibility of the exchange of diplomatic representatives between China and Nepal is discussed. I enclose a copy of it. The reference to the re-establishment of Chinese influence in Tibet is significant.

Dr. Lin Tung-hai, one of the members of the Chinese Mission who has already returned to Calcutta appears to have given an interview to the *Statesman*. It was reported in today's Calcutta edition of that newspaper. Dr. Lin Tung-hai's statement that the Mission had no political significance will be believed by no one, but the trend of his remarks throughout the interview was to the effect that Tibet is part of China, if only an outlying one. The Government of India will presumably have seen the article.

<sup>1</sup>Williamson to India, 6 October, 1934 in *IOR*, L/P&S/12/36/14.

#### 4. *India on Williamson's visit<sup>1</sup>: excerpts*

2. It is of the greatest importance at present, when new political forces are at work throughout Eastern and Central Asia, for the Government of India to maintain their influence in a friendly Tibet. It must be remembered that in Sinkiang restoration of Chinese control has only proved a cloak for the establishment in that Province of a Russian political supremacy not unlike that attained by the Japanese in Manchuria. Information has been received that the Chinese Communists have recently been driven into areas of China close to the Tibetan border and there is reason to believe that the Soviet authorities have considered the possibility of establishing connections between their authorities in Sinkiang and the Red Armies in Western China. The maintenance of an independent and autonomous Tibet, ruled on theocratic lines, is likely to be a stronger guarantee against a Soviet advance to the borders of India than any resumption of effective Chinese control in Tibet.

3. Nepal, over which country China claims a shadowy suzerainty and to which she has recently sent a special envoy, is at present in a favourable position in Tibet, where she maintains an Envoy, is exempted from trade duties, and receives special privileges including a subsidy. All these privileges would be undermined by the extension of effective Chinese authority in Tibet, and it follows that the interests of Nepal, like those of the Government of India, are concerned to maintain an autonomous Tibet.

4. The extension of Chinese authority in Tibet would inevitably lead to interference in Bhutan, a frontier State whose foreign relations the Government of India claim to control. Such a development would be likely to lead to constant attempts at Chinese encroachments on the North-Eastern frontier in a sector where, if Chinese Communists remain in control, the danger of Chinese penetration would seem to be considerable. The history of the Government of India's relations with China on the Burma frontier has recently demonstrated that China is in any case a difficult neighbour.

5. Mr. Williamson's letters have indicated that Tibet feels that in the matter of defence it is necessary to lean on some power. She would prefer to lean on the Government of India, and in his opinion

<sup>1</sup>India to Secretary of State, 28 June, 1935, in *IOR*, L/P&S/12/36/12.

would be eager to give them control of her foreign relations if they were to undertake to protect her from external aggression and to send troops for the defence of her eastern frontier if necessary. The Government of India conceive that neither His Majesty's Government nor themselves could consider for a moment any proposal to maintain the integrity of Tibet by force against the established Chinese Government. There is, however, the possibility of an early irruption of Communist forces into Tibet from the east or of Russian influence from the north, and in such a case effective assistance to Tibet, whether in the form of munitions or otherwise, would be defensible on the ground that the Tibetan Government had been attacked by an enemy whom the Chinese Government themselves regarded as hostile. In this matter of the defence of Lhasa it has been stated by the Government of India's officers who are qualified to judge that the defence of Tibet from attack either from the north or the east would be easy if the Tibetans could be persuaded not to meet an invading force on the frontier, but to withdraw transport and supplies along the routes and to attack communications, making it impossible for an invading force, with the military organisation likely to be at the disposal of such force, ever to reach Lhasa. On a review of the whole matter the Government of India recommend that, should Mr. Williamson be asked what guarantees, if any, can be given for the defence of Lhasa, he should make clear in his reply that the Government of India would be unable to guarantee the defence of Tibet against the Nanking Government whose suzerainty the Tibetans have themselves acknowledged. At the same time he might say that there is no reason to expect the development of an aggressive Chinese policy against Tibet at the present juncture, and His Majesty's Government are prepared to use all their diplomatic influence with the Chinese Government to prevent the development of such a policy. If the question of active support against aggression by forces other than those of the Chinese Government is raised, he would inform the Tibetan Government that he was prepared to report any requests made and to refer them for orders. He would not be given authority to offer concessions in munitions or to make promises in respect of the training of Tibetan officers or troops. The question whether the Government of India could consider the grant of effective assistance to the Lhasa Government in the event of attack by a power hostile to China, could then be considered in the light of his report and subsequent developments.

### 5. *Williamson's visit: India Office minute*<sup>1</sup>

It is possible that Sino-Tibetan negotiations may in due course be resumed and it seems desirable that HMG should be represented at them especially if their scope extends beyond the frontier question, which seems inevitable. The Chinese would certainly object to this; the Tibetans would probably welcome it (vide the Regent's remark to Rai Bahadur Norbhu Dhondup on P.Z. 440/35, paragraph 10). It seems very possible however that the Tibetans interpret the advice we gave them to negotiate direct with the Chinese on the frontier question (P.Z. 1572/33) as advice to negotiate direct over the whole field. A paragraph on this subject is suggested in the draft telegram.

<sup>1</sup>Minute, 15 July 1935, in *IOR L/P&S/12/36/12*.



## XII

### Kingdon-Ward and Tibet : 1935-6

#### *1. Williamson to India, 28 September, 1935<sup>1</sup>*

During course of conversation with Tibetan Government on 26th instant they informed me that foreigner named King or King-Da had entered Tibet without permission and has gone to Pemako near Great Bend of Tsangpo. Tibetan Government have instructed local authorities to detain him at Tselhakhang<sup>a</sup> (cannot find on map) but I have asked them to allow him to return to India immediately after making enquiries. I also heard at Tsetang in August about an unauthorized European entering Tibet. Person in question is very likely Kingdon-Ward. In Smith's letter to Wakely dated January 7th it was stated that Kingdon-Ward wished to visit Tsangpo valley east of Lhasa and province of Pome and he appears to have done this now without permission. I should be glad if identity of trespasser could be established as soon as possible. I suggest that he should be prosecuted under Frontier Regulations on his return to disarm suspicions of Tibetans which have been seriously aroused. It is impossible to approach Tibetan Government now about Kingdon-Ward's proposed visit next year and such trespassing prejudices chances of all other applicants especially of British subjects as Tibetan Government rely on our straightness and our ability and willingness to keep out unauthorized persons.

#### *2. India to Williamson, 5 November, 1935<sup>2</sup>*

Our telegram No. 2768 of 4th October. Kingdon-Ward.

2. Kingdon-Ward asserts that he received verbal permission to enter Tibet from Geshe Dorje one of the Dzungpons of Tawangdzong and that he went nowhere in Tibet without express permission of local authorities.

3. In connection with boundary dispute between Bhutan and

<sup>1</sup>IOR, L/P&S/12/37/28.

<sup>2</sup>IOR, L/P&S/12/37/28.

Assam (vide your letter 6(3)P/35 of 10th June 1935) Government of India have been examining question of international frontier between India and Tibet, East of Bhutan. This was defined by red line on map drawn by McMahon and accepted by Tibetan Government in accordance with Article IX of 1914 Convention. This line lies well north of Tawang and it is not understood why Tibetans maintain Dzongpon at Tawang who grants authority to enter Tibet. Are you sure that Kingdon-Ward actually went or is alleged by Tibetans to have gone to Tibetan side of red line referred to above or have you any reason to suppose that agreement come to in 1914 has been in any way modified either by practice or otherwise since that date. It is important that you should not in any way compromise with Tibetan Government validity of international boundary agreed to in 1914.

*1. British mission to Lhasa, 1935 on Kingdon-Ward:  
excerpts from report<sup>1</sup>*

20. Mr. Williamson gave the Tibetan Government the assurance that the Government of India are anxious to maintain their traditional friendship with Tibet and to continue to deal direct with Tibet. It was also explained that His Majesty's Government are prepared insofar as the merits of any individual case justify such action to give the Tibetan Government full diplomatic support in Nanking should Tibet become involved in any trouble with China.

No misconception appeared to exist in the minds of the Tibetan Government regarding the desire of His Majesty's Government to assist at any negotiations between Tibet and China with a view to the settlement of their Eastern Frontier dispute. With regard to the desire of His Majesty's Government to be represented at any general negotiations that may take place between Tibet and China with a view to recasting the status of Tibet as an autonomous state under the suzerainty of China, the Tibetan Government declared that an invitation would immediately be sent to the Government of India should such an occasion arise.

21. With regard to recognition of Tibetan independence subject

<sup>1</sup>Gould to India, 18 February, 1936, in *IOR, L/P&S/12/36/12*.

to theoretical Chinese suzerainty the actual position is that the Tibetan Government do not now acknowledge that Tibet is even nominally under the suzerainty of China. This was made clear by the Kashag on two occasions. Trimon Shape declared the position to be as follows:

Last year (1934) General Huang Mu Sung while in Tibet pressed the Tibetan Government to admit Chinese suzerainty outwardly. The Tibetan Government replied that they would be prepared to do so provided the Chinese would surrender to them certain territory, namely Derge and Nyarong on the Eastern Frontier, while as regards the administration of their internal and external affairs Tibet would remain free and untrammelled by China. Derge and Nyarong as the Government of India are aware have not been surrendered to Tibet and the Tibetan Government now refuse to acknowledge Chinese suzerainty either in theory or in fact.

*Vis-a-vis* China, the Tibetan outlook on the 1914 negotiations is similar.

22. Although no apprehension appeared to exist in the mind of the Tibetan Government regarding the India Act 1935 opportunities were taken to explain to more enlightened individuals in whose minds the doubt might sometime arise that they had nothing to fear from it. It was explained that India's foreign relations would remain as at present in the hands of the Governor General acting under the direction of the Secretary of State for India.

It is probably not merely a matter of chance that it was shortly before Mr Williamson's arrival that the Tibetan Government adopted a definite policy in regard to the proposal that the Tashi Lama should be accompanied by a Chinese escort, and that up to the present time they have resolutely adhered to that decision. The presence of Mr. Williamson in Lhasa personified His Majesty's Government's policy of support of the Tibetan Government and at the same time made it possible to avoid the complications which might have been incidental to any attempt to state in writing the qualified assurances which he was authorised to give.

Oral discussion brought out the important point that the Tibetan Government definitely do not consider that they have at any time in recent history admitted the Chinese claim even to nominal

suzerainty. They acknowledge that they have been prepared to admit such claim as part and parcel of a bi-lateral bargain, but they deny that they are in any way bound by any of the terms of the bargain unless and until China discharges her part of the bargain.

The attitude of mind engendered by the mission facilitated a friendly settlement of the Kingdon-Ward escapade which otherwise might have tended to prejudice this year's Everest Expedition.

# XIII

Lhasa, 1936-7

## *1. Lhasa Mission, 1936-7: excerpts from report<sup>1</sup>*

### Military

24. An important factor in the present situation is the state of the Tibetan army. This was the subject of study by Brigadier Neame who appeared to me to bring conspicuous ability to the performance of his task. Full confidence was reposed in him, from the outset and as if as a matter of course, by the non-military Commanders-in-Chief both monk and lay, by fighting soldiers, and by the Kashag. The largest possible parade was staged for him; the Kashag, without whose express permission not a round of gun or rifle ammunition can be fired in practice, astonished the populace by permitting a display with live ammunition; and full information on all matters was placed at his disposal. His estimate of the military efficiency of Tibet was not flattering (admittedly he had no opportunity of appreciating the toughness which Tibetans on occasion display in the field or of judging the quality of the Chinese troops or Communist forces which they may have occasion to meet on the Eastern Tibetan frontier, or of judging of the people with whom they have to deal in matters of internal security), and in some respects his recommendations went beyond what either the Tibetan Government or the Government of India were prepared to accept. But as regards the supply of munitions he was of opinion that the Tibetan Government had been substantially accurate in estimating their present requirements and it is in the light of his recommendations that the Government of India agreed to provide on cash payment the munitions for which the Tibetan Government had asked and to extend to the Tibetan Government an offer to train a limited number of Tibetan officers and non-commissioned officers. Both Brigadier Neame and myself were of the opinion that it is not in the direction of encouraging Tibetans to adopt khaki uniforms and helmets of Indian pattern that we can best help them, but rather in such practical matters as the bare elements of drill, tactics, toughness in which

<sup>1</sup>Encl. in Gould to India, 30 April, 1937, in *IOR, L/P&S/12/36/27*.

they are well qualified to excel, and fire practice and discipline. In connection with the supply of munitions it may be noted that, ever since the first arms were provided on payment, and instalments fixed, the Tibetan Government have been regular and prompt in meeting their obligations. As regards the offer of training in India the present attitude of the Tibetan Government is that, while the offer is highly appreciated, present preoccupations on the Eastern frontier do not admit of the immediate detachment of suitable personnel to undergo a course of training.

### Treaties and Negotiations

25. In Appendix A to this Report attempt is made to summarise the actual treaty position, which is complicated, and reference is made to the Huangmusung negotiations<sup>a</sup> and to some of the more important declarations or indications of our general policy in regard to Tibet. A matter which came prominently to notice in interviews with the Kashag was that the Tibetan Government appeared to be completely ignorant of the terms of many of the earlier engagements relating to Tibet, and almost equally ignorant of the terms of the 1914 agreement and Trade Regulations, and of the existence of the declaration of the 3rd July 1914 or of its purport. Possibly it may be fortunate, in view of the tangled treaty position, that the Chinese appear to base their claims and policy on considerations more general than the specific terms of particular engagements.

26. The Tibetan position is that the Tibetan Government deny that, pending the execution of some acceptable agreement, China has any such claim to suzerainty over Tibet as can be recognised by His Majesty's Government; and Tibet claims that, whether under the draft 1914 Convention or otherwise, China has no exclusive right to the territory which, under the draft McMahan agreement, but no where else, has been defined as "Inner Tibet"-*vide* Sikkim letter No. 7(5)-P/35, dated the 16th December 1935. Neither the Teichman truce of 1918 nor the Yangtse truce of 1935 made any reference either to the conception of an Inner Tibet or to Chinese suzerainty over Outer Tibet, and the Tibetan Government regard these two matters as major assets for any future negotiations which may be undertaken with a view to establishing good relations with China.

27. Both China and Tibet thus appear to be inclined to deal

with present problems on objective lines, and in this connection the immediate matter on which the Tibetan Government desire advice is whether His Majesty's Government would prefer that future negotiations with a view to bringing about a settlement of immediate or chronic difficulties between China and Tibet should be bipartite or tripartite. Mr. Williamson's instructions on the subject have been noted in paragraph 5. In the course of conversations with the Kashag it transpired that they had no clear recollection of having been informed at the time of Mr. Williamson's Mission that His Majesty's Government would be glad to be represented at any general negotiations which might take place between China and Tibet with a view to recasting the status of Tibet as an autonomous state under the suzerainty of China, and I can only conclude that Mr. Williamson's language at the relevant interview, of which no contemporary precis has been left on record, was unemphatic. In my opinion there is little prospect of China and Tibet coming to terms on major issues except with the assistance of His Majesty's Government, and the prevalent Tibetan opinion is that, even if an ostensible settlement were to be reached, there would be small prospect of its continued observance by China unless His Majesty's Government were a party. I see grave objection to the acquiescence of His Majesty's Government in the impairment of the spirit of any provision of the 1914 Convention as subsisting between ourselves and Tibet. On the other hand it appears to me to be immaterial whether, in view of Chinese susceptibilities, and with a view to achieving practical results, His Majesty's Government figure in negotiations as an actual party or as a potent and friendly assessor, and as a witness of conclusions reached. In February 1933 the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs was given to understand that "as neighbours of Tibet we cannot tolerate anything likely to cause disturbance or lead to trouble" and that "The Government of India could not acquiesce in Chinese troops entering the country—that was all there was to it". It is for consideration whether a reversion to the treatment of the subject, if feasible, on such objective lines would not be the method most likely to bring about a solution of present problems.

It is worthy of note that there is good reason to suppose that it is in the inner circle of clerical officials, who are in touch with the heads of the monastic colleges, that opinion is most definitely in favour of the association of His Majesty's Government in any major

negotiations with China.

28. While on the one hand the Tibetan ignorance of the details of the 1914 agreements is an indication of the harmoniousness of Anglo-Tibetan relations during the last 23 years, it is highly important that the Tibetan Government should be fully aware of the obligations into which they have entered with His Majesty's Government. So long as the rights, direct and indirect, which are secured to His Majesty's Government under the 1914 agreements are not infringed, the extent to which the Tibetan Government could harm itself in the course even of direct negotiations with China is limited. I have therefore been careful to encourage the Tibetan Government to study the treaty position.

27. Related to the matter of treaties is the question of the avoidance in official correspondence and in the English Press of the use of tendentious Chinese geographical concepts such as that of a Sikang province which, according to Chinese maps, overlaps both Outer Tibet and India.

### Tawang

30. Connected also with the subject of treaties and in the Tibetan mind, with the question of the establishment of an agreed frontier between China and Tibet, is the matter of Tawang. There is no doubt that prior to 1914 the Tawang area was Tibetan; although there was no specific mention of Tawang in the notes exchanged at the time of the 1914 conference, it is an undoubted fact that Tibet definitely ceded Tawang to us in 1914; Sir Henry McMahon acting on Tibetan advice, recommended that prompt and adequate steps should be taken to peg out our claim to the ceded area; but, owing presumably to the preoccupations of the Great War, the steps advocated were not taken; even in officially inspired maps published in India Tawang continued to be represented as being in Tibet; and it was discovered only the other day and by chance (in connection with the Kingdon-Ward case) that Tawang, which should be British, continues to be controlled exactly as it was controlled prior to 1914. In the circumstances the only possible policy is to take a firm line particularly in view of the consideration that, were China again to become dominant in Tibet, she might proceed to claim both Tawang and territories to the east of it which in modern Chinese maps are shown as falling within the limits of the Chinese



province of Sikang. *Vis-a-vis* the Tibetan Government the line which it is necessary to adopt, and which I have adopted in conversation with the Kashag, is that since 1914 everything to the south of the McMahon line has definitely been British, and that, if there were a matter of *quid pro quo*, Tibet has had value in the form of support both in arms and in the field of diplomacy. (The matter of Tawang, which will require strong and tactful handling, is to form the subject of discussion between the Governor of Assam and myself in the near future). (Regarding the posting of Chinese troops in Tawang in 1910, see Sir Charles Bell's telegrams 1291-T.E.C. and 143-S, of 21st September and 7th October 1910.) Gongka is possibly identical with Gyangkar, the civil headquarters two miles east of Tawang. (See also Sir Henry McMahon's letter to Lonchen Shatra, dated the 24th March, 1914, regarding certain local adjustments.)

#### Continuance of Mission

40. My instructions included the question of establishing some form of permanent contact with Lhasa. A main object of this report has been to outline the circumstances in connection with which the question of permanent contact has to be considered. On the one hand it is at Lhasa, and at Lhasa only, that adequate touch with the Tibetan Government can be maintained and influence exercised—the influence of short-period or temporary Missions is apt to be evanescent; and, since the time of the Huangmusung Mission, the Chinese have, through Mr. Tsiang and his wireless, been exercising continuous and effective touch and influence. Disadvantages incidental to short-period Missions are that, as on the occasion of my Mission, they cannot usually be arranged except after considerable discussion and delay, that consequently favourable opportunities are apt to be lost, and that, in proportion to the expenditure involved, the results are apt to be meagre.

Whether the continuance of our present Mission at Lhasa would tend to encourage the Chinese to establish a Chinese Mission there is very doubtful. The position is rather that since 1934 the Chinese have actually had a representative there and that, if they had had the field to themselves, they might not improbably by now have established themselves more firmly. Should the Chinese in future re-establish themselves in Tibet, the best antidote to the exercise by them of an excessive degree of domination would probably be

the presence of a British representative at Lhasa; and it would in all probability be easier to continue to maintain a representative who had already been established there than to negotiate for his establishment after the Chinese had first established themselves.

A year ago the Government were in favour of my visiting Lhasa "in order to maintain touch, ascertain and report on the situation, and be at hand for mediation". It is for similar reasons that it will be advisable to maintain British representation at Lhasa for some time to come. Particularly in the matter of bringing about a settlement of differences between the Tibetan Government and the Tashi Lama, the continuance of the Mission is desirable in order that both parties may be encouraged both to be moderate and also to be confident. I myself believe that the continued presence of the Mission may tend also towards a satisfactory adjustment of Sino-Tibetan relations.

On the other hand the time has not yet come to consider any permanent arrangements for British representation at Lhasa. It would at the present stage be inconvenient to have to negotiate with the Tibetan Government to this end; and it would be prudent to keep the door open for a self-denying arrangement with China, whereby both His Majesty's Government and the Chinese Government might refrain in practice from maintaining a permanent representative, whether formally or informally, at Lhasa. For there can be no doubt that, however unfavourable prospects may appear to be at the present time it is along the lines of a tripartite understanding or agreement between Tibet, China and His Majesty's Government that a lasting and economical solution of the present complications in regard to Tibet may best be reached. As regards temporary, but for the time being continuous, representation the position is that the Regent, Prime Minister, Cabinet, and all classes both lay and clerical, gave the most cordial reception to the proposition that, on the withdrawal of the main body of my Mission, the Mission itself should remain in being, in charge of Mr. Richardson.<sup>a</sup> There is reason to suppose that his presence at Lhasa continues to be entirely welcome.

### Results of Mission

42. Foremost amongst my instructions was the exploration of the general situation of which I have attempted to give some account.

Tibet, if one may judge Tibet by Lhasa, is a country disposed, by a reasoned consideration of her own interests and by natural inclination, to progress along the lines of our settled policy, but hampered by fear of China. Of over-optimism on the part of the Tibetan Government there definitely at the present time is no trace. At his final interview the lay Commander-in-Chief informed me that in his opinion it had been the presence of the Mission, rather than any efforts which the Tibetans themselves had been able to put forth, which had averted a crisis in the matter of the Tashi Lama's escort. I have been careful to point out the fact that, and the reasons why, Tibet denies that, pending the execution of a new agreement, China enjoys any rights in Tibet, and what appears to me to be the present treaty position in regard to Tibet. Amongst tangible results of the Mission are the facts that the Mission has undoubtedly been potent as a conciliator, though not as an official mediator, between the Tibetan Government and the Tashi Lama except such demands or conditions as would be inconsistent with the maintenance of Tibetan unity and effectual independence, and with established British policy in regard to Tibet; permission has been accorded for another Everest expedition; the Kaulback<sup>a</sup> incident has been adjusted; the Tibetan military position has been appreciated by an expert and arms are being supplied on an agreed basis; the influence of Mr. Tsiang and of the Chinese wireless has been neutralized; the Tawang position has been ventilated; the Tibetan Government have been reminded of their treaty position *vis-a-vis* His Majesty's Government; without commitments as to permanent representation it has been arranged that for the time being representation shall be continuous; the Tibetan Government have become familiar with the idea that we can afford support in certain ways but not in others; means of developing the trade, prosperity and national consciousness of Tibet have been investigated and in some cases put into practice; and the difficult period to which Kusho Dingja referred at Gyantse has been passed. But possibly it is the intangible results which are the more important. In the sphere of the intangible may be included speculation as to what might now have been the position if, instead of the Mission being in Lhasa, a visible emblem of the diplomatic support which is being afforded at Nanking, Mr. Tsiang had during the last six months been the only foreign representative on the spot.

Possibly however the most valuable result of the Mission and

of its present continuance under Mr. Richardson, is that we now know the Tibetans, and they know us, better than can have been the case since the days when Sir Charles Bell was in close touch with the Dalai Lama. The predominant impression left on my own mind is that under present conditions both in Tibet and in China Time is likely to be (the) best healer, and that the exercise of patience, possibly to be continued over a considerable period, may ultimately result in a satisfactory adjustment of the Sino-Tibetan problem.

## APPENDIX A

### The Treaty Position

In the Convention of 1890 His Majesty's Government and the then Imperial Chinese Government, without consulting Tibet, fixed the boundary between India (i.e., Sikkim), and Tibet, reserved for future discussion the method in which official communications between the British authorities in India and the authorities in Tibet should be conducted, and agreed to appoint Commissioners to discuss this and certain other matters including facilities for trade across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier. Accordingly in 1893 British and Chinese Commissioners drew up Trade Regulations which provided *inter alia* for the prohibition of the import and export of arms as the option of either Government (British or Chinese), for the imposition of a tariff to be mutually agreed upon, for a tax on Indian tea imported into Tibet, for inspection of imports at a Chinese customs station, and for the recognition of Chinese authority in various matters. In 1904, subsequent to the Expedition of that year, the Governments of Great Britain and Tibet entered into a Convention which while maintaining the general principles of the 1890 Convention and of the 1893 Regulations, fixed an indemnity of £500,000, and laid down that without the previous consent of the British Government Tibet should not allow any Foreign Power to intervene in Tibetan affairs, appoint agents, or indulge in certain activities. In 1906 His Majesty's Government and the Imperial Chinese Government, again acting over the head of Tibet, confirmed the 1904 Anglo-Tibetan Convention, denied to any State other than China the concessions mentioned in Article IX (d) of the 1904 Convention, and confirmed generally the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and the Regula-

tions of 1893. China paid the 1904 indemnity which meanwhile had been reduced to one-third of the original amount.

In the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 the Governments of Great Britain and Russia recognized the suzerain rights of China in Tibet, engaged not to enter into negotiations with Tibet, except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government, and engaged not to send Representatives to Lhasa.

In 1908, in pursuance of Article 3 of the Lhasa Convention of 1904, Great Britain, China and Tibet proceeded, in confirmation and in modification of the 1893 Trade Regulations to draw up the Trade Regulations of 1908, the general effect of which was to accord very full recognition to the position of China in Tibet. Article V contemplated the relinquishment of certain extra-territorial rights, Article VI the handing over of rest-houses to China, Article XII also granted vague but possibly inconvenient rights to Tibetan subjects trading or residing in India.

Then came the Chinese Revolution and the expulsion of the Chinese from Tibet.

The 1914 negotiations between Great Britain, China, and Tibet were on our part directed largely to removing many provisions in former engagements which were detrimental to our interests or to those of Tibet, the main *quid pro quo* offered to China being, apparently, the renewed recognition of her suzerainty over Tibet. Since however China refused to proceed to full signature she was, under the Anglo-Tibetan declaration of the 3rd July 1914, expressly debarred from all privileges accruing therefrom, the Convention being declared to be binding as between Great Britain and Tibet, and between them alone. *Vis-a-vis* Russia, the final 1914 McMahon memorandum records that "The international position in regard to Tibet, moreover had been so materially altered, since the conclusion of the (1907) Anglo-Russian Convention, by the Urga Protocol and the Russo-Mongolian Agreement of 1912 that it was essential to safeguard the special interests of Great Britain in the maintenance of the *status quo* in Tibet, which had been specially recognized by Russia in the Convention of 1907." As regards Russia's cognizance of the 1914 Convention see Viceroy's telegram of 1st July 1914 (Tibet Conference Series, Correspondence, Pro. No. 205).

In the 1914 Convention the earlier Conventions of 1890, 1904 and 1906 were declared to be binding except in so far as they might have been modified by, or might be inconsistent with or repugnant

to, the present (1914) Convention, but the Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908 were cancelled and it was agreed that new Trade Regulations should be negotiated: and this was done.

Unless it be held that subsequent events, and the 1914 Convention and Regulations which are binding as between Great Britain and Tibet alone, and from the advantages of which China is totally excluded, override all previous engagements, it would appear that His Majesty's Government has offended against treaty obligations whenever they have, against the wishes of China, permitted the export of arms to Tibet; all Indian tea imported into Tibet is liable to be taxed at the same rate as China tea imported into England; we may have in due course to hand over our rest houses and telegraph line and withdraw our escorts; Tibetan subjects trading or residing in India are entitled to certain special rights; and our claim to Tawang and to much of the tribal area South of the McMahon line becomes shadowy. *Vis-a-vis* Russia however Russian assent to the 1914 agreement<sup>a</sup> absolves us of breach of agreement whenever we send a Representative to Lhasa or negotiate direct with the Government.

In view of events prior to 1914 and in view of the fact that China refused to sign the Convention of 1914, China cannot now apparently claim—*vide* the Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 1914—

Article 1. That the Conventions of 1890, 1904 and 1906 continue to be operative in her favour.

Article 2. Recognition of suzerainty.

Article 4. Right to establish a Chinese high official with escort at Lhasa.

Article 6. Admission that China is not a "foreign power" in the sense of the 1904 Convention.

Article 9. Any recognition of the conception of an "Outer" and "Inner" Tibet.

Note 1. Admission that Tibet forms part of Chinese territory.

Note 2. Any concern with a new Dalai Lama.

Note 5. Any limitation of strength of British escorts in Tibet.

Neither the Teichman truce of 1918 nor the Yangtse line truce of 1933 made any reference to the conception of an "Outer" and "Inner" Tibet; while the Huangmusung demands entirely ignored the provisions and the spirit of the agreements of 1914.

It would thus appear that at the present time there are extant

no valid agreements in regard to Tibet except the Anglo-Tibetan agreement and Trade Regulations of 1914 which are valid only as between Great Britain and Tibet (with Russia consenting); and the special agreement negotiated by Sir Charles Bell with the Dalai Lama in 1921 whereby *inter alia*, instead of access to Lhasa being limited to the occasions contemplated in the 1914 agreement, a British officer may be despatched temporarily to Lhasa whenever the British and Tibetan Governments desire this.

Regarding Chinese tendency to ignore the 1914 Convention and to claim that earlier engagements still have force, see Foreign Department telegram 2399-S., dated 15th November, 1928 and Colonel Weir's telegram 1236-P., dated 27th November, 1928.

On the other hand, Foreign Office telegram No. 284 of 27th August 1921 (Foreign Department telegram to Sir Charles Bell No. 2203-S., of 16th September, 1921) reports the handing to the Chinese Minister in London of a Memorandum containing the paragraph

In view of commitments, arising out of the tripartite negotiations of 1914, of His Majesty's Government to the Tibetan Government and in view of the fact that, with the exception of the boundary clause, the draft Convention of 1914 providing for Tibetan autonomy under Chinese suzerainty was accepted by the Chinese Government, who in their offer of 1919 formally reaffirmed their attitude in this, His Majesty's Government, failing a resumption to negotiations in the immediate future, do not feel justified in withholding any longer their recognition of the status of Tibet as an autonomous State under the suzerainty of China and intend dealing with Tibet in future on this basis.

It is to be noted

(1) that this reference to suzerainty was made without consultation with the Tibetan Government. The fact that it was being or had been made was not communicated to the Dalai Lama at the time (*vide* Sir Charles Bell's telegram 80-S, of 12th December 1921); nor, so far as I am aware, has it ever been communicated to the Tibetan Government.

(2) that the Chinese Government have abandoned the position that all that is now in dispute is the boundary clause. The Kashag recently stated to me that when they mentioned the boundary question to Huangmusung, he replied that that was a trifling

matter in comparison with other matters in dispute. Such an attitude on the part of the Chinese Government tends perhaps to invalidate any deductions based on the consideration that in 1914, and again in 1919, the wording of the unratified Convention of 1914 in regard to suzerainty was not in dispute.

It is curious how at frequent intervals during the last 23 years there has cropped up again and again the idea that, although China failed to ratify the 1914 Convention, such portions of it as China would in 1914 have been prepared to ratify have some sort of binding force, in favour of China. Not only does an unratified agreement lack any force but, as has already been pointed out, under the Anglo-Tibetan declaration of the 3rd July 1914, China is expressly debarred from privileges accruing from the Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 1914. Even Mr. Williamson in paragraph 9 of his demi-official letter No. 7 (12)-P/34, dated the 20th January 1935 appears to have laboured under the impression that at the time of the Huangmusung negotiations Tibet yielded on the point of recognizing suzerainty; whereas the position is that this was one of the points which then, as in 1914, Tibet was prepared to yield only in return for a settlement. It should be borne in mind that in January 1935 Mr. Williamson was writing from hearsay. What the Tibetan Government had actually to say on the subject is shown in the following extract from my report on Mr. Williamson's Mission.

Paragraph 21. With regard to recognition of Tibetan independence subject to theoretical Chinese suzerainty the actual position is that the Tibetan Government do not now acknowledge that Tibet is even nominally under the suzerainty of China. This was made clear by the Kashag on two occasions. Trimon Shape declared the position to be as follows:

Last year (1934) General Huang Mu Sung while in Tibet pressed the Tibetan Government to admit Chinese suzerainty outwardly. The Tibetan Government replied that they would be prepared to do so provided the Chinese would surrender to them certain territory, namely Derge and Nyarong on the Eastern Frontier, while as regards the administration of their internal and external affairs Tibet would remain free and untrammelled by China. Derge and Nyarong as the Government of India are aware have not been surrendered to Tibet and the Tibetan Government now refuse to acknowledge



Chinese suzerainty either in theory or in fact.' *Vis-a-vis* China, the Tibetan outlook on the 1914 Negotiations is similar.

Mr. Williamson was instructed to assure the Tibetan Government that His Majesty's Government would not in any event negotiate with China over the head of the Tibetan Government—a principle which had been ignored in the memorandum referred to in Foreign Office telegram No. 284 of the 27th August 1921.

With reference to the Huangmusung negotiations 1934, the following points may be noted :

- (i) At the time of the Huangmusung negotiations, Tibet conceded nothing. All that the Tibetan Government did was to indicate what were the points which they would be willing to concede in return for a satisfactory settlement.
- (ii) In brief, the Tibetan Government were then prepared to recognize and to revive the political and religious ties which had in the past linked an autonomous Tibet to a nominally suzerain China, to agree to a certain frontier in the vicinity of which no troops should be located by either party, and to facilitate the peaceful return of the Tashi Lama. What the Tibetan Government refused were recognition of Chinese control over the Tibetan army or civil administration or the conduct of foreign affairs, and any voice in the selection of officials or the discovery of a new Dalai Lama. In addition the Tibetan Government were not prepared to concede to China jurisdiction over Chinese half-breeds; did not welcome the idea of a permanent local Chinese representative except possibly on the lines contemplated in the draft 1914 Convention; and expressed the wish that the Tashi Lama should return *via* India. They would have no objection to the Chinese Government continuing to pay salaries to Tibetan officials posted to China. The idea of Tibet becoming in any way a constituent member of a Chinese republican federation was scouted. Nor were the Tibetan Government prepared to recognize even nominal Chinese suzerainty except in the event of China coming to terms on all major matters.
- (iii) The National Assembly desired that His Majesty's Government should be a party to any negotiations with China. It may be noted that such association is stipulated in Article 5 of the Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 1914.

## 2. *Lhasa Mission report, 1936, Appendix to Part IV*<sup>1</sup>

Neame's impressions of the condition of the Tibetan army from the information so far obtained from this and other sources are as follows.

It is clearly apparent that the Tibetans as a nation are absolutely unmilitary, all their thoughts and energies are devoted to their religious life. The Tibetan Government have absolutely no idea of military organization, administration or training. The military authorities even if they had the knowledge, have no power to apply it. The troops are untrained, unreliable, and unpopular with the country. The Tibetan Official hierarchy are quite indiscriminately pitch-forked into civil or military jobs regardless of their qualifications. No regular soldier of experience can rise beyond the rank of Rupon, a lower grade of commissioned officer.

In fact, it is justifiable to say that, except for the fact that they possess a certain number of modern weapons, which few of them know how to use, the army has advanced but little from its condition in 1904 when the British Mission advanced to Lhasa without any difficulty as regards military resistance although opposed at times by as many as 15,000 Tibetan troops. The British Mission never had more than 3 battalions of infantry, supported by 1 or 2 mountain guns, in action at a time—in fact about 2,000 men and 1 or 2 guns.

## 3. *New Delhi on Lhasa Mission report:*<sup>2</sup> *excerpts*

The only portion of Mr. Gould's report which calls for special comments, from the Government of India, at present, is Appendix A which deals with the Treaty position. Mr. Gould there takes the view that China is not at present entitled to claim suzerainty over Tibet. With this view the Government of India are unable to agree. As Mr. Gould himself has pointed out, not only Chinese suzerainty but, in some measure, Chinese control over Tibet was recognized prior to 1914. Article I of the Convention of 1914, it is true, states

<sup>1</sup>*IOR, L/P&S/12/36/25.*

<sup>2</sup>*India to Secretary of State, 17 June, 1937, in IOR, L/P&S/12/36/27.*

that the Conventions of 1890, 1904 and 1906 are binding on the parties "except in so far as they may have been modified by or may be inconsistent with or repugnant to, any of the provisions of the present Convention". There is nothing in the 1914 Convention which is "inconsistent with or repugnant to" Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. Nor can it be held that the refusal of China to sign the Convention of 1914 deprives her of her rights of suzerainty over Tibet. The Anglo-Tibetan Declaration attached to the Convention of 1914 states that "so long as the Government of China withholds signature to the aforesaid Convention, she will be debarred from the enjoyment of all privileges accruing therefrom". But Chinese suzerainty over Tibet is not a privilege accruing from the Convention of 1914: rather it is based on age-long usage and was recognized in previous Conventions which were merely confirmed in 1914. Moreover the memorandum handed over to the Chinese Minister in London in 1921---*vide* Foreign Office telegram No. 284, dated the 27th August 1921---states that His Majesty's Government recognize Tibet as an autonomous State "under the suzerainty of China". As the result of that recognition of "autonomy" Tibet secured certain concrete benefits from His Majesty's Government such as the supply of arms and diplomatic support against Chinese attempts to interfere with the internal administration of Outer Tibet. It was indeed mainly in order to secure liberty of action in these directions that His Majesty's Government made this declaration and not with the intention of subjecting Tibet to any measure of Chinese control, which had not existed before. In these circumstances the Government of India do not consider that it is open to them or to His Majesty's Government to repudiate Chinese suzerainty over Tibet or to support the Tibetan Government in an attempt to do so.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

H. A. R. Metcalfe

Secretary to the Government of India.

# XIV

## India re-discovers the McMahon line, 1936

### 1. Assam's control<sup>1</sup>

I am desired to refer to your demi-official letter No. F. 493-X/35, dated the 6th February 1936 in which you enquire whether, in the course of the last twenty years, Assam has exercised any measure of political control in the Balipara tribal area up to the McMahon line, and in particular whether the Tibetan Government honour the frontier by refraining from administrative measures such as the collection of revenue on the Indian side of the frontier, more especially in the Tawang area. In your subsequent demi-official letter No. F. 76-X/35, dated the 20th February 1936 you ask for details of the apparent claim of the Dzongpons of Tawang to derive authority from the Tibetan.

2. Captain Lightfoot, the Political Officer, Balipara Frontier Tract in April last toured in the extreme west of the tribal area and visited Tawang dzong. He collected evidence as to Tibetan influence from all sources such as village headmen, Tibetan traders, and officers who are engaged in revenue collection work. The results of his enquiries are given in the paragraphs that follow.

3. Tawang dzong consists of a monastery with about 500 monks and of a small village just outside the monastery. The monasterial council appoints 4 Dzongpons, 2 of whom live in Dirangdzong (83 A/B-3) and 2 in Kalaktang (83 A/A-4)<sup>a</sup>. The Dzongpons of Dirangdzong are responsible for collecting revenue on behalf of the Tawangdzong monastery from the area north of a line running from west to east through Manda La and Bomdi La (83 A/B-3). South of this the Kalaktang Dzongpons collect revenue in an undefined area between that line and the Inner Line of the Balipara Frontier Tract. The revenue collected is largely in kind, the main articles being red pepper, chillies, ponies and rice.

4. These Dzongpons hold office for a term of three years and, besides collecting revenues, administer these areas in so far as they decide disputes and award punishments. They visit Tawangdzong

<sup>1</sup>Dawson (Chief Secretary, Assam) to Caroe (Deputy Secretary, New Delhi), 29 May, 1936, in *IOR*, L/P&S/12/36/29.

for two months in the hot weather. They keep in their own hands the revenue collected as they are responsible for keeping the monastery and the main road to Tawang in repair and have also to perform an expensive religious ceremony at the end of their term of office.

5. These four Dzungpons are not however the only officials who collect revenue. The Chanzu of Tawang also does so, each year from the Dirangdzong area, and once in three years from the Kalaktang area. This revenue is for the maintenance of the Guru of the monastery and his relatives. There are also four other officers from Tawang who make collections for the maintenance of the monks in the Tawang monastery.

6. Nor does this complete the collections. There are two other Dzungpons, locally known by the Monbas as the Tsona (78 M/D-I) Dzungpons, appointed by the Tibetan Government. Their task is to collect revenue and decide disputes in the area round Tawangdzong and to the north of the Manda La-Bomdi La line. They also collect revenue from the Tibetan district of Tsona. The names of the present officers are Ragashak, a permanent official and Gadeu, who holds office for three years. Both are Tibetans and not local Monbas. They are purely civil officials and have nothing whatever to do with the running of the monastery. They live in the village of Gyankar which lies about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles due east of Tawangdzong. The total annual collection of revenue—paid in kind—from the areas in their charge is said to amount to Rs. 10,000 but this figure must be taken for what it is worth, as there are no means of check.

7. Periodical visits are also paid by various Tibetan officials who check the collection work of the various Dzungpons.

8. Apart from these collections of revenue, Rs. 5,000 is paid annually in *posa*<sup>a</sup> to the Kalaktang Dzungpons. This sum is distributed as follows:

Rs. 1,122 is sent by the Tawangdzong monastery to Lhasa where Rs. 600 is paid to the Drepung and other monasteries and Rs. 522 retained by the Tibetan Government. The balance Rs. 3,878 is divided among the Dzungpons of Tawangdzong and Tsona-dzong.

9. The Political Officer in his report sums up the result of his enquiry as follows:

“The people, round Tawangdzong especially, definitely consider

themselves as being under the Tibetan Government and there is no doubt whatever that the Tibetan Government definitely rule the Tawang area and collect revenue from as far south as Dirangdzong."

10. From the enquiry it seems clear that the connection of the Lhasa Government with the Tawang area and the country to the South at least as far as a line through Manda La and Bomdi La (all this tract being south of the McMahon line) rests on four points:

- (a) The Dzongpons of the Tsona district in Tibet live at Gyankar near Tawang and collect revenue from the Tawang as well as from the Tsona district;
- (b) Out of the *posa* of Rs. 5,000 paid to the Tawang Dzongpons who live at Kalaktang Rs. 1,122 is sent to Lhasa;
- (c) Tibetan officials check the collection work of the various Dzongpons as far as Dirangdzong; and
- (d) the people round Tawang consider themselves as being under the Tibetan Government.

11. Captain Lightfoot who came to Shillong a few days ago was asked if he had reasonable proof of the correctness of these points. He said that he was reasonably sure of the truth of the information which had been given to him. So far as he is aware, the last Political Officer to visit Tawangdzong was Captain Nevill in 1914. He has failed to trace any previous notes dealing with the points at issue. He has a photograph of the Tsona Dzongpons taken at Gyankar in 1914. He tried to ascertain how long Tibetan influence had been exercised in the area through which he toured, especially round Tawang. All he could get was a vague reply that this had been the case for a long time.

12. As to the question whether Assam has exercised any measure of political control in the Balipara tribal area up to the McMahon line, the policy of Government in the tribal area has always been to interfere as little as possible in internal administration. Friendly tours are made every cold weather in different sections of the tribal area but these only extend a comparatively short distance from the Inner Line and very rarely go anywhere near the McMahon line. In the course of these tours the Political Officer tries to settle any local disputes which the tribesmen bring before him. Improvement in communications has been effected by the construction of new

roads. There are also occasional expeditions—especially against the Dafflas to inflict punishment for raids on villages which are in British territory or are under our immediate protection. The people who live in the extreme west of the tribal area where Tibetan influence is exercised are very peaceful and there has never been any cause for our interference in that quarter.

## 2. *New Delhi's viewpoint<sup>1</sup>: excerpts*

Secondly, although a correct reference to this frontier was made in Sir Charles Bell's book 'Tibet: Past and Present' published in 1924, well-known publications such as the *Times Atlas* still show the frontier of India along the administered border of the Province of Assam. Thirdly, it has been ascertained in the present year that the Tibetan Government continue to raise revenue of various kinds, in part for the Tawang Monastery but also for the Lhasa Government throughout a large area on the Indian side of the international frontier. A copy of a demi-official letter No. Pol. 1161/4147-A.P., dated the 29th May 1936, giving details of Tibetan administrative organization in this area, is forwarded as an enclosure to this letter. This letter shows that not only are two forms of the revenue raised in this area paid to the Lhasa Government but that that Government actually maintain officials in and around Tawang and that the population consider themselves as subject to the Tibetan Government. Finally, a recent reference to His Majesty's Embassy, Peking, reveals (see Peking Despatch No. 35, dated the 25th June 1936) that the latest Chinese atlases show almost the whole of the tribal area south of the McMahon line up to the administered border of British India in Assam together with a portion of northern Burma, as included in China.

3. His Majesty's Government have now agreed that the 1914 Convention with Tibet and connected agreements should be published (with due avoidance of unnecessary publicity) and that the boundary as then laid down should be shown on maps published by the Survey of India. The Government of India, however, feel

<sup>1</sup>Foreign Secretary, India to Under Secretary of State, London, 17 August, 1936, in *IOR, L/P&S/12/36/29*.

that this action will hardly suffice to correct the false impressions which have already gained ground, and may present greater embarrassment in future. The position briefly is that the cartographical activities of the Chinese have set up a claim to absorb in China a very large stretch of Indian territory, while in a portion of India just west of the area claimed by the Chinese as part of Sikang Province, namely Tawang, the Tibetan Government, over whom the Chinese claim suzerainty, are collecting revenue and exercising jurisdiction many miles on the Indian side of the international frontier. China's claim does not at present actually include Tawang itself, but there can be little doubt that it will be extended to Tawang, and even to Bhutan, and Sikkim, if no steps are taken to challenge these activities. There is moreover the danger that the exercise of jurisdiction by Tibet in the Tawang area might enable China, or other Power in a position in future to assert authority over Tibet, to claim prescriptive rights over a part of the territory recognised as within India under the 1914 Convention.

4. The action proposed by the Government of India to meet this situation would be on the following lines. Fortunately in connection with a recent journey by a British subject to Eastern Tibet, the Government of India have just obtained a re-affirmation by the Tibetan Government that the McMahon line (referred to by them as the Red Line) still represents the international frontier between India and Tibet. Copies of the telegrams exchanged between the Government of India and the Political Officer in Sikkim on this subject are forwarded as enclosures to this letter. While the Government of India are far from anxious to embroil themselves with the Tibetan Government in matters such as revenue collection in the Tawang area, they would strongly urge that advantage should be taken of the present political Mission to Lhasa to instruct Mr. Gould to obtain from the Tibetan Government a definite reaffirmation by exchange of notes acknowledging the McMahon line as the frontier between India and Tibet, and at the same time to demand that the collection of revenue for the Lhasa Government in the Tawang area should be discontinued. It would be made clear that there was no intention to interfere with monastic collections for the

<sup>1</sup>(1) Telegram No. 3028, dated the 5 November, 1935 to the Political Officer in Sikkim.

(2) Telegram from the Trade Agent, Lhasa, No. 5, dated the 14th November, 1935.



Tawang Monastery. The question whether as a result of such protest it will be necessary to introduce Indian Administration to replace Tibetan officials in the Tawang area, can be left over for further consideration in the light of Mr. Gould's report on conclusion of the Lhasa Mission.

5. As regards China, the position of His Majesty's Government and the Government of India is that they recognise Tibet as autonomous both in internal and in external affairs, and that they are therefore competent to conclude a treaty with Tibet as in the case of the 1914 Convention, and to reaffirm the provisions of such treaty by direct negotiations with Tibet when and in such manner as may seem fit to both parties and without the intervention of the Chinese Government. Proceeding on this principle the Government of India would recommend that His Majesty's Ambassador, Peking, should be instructed to make a strong protest to the Chinese Government against the usurpation of Indian territory on Chinese maps, and basing the Government of India's claim on the position set up by the 1914 Convention to inform the Chinese Government that the boundaries of Sikang Province in so far as they infringe India are a breach of that treaty and are in no way recognised by His Majesty's Government.

6. The Government of India feel that it is important to make use of the opportunity presented by the Mission to Lhasa to make their position clear at least with the Tibetan Government. They would therefore ask that if possible orders on this part of their recommendations should be conveyed by telegram. In making these recommendations they are particularly impressed by the consideration that the impending separation of Burma renders it more than ever desirable that the international boundaries claimed by India on her North-Eastern frontier should be left in no doubt either with the Chinese or the Tibetan Governments.

### 3. *India Office minute by J. C. Walton<sup>1</sup>: excerpts*

This reason, though, for what it is worth, it is the one which has hitherto guided us in the recent past. Thus in 1925 we suggested

<sup>1</sup>Minute by J. C. Walton, 4 June, 1936 in *IOR, L/P&S/12/36/23*.

to the F.O. that publication of the Trade Regulations of 1914 might no doubt have the effect of arousing in China renewed public interest in Tibet, and anti-British comments; but Lord Birkenhead is inclined to think that there is no serious objection to publication, if the Government of India think it desirable; and the F.O. replied that they would prefer that publication should be avoided unless the G. of I. attach great importance to it. In 1928, when the Tibet chapter of Aitchison was under revision, the G. of I. purposely omitted explicit reference to the Trade Regulations of 1914; they stated that "in view of the possibility that publication now of the facts of the Declaration of 3 July 1914 (though it seems unlikely that China is still unaware of its existence) may force her to take overt notice of it, and so afford a fresh handle for anti-British propaganda, the Government of India think that it is on the whole most prudent to treat the matter as has been done in the draft Narrative". The I.O. and F.O. concurred in this suggestion. Again, in 1933/4 the I.O. and the G. of I. agreed that no specific treaty should be cited in the Declaration in Council regarding the exercise of foreign jurisdiction in Tibet, in view of the fact that the Trade Regulations of 1914 had not been agreed to by the Chinese Government who might, if they were cited in the Declaration in Council, conceivably raise objection to the action of H.M.G.

It will be seen that though the risk of attracting unwelcoming Chinese notice has been the reason for non-publication we have not felt very strongly about it so far as the G. of I. and this office is concerned. There does not seem to be any strong balance of argument either for or against publication. If the F.O. are willing to concur we might perhaps decide to publish.

The reason of the urgency with which the G. of I. put forward their proposal is not clear. Presumably they contemplate publishing a supplement to, or a reprint of, the present Tibet volume. If there is no reason for urgency an alternative would be to make a note of the additions to be included in the next revision of Aitchison. This will be suggested when we write to them after hearing from the F.O.

J. C. Walton  
4.6.36

#### 4. *India Office minute by M. J. Clauson*<sup>1</sup>

The boundary between India and Tibet was laid down in 1914 at the Simla Conference between the British, Chinese and Tibetans during that year: please see the Convention of 3rd July, 1914, and the map attached to it (flagged at the bottom of the file).

Just on the Indian side of the line and adjoining Bhutan is the district of Tawang. Paragraph iv(4) of Sir H. McMahon's Memorandum on the Tibet Conference (see Flag 'A') refers to this district.

In that paragraph Sir H. McMahon refers to the desirability of putting the Tawang district, now that it was definitely inside India, on a satisfactory basis. This was never done; principally, it appears the Chinese never ratified the Convention and it was desired not to draw too much attention to its existence for fear of embroiling ourselves in an unnecessary controversy with the Chinese. Indeed there is a very large tract of unadministered territory between the administrative border of Assam and the international frontier with Tibet. (There is also a similar tract between the administrative border of Burma and the international frontier with the Chinese Province of Hsi Kang.)

At Tawang there is a Tibetan Monastery. The Monastery collects various kinds of revenue for religious purposes from the surrounding country, and there can be no question of interfering with this arrangement. In addition, however, to the dues collected by the Monastery, it appears that the Tibetan Government carry on some sort of administration in the district and collect revenues for purely civil purposes. It is obviously undesirable that this should happen on the British side of the line, and it is proposed by the Government of India that Mr. Gould should raise the matter with the Tibetan Government during his present visit to Lhasa.

At the same time it is suggested that he should obtain from the Tibetan Government a written reaffirmation of the 1914 frontier. It appears from the second and third enclosures to the Government of India letter of 17th August now submitted (see Flag 'B') that there is no question but that the Tibetan Government still recognise this frontier, as they specifically said so in connection with a recent protest which they made against Mr. Kingdon-Ward's illicit expedition into Tibet, and it is perhaps doubtful whether it is really

<sup>1</sup>Minute by M. J. Clauson, 31 August, 1936 in *IOR, L/P&S/12/36/29*.

essential to secure a written reaffirmation from them. There would obviously be advantage, however, in doing so if Mr. Gould can do it without serious difficulty.

A draft telegram approving the Government of India's recommendations is submitted. The telegram is worded in such a way as somewhat to tone down the recommendations. Mr. Gould has rather delicate business to transact with the Tibetan Government while he is in Lhasa, and it seems undesirable to encourage him to be aggressive with the Tibetans over this frontier question as to which we know they see eye to eye with us.

There is a further suggestion in the Government of India's letter for a protest to the Chinese Government in connection with the Indo-Chinese part of the frontier, but this is of no immediate urgency and may be left over for the moment. It is desirable to clear up the questions affecting Mr. Gould's conversation with the Tibetans as he has already arrived in Lhasa.

M. J. Clauson  
31.8.36

### *5. India Office minute by J. C. Walton<sup>1</sup>*

Please see Mr. Clauson's note below.

So far as the Tibetan Government are concerned the north-east frontier of India was laid down in two agreements in 1914—(1) Art. 9 of the Tripartite Convention, which was ultimately not accepted by China but was acknowledged as binding between Tibet and Gt. Britain by the Anglo-Tibetan declaration of 3rd July, 1914; (2) a separate and earlier exchange of Notes between Sir H. McMahon and the Lonchen Shatra in March 1914; the map attached to the latter showed the Indo-Tibetan frontier in much greater detail than the map of the boundaries of Tibet as a whole which was attached to the Convention. In their present letter the G. of I. do not expressly refer to the exchange of notes. These notes have a much more specific application to the present proposal than the later documents, and might be the best basis for Mr. Gould's

<sup>1</sup>Minute by J. C. Walton, 9 September, 1936 in *IOR, L/P&S/12/36/29*.

representations.

The juridical position in regard to the north-east frontier is not perfectly secure, because the Agreements of 1914 on the subject were concluded only with Tibet and not with China, and China has an acknowledged claim to suzerainty (which might mean much or little) over Tibet. The present proposal to reaffirm the Anglo-Tibetan undertakings will not, of course, cure the defect, such as it is. But none the less the reaffirmation may be worth while, as it would have the advantage of clearing up the position in Tawang, and, if the fundamental question of the validity of the Agreements is ever raised by China, it might also conceivably be of some small assistance to our case that they had been recently reaffirmed by Tibet.

The G. of I.'s further proposal to protest at Nanking against the cartographical encroachments of China can be taken up separately with the F.O. The proposal for action *vis-a-vis* Tibet is urgent, in order that we may take advantage of Mr. Gould's presence at Lhasa. We might telegraph in the sense of the attached draft, subject to F.O. concurrence, which is being sought; it seems desirable to allow Mr. Gould to exercise some discretion (in the light of circumstances on the spot) as to the proposed representations.

J. C. Walton  
9.9.36

(Intlld.)	L.D.W.	(Sir Leonard Day Wakely)	10.9.
„	S.F.S.	(Sir Samuel Findlater Stewart)	11.9.
„	Z.	(Lord Zetland).	13.9.

# XV

## Exercising Control in Tawang

### *1. Assam to India<sup>1</sup>: excerpts*

7. There are certain commitments, considerable, but not incommensurate with the important objects to be achieved, which His Excellency considers that the forward policy now proposed must inevitably involve and I am to enumerate these as follows:

- (1) In view of the heavy responsibilities which have to be discharged elsewhere on this frontier His Excellency feels that it will be impossible to depute an officer to Tawang for the length of time proposed without an addition of one officer to either the Indian Civil Service or Indian Police cadre of the Province.
- (2) The Assistant Political Officer deputed to Tawang will not only need an escort with him, but supporting posts will have to be established on his line of communication, which will run through country inhabited by very restless tribes, who, unless kept in order by a show of force, might at any moment cut him off from the plains and place the expedition in grave jeopardy. The force of Assam Rifles necessary for the escort, the supporting posts, and the provision convoys would have in the first instance to be found by the 2nd (Lakhimpur) Battalion of the Assam Rifles, the headquarters of which are many days journey away at Sadiya. But this could not be regarded as other than a temporary, and not a satisfactory, arrangement, and, if the proposals outlined above regarding the penetration of the Tawang area are carried out and the occupation maintained, it is quite clear that it will be necessary to examine the question of terminating the temporary amalgamation of the 2nd and 5th battalions which was reported to the Secretary of State in Government of India Home Department letter No. 44/F.6/IV/32 Police dated the 7th July 1932, and of re-establishing the 5th Battalion or at least an independent

<sup>1</sup>Assam to New Delhi, 'Indo-Tibetan Frontier', 27 May, 1937 in *IOR, L/P&S/12/36/29*.

wing of the 2nd Battalion with headquarters at Lokra.

- (3) It is probable that the carrier corps of Balipara Frontier Force will have to be strengthened in order to cope with the extra work entailed in the transport of rations to the various posts contemplated.
- (4) There are at present in the area no roads better than tribesmen's tracks, rough and ungraded, traversed by unbridged rivers, unfordable in flood. In order, therefore, to ensure satisfactory communication between the post at Tawang and its base it will be necessary to construct a bridle path, properly bridged, from administered territory to Tawang, with rest houses for use in the severe weather which is to be expected.

8. His Excellency regrets that he cannot, at this early stage, estimate in detail the financial implications of the policy he proposes, but he trusts that the contents of this letter will furnish a sufficiently clear indication of the measures which he believes to be necessary if the policy adumbrated in paragraph 8 of Mr. Gould's letter of the 15th November 1936, referred to in paragraph 2 above, is to be pursued with a reasonable likelihood of success.

## *2. Lightfoot's report: Assam's recommendations<sup>1</sup>*

I am directed to refer to the correspondence resting with your telegram No. 1107 of the 7th July 1938 and to submit for the information and orders of the Government of India a copy of the report of the Political Officer, Balipara, on his expedition to the Towang area. Captain Lightfoot has throughout borne in mind the instructions contained in your Confidential letter No. F. 493-X/35, dated the 1st July, 1937, and your telegram No. 818 of 16th May, 1936.

2. His Excellency has had the advantage not only of perusing Captain Lightfoot's report, but of discussing personally with him the deplorable state of the inhabitants of the Towang area under Tibetan oppression. The Political Officer, in the course of his joint exploration with Bhutan representatives of a suitable boundary between that State and the Balipara trible area, saw some Bhutan

<sup>1</sup>Assam to New Delhi, 7 September, 1938 in *IOR, L/P&S/12/36/29*.

villagers and described in a way which greatly impressed His Excellency the contrast between the cheerful demeanour of the Bhutan subjects and the crowded condition of villagers of identical race in the Towang area.

3. Fully though His Excellency appreciates the weighty reasons which have hitherto made the Government of India reluctant to commit themselves to further responsibilities in the Towang area, His Excellency cannot resist the conclusion that the report reveals a state of affairs far more serious than anything which the meagre information previously available had suggested and one which is intolerable in an area which is undoubtedly British. His Excellency ventures to express the opinion that to acquiesce in the continuance of the state of virtual slavery (vide Report, Part I, paragraph 16 and Appendix I) in which the Monbas live is incompatible with the solemn commitments involved by the recent withdrawal of the reservation to the Slavery Convention in respect of the unadministered parts of the Balipara Frontier Tract, conveyance of which to the League of Nations was intimated to this Government in your Memo No. F.304-X/38 of the 25th May 1938.

That brutal punishments are inflicted on British Monbas by irregular Tibetan courts His Excellency has no doubt. Of the frequency of so called capital punishments there is no precise information, but His Excellency is satisfied that inhabitants of a British area are from time to time murdered in this way under the orders of officials of the Tibetan Government.

4. His Excellency therefore ventures to trust that the Government of India will now place on record a decision that it is their intention to assume full responsibility in this area, and that subject to the exigencies of the relationships which at present subsist between the Tibetan Government and the Government of India steps will be taken at an appropriate time, the earlier the better, to relieve the Monbas from the grievous oppression to which they are now subjected.

5. With this end in view His Excellency begs to submit the following concrete proposals. Realising that the financial aspect is of importance His Excellency has framed them on the least expensive lines possible. Though, for reasons which will appear below, a complete estimate is not yet ready, His Excellency considers that the net cost will be inconsiderable, and that as good administration brings peace and prosperity the cost is likely to dwindle to



negligible proportions, and may even be converted into an excess of revenue over expenditure:

- (1) A control area should be declared, with boundaries as proposed by the Political Officer (vide Report, Part II, paragraph 2 and Appendix 2). This will in itself entail no expenditure, but will mark the limits of the area from which the tribute proposed in sub-paragraph (5) below will be paid and into which raids by Akas from the east will not be allowed.
- (2) The Tibetan Government should be requested to withdraw their officials from this area. The absolute necessity of this needs, His Excellency feels, no further emphasis. (Vide Report, Part II, paragraph 3).
- (3) Negotiations should be begun with the object to causing the substitution of Monba for Tibetan religious officials in Towang monastery and of placing the contributions of the monastery on a known and equitable basis, with the abolition of all forced labour.
- (4) Monopolies in salt and rice should be abolished.
- (5) A tribute of Rs. 5 per house should be imposed throughout the area. His Excellency has discussed this with the Political Officer and is satisfied that it is not excessive. (Vide Report, Part II, paragraph 4 (1).)

His Excellency recommends that this should be a tribute rather than a tax, for he considers that the area now under consideration must remain tribal territory and cannot form part of the Province of Assam, even with the status only of an excluded area, in any future that can be foreseen. The inhabitants are for the most part Buddhist, with no affinities with the plainsmen of Assam. Indeed members of some of the tribes are, His Excellency understands, forbidden by their religion even to visit the plains. His Excellency therefore considers that the receipts in the form of tribute from the Towang area should be credited to Central Revenues, from which expenditure on the area will be drawn.

- (6) His Excellency agrees with the Political Officer (vide Report, Part II, paragraph 4 (2), (3) and (4)) that the administrative staff should consist of an Agent at Towang and Assistant Agent at Dirangdzong, and considers that the type of officer

and pay proposed are suitable. They will require the small office establishment suggested. His Excellency considers that an administration of this type, while being the least expensive that can be devised, will be adequate.

- (7) Regarding the escort that will be required His Excellency has sought the advice of his Inspector-General of Police and is inclined to agree with him though that half a platoon with the Agent at Towang will be sufficient it would be advisable to post a full platoon with the Assistant Agent at Dirangdzong on the line of communication. The escort will require a medical staff of one Sub-Assistant Surgeon and one Compounder, who will also treat the local inhabitants.

The escort will be drawn from the 2nd (Sadiya) Battalion, Assam Rifles, and His Excellency is examining the question whether it will be possible to provide these additional posts without establishing a wing of the battalion at Lokra or even splitting up the present 2nd Battalion and reconstituting the 5th Battalion.

It is the intricacy of this problem and the necessity of going carefully into the question of the cost of rationing the posts that have prevented His Excellency from submitting a detailed estimate with this letter. His Excellency regrets this inevitable delay, but ventures to hope that perusal of Captain Lightfoot's report at this stage will be of assistance to the Government of India in arriving at an early decision. A detailed estimate will be forwarded as soon as possible.

6. His Excellency has noted, and desires to bring to the notice of the Government of India, the names of the officers whose good work the Political Officer commends. He desires to add to them the name of Captain Lightfoot himself who, while in no way refraining from making the thorough investigation which the problem demanded has throughout shown tact and sound judgment in a situation which was often most delicate.

### 3. *Gould to India*<sup>1</sup>: Lhasa, 1936

The clear facts of the case appear to be that up to 1914 the Tawang area was Tibetan; that in 1914 it was ceded by Tibet (without mention of any *quid pro quo*); that such cession has not been recognised by China; and that since 1914 we have done little if anything to disturb that *de facto* continuance by Tibet of the same methods and degree of control as were exercised by Tibet in the area prior to 1914.

The future handling of the case may conveniently be considered in relation to two extremely opposed contingencies. But first it may be remarked that, judging by the evidence of the map, the Tawang area appears not only to afford a favourable alternative route for trade between India and Central and East Central Tibet but also to provide, both climatically and from the point of view of communications, particularly favourable conditions for the location of troops whether they be Indian, Tibetan, or Chinese. And it is difficult to imagine any method by which the Chinese, by a moderate amount of expenditure and effort, could cause us more embarrassment than by claiming that Tawang is Chinese and by locating Chinese troops, and a Chinese administration, in the Tawang area.

In the event of Tibet succeeding—possibly without assistance—in coming to terms with China, particularly as regards the fixation of a Sino-Tibetan frontier, the Tibetans will have obtained the *quid pro quo* which, the Kashag now suggest, was intended to underline the cession of Tawang, and, by the oral admission of the Tibetan Government to our assuming in the Tawang area, and eastwards, up to the McMahon line, such degree and methods of control as may best suit us.

If, on the other hand, the Tibetan Government allow Chinese troops to enter Tibet, we should in my opinion be well advised to take the bull by the horns and time by the forelock, and forthwith assert authority in the Tawang area, and at the same time make sure that we exercise a degree of authority adequate to exclude Chinese influence throughout the area south of the McMohan line towards the Rima area. In this connection I have recently received information from a trustworthy Tibetan source that the Chinese, as part of

<sup>1</sup>Excerpts from Gould (Lhasa) to India, 15 November, 1936 in *IOR*, L/P&S/12/36/29.

their "Sikang" idea, have mapped out areas, and have established a provisional framework of Government, and have planted "cells", with a view to the familiarisation of distant areas with Chinese Republican ideas; and there is no reason to suppose that in making their plans they have respected the McMahon Red Line.

An intermediate possibility is that for some time to come Chinese troops may not enter Tibet, and Tibet may not succeed in securing a settled Sino-Tibetan frontier. In that case, while there can be no question of relaxing our claim to the Tawang area and to all areas south of the McMahon line, there will be plenty of time to consider, in consultation with the Government of Assam, what ultimate arrangements will be best, and how they may gradually be introduced in such manner as may be calculated to cause least shock to Tibetan susceptibilities.

B. J. Gould  
Political Officer in Sikkim

#### 4. *Gould to India<sup>1</sup>: Gangtok, 1938*

I apprehend that, the questions of the Sino-Tibetan frontier, and of Tibet's relations with China, being still unsettled, there is in fact small prospect of the Tibetan Government agreeing, in anticipation, to honour the 1914 agreement in regard to Tawang, on which for more than 20 years we have taken no action and which the Tibetan Government regard as having been intended in 1914, to be part and parcel of an arrangement whereby their own interests would be secured. On the other hand there is the fact that the Tibetan Government have not in the past taken exception to such activity as has from time to time been displayed by the Assam Government in areas which in 1914 were Tibetan rather than British.

Politically it would have been most convenient if a matter to which so little attention has been directed during the last 24 years could have continued to remain in oblivion. But I realise that this is not practicable. In the circumstances I feel that I must agree with

<sup>1</sup>Excerpts from Gould (Gangtok) to New Delhi, 15 February, 1938 in *IOR*, L/P&S/12/36/29.

Norbhu that on the whole it will probably be best that action on the part of the Assam Government in the Tawang area should precede conversations in Lhasa.

### 5. *Norbhu to Gould*<sup>1</sup> : *Lhasa, 1938*

I have the honour to report that as I have not received any answer from the Kashag (Cabinet Ministers), I again called on them on the 20th August 1938, and enquired from them whether they had come to any decision regarding Tawang about which I had discussed with them several times. The Kashag told me frankly that they were ashamed of themselves in not being able to fulfil their repeated promises to let me have their decision on the subject. They then explained that most of the officers who had been to India in connection with the Anglo-Tibetan Simla Conference of 1913-14 had expired and some of them had already retired from the Government service and that the present Cabinet Ministers and the King (Regent) are all ignorant of the knowledge that Tawang was ceded to British India. They added that it takes a long while to trace documents on any subject as the office records of the Tibetan Government are not kept in a proper order as the offices of other countries do. Moreover, they stated that some of the relevant documents of 1913-14 Simla Treaty are with the Regent and some papers are in other offices, which are not easily traceable. They, therefore, could not go through the question. They also added that office works are carried out very slowly in the offices of the Tibetan Government and that I, therefore, should not take an exception for the delay. They also requested me to inform you and the Government of India accordingly in the best possible manner so that you and the Government of India may not be disappointed.

2. In the meanwhile, the Kashag asked me to furnish them with a copy of the Treaty clause by virtue of which Tawang was ceded to the British Government. They said that on receipt of this they will confer among themselves. They, however, made me understand distinctly that the settlement of the question will take time as they are not empowered to decide such an important question

<sup>1</sup>Norbhu (Lhasa) to Gould, 26 August, 1938 in *IOR, L/P&S/12/36/29*.

without referring it to the National Assembly.

3. In accordance with the above discussion, I have sent a copy of Article 9 of 1914 Convention together with a covering letter, a copy of which is forwarded herewith for your information.

4. So far I have seen the Kashag not less than 9 times and the Regent 3 times about Tawang. All of them are afraid to come to a decision in the matter and the explanation given by them regarding the possible delay in going through the question is merely a pretence. As they said definitely that they want time to come to a decision, I am afraid, it means that the matter will be delayed for many months or years, as they have done in the case of Tehri-Tibet boundary dispute, which has remained unsettled for so many years.

5. Under these circumstances, I am of the opinion that the only alternative now left is to depute the Political Officer, Balipara, every year to Tawang with a personal bodyguard of 12 sepoy and to stop the annual Posa of Rs. 5,000/- forthwith. It may also be made known in the widest possible way that Tawang is within British India. If we do these, the Tibetan Government will sooner or later come to a definite proposal, which will enable the Assam Government to take action as necessary.

# XVI

Lhasa 1938

*Lhasa Mission Diary for the month of May 1938.<sup>1</sup>  
excerpts*

2nd May.—At the request of the Kashag, Norbhu called on them today. They raised the question of Tawang about which Norbhu has reported to the Political Officer in Sikkim.

4th May.—Lhalu Lhacham called on Norbhu on a friendly visit and stayed to lunch.

6th May.—Norbhu called on Bhondong Shape to discuss regarding Tawang.

7th May.—In the morning, Norbhu went to see Tendong Shape in connection with the Tawang question.

In the afternoon, Norbhu interviewed Kalon Lama regarding Tawang.

11th May.—The Tibetan Government invited the Mission personnel to witness the show of “Trungkor Tsegyuk”, musket firing and arrow shooting from horseback performed by junior Tibetan officials. A separate tent was provided for the Mission. The performance is said to be a horsemanship test for every Tibetan officer entering into Government service and is compulsory. Each officer has to do it once after entering into the service. As only 6 or 8 officials enter into service annually, this show is held when a sufficient number of officials have entered into service. The last race is said to have taken place about 10 years ago. There were about 54 junior officials this time and most of them were young men. Upto midday, musket firing and arrow shooting from horseback was performed and in the afternoon a competition of arrow shooting, dismounted, was held. The latter competition was judged by the distance of an arrow shot. Each official shot 2 arrows. On conclusion, ceremonial scarves were given to the officials as prizes. The Regent and Cabinet Ministers were present.

16th May.—Norbhu went to offer congratulations and customary presents to Depon Jigme Tering, Kusho Kunsangtse and Kusho Choden Tender who were appointed as Labrang Chanzod, Treasurers

<sup>1</sup>IOR, L/P&S/12/36/25.

to the Tibetan Government. The posts carry the rank of senior 4th rank.

18th May.—Norbhu called on the Kashag to discuss Tawang question.

19th May.—Labrang Chanzod Jigme Tering invited the Mission personnel to lunch and dinner given in celebration of his recent promotion.

20th May.—Labrang Chanzod Kunsangtse invited Norbhu to lunch and dinner given in celebration of his recent promotion, as Treasurer of the Tibetan Government.

21st May.—Labrang Chanzod Choden Tender invited all the members of the Mission to his party given in celebration of his recent promotion.

24th May.—Norbhu again called on the Kashag to discuss Tawang question.

27th May.—Norbhu entertained about 20 junior Tibetan officials and their wives to lunch, cinema and tea. All of them appreciated the entertainment very much.

29th May.—The Regent called Norbhu and asked him to wire to the Political Officer in Sikkim to release Mathinfu Zillingpa, his wife and daughter who were detained at Kalimpong by Bengal Police. Norbhu has reported about this to the Political Officer in Sikkim.

30th May.—Norbhu called on the Kashag to discuss the question of Tawang.

In the afternoon, Dzasa Tsarong called on Norbhu for a friendly chat. He was entertained to tea and dinner.

31st May.—3,978 persons and children were vaccinated during May 1938.



# XVII

## India and the Mongolian Fringe<sup>1</sup>

*Note by Foreign Secretary*

The intention of this paper is, in retrospect and prospect, very briefly to review the relations of the States and tribal areas on the North East Frontier of India with one another, with India, and with China and Tibet, with the object of arriving at some appraisal of the importance of this frontier at the present juncture to the security of India and of the measures necessary to maintain in this quarter, as elsewhere, the traditional foreign policy of the Government of India. This may be defined as the defence of the Indian glacis by and through the stabilisation of minor States or tribal organisations situated thereon, so denying occupation to any Great Power. Here, as in the North-West, it is possible to point to the development, no doubt half unconscious, of an inner and an outer ring of defence. In the North-West and West we have the Pathan and Baluch tribes under a loose control, backed by Afghanistan and Persia, the tribes being more closely allied by race and language to the principalities in their rear than to India. In the North-East we have in the forefront the juridically independent State of Nepal, Sikkim, hitherto considered as an Indian State, and the Protectorate of Bhutan, a semi-independent State in special treaty relations with the Government of India; while behind them stands Tibet, also in special treaty relations with us but under the shadowy suzerainty of China. Though the degree varies, all the States in the inner ring have Mongolian affinities, the Nepalese ruling family and many of the valley-dwellers of Nepal may look to India for cultural inspiration, but we have only to look to Nepalese architecture and to the features and character of Gurkha rifleman to trace the Mongol connection; while Sikkim and Bhutan are culturally in all respects appanages of Tibet. Only in the far North-east, along the Assam border beyond Bhutan, we have wild primitive tribes inhabiting a no man's land of dense jungle, and interposed between the civilization of India and that of Sino-Tibetan origin. And into that no man's land the Tibetans are year by year encroaching further towards the plains of India. Meanwhile China is in turmoil, pressed back by open war in the East at the hands of

<sup>1</sup>For the text, *IOR*, L/P&S/12/36/23, Part I.

Japan, in the North and West yielding her Provinces to the more insidious presence of Soviet Russia. A new reincarnation of the Dalai Lama is about to be inaugurated in Lhasa. China and India are despatching Missions to mark the occasion and to endeavour, each in their several interests, to maintain their political influence at this great Central Asian Centre. The scene was shifting before the European war broke: more rapid transformations are likely under the impact of war both in the West and the East. The moment is ripe to consider what positive policy may be adopted to maintain a defence which, during the past century and more, has been secured with less expenditure of life and money than on any part of the Indian perimeter.

### *Nepal*

For many years the relations of Nepal with its neighbours remained uncertain. Her connection with China is often forgotten, but never by the Chinese. Until 1908 the Nepalese sent a quin-quennial mission with presents to Peking, and the custom only ceased on the deposition of the Chinese emperor in the revolution of 1912. China made a treaty with Nepal in 1780, on which she found a vague claim to suzerainty. Later in 1792, when in pursuance of ancient rivalries the Nepalese invaded Tibet, China sent an expedition to the assistance of Tibet with the result that the Nepalese were driven out and sustained a severe defeat at the hands of the Chinese General only 20 miles from Katmandu. The Chinese suspecting that the Indian Government had supported the Nepalese, closed the Tibetan passes to India, and they remained closed until the 1904 Lhasa expedition. Before the 1792 defeat the Nepalese had invaded Sikkim also and threatened Bhutan, and were able to maintain their position in the former until the 1815 war with the Indian Government, when the Gurkhas were decisively defeated by the British and Sikkim was restored.<sup>a</sup> Since that time Nepal has remained in uninterrupted friendly relations with the Indian Government and she supplies large numbers of soldiers, who form perhaps the sturdiest and most reliable part of the Indian Army. For many years her constitutional status remained undefined, and it is interesting to observe that in the last edition of the Gazetteer of India she figures as an Indian State. The British representative at the Court of Nepal was known as the Resident and it was the fashion to define Nepal's position as semi-independent and analogous to that

of Afghanistan, which until the Third Afghan War was a British protectorate. But in the Mutiny of 1857 and again in the Great War of 1914-18 Nepal rendered valuable services to India and the Empire. As a reward for services in the Mutiny and subsequent campaigns certain Terai territories of India were ceded to her, and in recognition of her assistance in the Great War she receives a subsidy of Rs. 10 lakhs a year and has obtained formal recognition of her existence as an independent State. In 1933 the post of British Resident at Katmandu (the nomenclature of which in deference to Nepalese susceptibilities had already been changed to that of Envoy) was formally recognised as that of one of His Majesty's Ministers, and a Nepalese Legation obtained recognition as a juridically independent State. Nevertheless she must be designated as a State in very special treaty relations with His Majesty's Government. Not only does she supply a very large contingent of regular troops to the Indian Army but she is dependent on India for an important part of her annual revenue in the shape of subsidy, and hitherto (with one exception—a significant one—the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa) she has not established diplomatic relations with other Powers. Her rulers are loaded with British honours and she is dependent for her trade on transit of India, receiving a refund of Indian customs duty on all imports via India. Moreover, although we have entered into no formal commitments to defend Nepal against external aggression, there can be no doubt that, if her independence were threatened, we should be compelled to go to her assistance. The Gurkha source of recruitment must be maintained at all costs and India could not tolerate another Power south of the Himalayas. How the Nepalese themselves interpret the meaning of their special relations with the Empire has been shown by their grant of a contingent of the Nepalese Army—to be distinguished from the Gurkhas of the Indian Army—for service in India in the Great War and again in the present war. In some respects the position of Nepal in the British Imperial pattern is not unlike that of Muscat in the Gulf, another juridically independent State, in treaty relations not only with Britain but with other Powers, whose independence it is an essential British interest to defend, and over which therefore we are bound to maintain an unobtrusive tutelage. The readiness of the Nepalese Government to honour their side of the bargain has always hitherto made it possible in their case to dispense with formal and embarrassing definitions of interest.

There is a further aspect of the Nepal problem<sup>a</sup> which requires

notice. The Nepalese are a philoprogenitive and colonising race. Though barred from expansion of their jurisdiction either to West or East by arrangements made with the British after the 1815 war, Nepalese cultivators, artisans and tradesmen have spread widely into Sikkim (where they now form the bulk of the population) and into Bhutan. They are also found in large numbers in Assam, where the local defence force, the Assam Rifles, is moreover mainly composed of Gurkhas. This tendency to expansion is in different degrees feared and hated by the other States. Finally the relations of Nepal with Tibet are always liable to strain. During the winter of 1929-30 Nepal and Tibet were again on the verge of war, and Tibetans dislike and fear Nepalese encroachments. The employment of Gurkha troops on the Lhasa trade route would arouse intense Tibetan resentment and would jeopardise our position in Lhasa.

### *Sikkim*

The original inhabitants of Sikkim are the Lepchas—a hill Mongoloid race. The ruling family of the Maharajas is of Sino-Tibetan origin and came from Kham. They were established as Gyalpos (Kings) of Sikkim by the Lhasan Lama in 1641, when under the same influence the Sikkimese were converted to Buddhism. Sikkim was over-run by Bhutan in 1700 and again in 1770, when Bhutan held Sikkim for 6 or 7 years. Later, as already related, Sikkim suffered invasion from Nepal in 1788-89, when the Sikkim ruler received help from Bhutan against the Nepalese. In spite of the subsequent defeat of the Nepalese by the Tibetans with Chinese aid in 1792, the rulers of Sikkim had to pay tribute to Nepal until in 1817, when as a result of the defeat of Nepal by the British in the 1815 war, Sikkim's independence from Nepal was finally secured.

Subsequently struggles between the Lepcha and Tibetan factions caused disturbances on the Indian frontier with one result that the Sikkim Terai and Darjeeling were taken over by the Bengal Government, the Darjeeling District being finally constituted in 1861 as a result of an expedition to Tumlong, the then capital of the State. Later in 1888 the Tibetans in support of their faction moved into Sikkim and erected a fort at Lingtu within sight of Darjeeling. They were ejected by the Indian Government in the same year, since when relations between Tibet and Sikkim have been on the whole correct, though until the year of the Lhasa Expedition of 1904 trade blocks

were established in the Chumbi Valley (claimed by Sikkim, but now acknowledged as part of Tibet) in pursuance of the old Sino-Tibetan policy of cutting off trade with India.<sup>a</sup>

The little State of Sikkim, interposed between India, Tibet, Nepal and Bhutan, really owes its existence to the bold policy of Warren Hastings, who determined to maintain it both as a window into Tibet and to prevent the expansion of the Nepal Kingdom to the East. Hastings established friendly relations with the Tashi (Panchen) Lama of the day, then Regent of Tibet during a minority of the Dalai Lama. The Tashi Lama had interceded with the Governor-General on behalf of Bhutan, and Hastings took advantage of his friendly letter to despatch Bogle<sup>b</sup> and subsequently other officers, in an endeavour to open up trade with the northern principalities. Most of the story is more pertinent to the history of Bhutan and a promising beginning was brought to nothing partly by the Sino-Nepalese war of 1792 and partly by the more cautious policy of Hastings' successors. But one result endured—the final establishment of Sikkim as a State independent alike of Tibet, Nepal and Bhutan.

### *Bhutan*

The first British Mission to Bhutan was that of Bogle, already mentioned, who proceeded under the auspices of Warren Hastings in 1774 to open up trade routes with Tibet via Bhutan. Bogle who established relations with the Deb Raja (the then temporal ruler) of Bhutan in distinction to the Dharma Raja (the spiritual ruler) found Bhutan nominally dependent on Tibet, though in practice the Tibetans were unable at that time to exercise any real control. The prospects of development of trade routes through Bhutan, which seemed bright, were shattered by the Tibet war with Nepal, while later our relations with Bhutan suffered a severe setback as a result of the occupation of Assam after the first Burmese War in 1825. In becoming possessors of Assam we succeeded to the unsatisfactory relations of the Assamese with the Bhutanese in the Duars between the Teesta and Dhansiri rivers. These Duars had been wrested from the Muslim rulers of Assam by the Bhutanese, who, though they never obtained absolute possession of the country, succeeded by a policy of raiding and outrage in forcing the Assam princes to purchase security by making over the Duars in consideration of an annual tribute in kind. We succeeded to these arrangements and our demand for punctual

realization of the tribute led to widespread disorder and the attachment of the Duars as security. A Mission under Pemberton<sup>a</sup> was despatched in 1837 and returned without result. Renewed and continuous outrages, reminiscent of the situation in the Derajat on the Waziristan border in more recent years, led to the despatch of a further Mission under Eden in 1863. By this time the real power in Bhutan had passed into the hands of a frontier official known as the Tongsa Penlop, who had reduced the Deb and Dharma Rajas to the position of puppets. Eden's mission was arrogantly treated and sent back under duress. The result was the Bhutan war of 1864 and the formal annexation of all the Duars under the Sinchula Treaty of the following year. Since that date the relations of Bhutan with India have been excellent and the Tongsa Penlop of the time, Sir Ugyen Wang-chuk, rendered great assistance to us during the Lhasa Expedition of 1904, while in 1907 his family was elected by a Bhutanese Council as that of hereditary Maharaja of Bhutan.

Bhutan has ancient connections both with China and Tibet. The right of granting a seal of office to the ruler of Bhutan was revived by the Emperor Chien Lung in 1736. Pemberton in 1837 reported that at the time of his Mission the power of China was regarded with great respect in Bhutan and marked deference was shown to the wishes of the Chinese Amban in Lhasa. Annual Imperial mandates arrived through the Lhasa Ambans and presents in kind were returned. In 1877, when the Deb Raja reported to Lhasa the wishes of the British Government that a good road should be constructed through Bhutan, Chinese and Tibetan officials were sent to Bhutan to support him in a refusal. In 1890 the Chinese Emperor sanctioned titles for the Penlops.

As regards Tibet, leaving aside earlier tradition, we find that the Tashi Lama in his correspondence with Hastings in 1774 claimed Bhutan as a dependency of the Dalai Lama. Bhutan still maintains an agent at Lhasa. But since the 1865 settlement the rulers of Bhutan have come to rely more and more on their connection with India, and the position now reached is that under the Treaty of 1910, in return for an increase in the subsidy paid to Bhutan from Rs. 50,000 to Rs. one lakh, the Sinchula Treaty has been amended to include a provision that Bhutan's foreign relations should be controlled by the British Government. The most recent ex-cathedra pronouncement was made by the Secretary of State for India in 1924,<sup>b</sup> when he defined Bhutan as under the suzerainty of His Majesty, but not an

Indian State, though its transition to that status could easily be affected with the concurrence of both parties. Bhutan then is not at present a part of India; the frontier of India runs in this sector along the foothills and not as in Sikkim on the main Himalaya range; but Bhutan's foreign relations, and consequently its defence, are, unlike those of Nepal, formally guaranteed by the Government of India, and the State is really a Protectorate in close treaty relations with His Majesty's Government. We may perhaps again press into service the Persian Gulf analogy and compare Bhutan with Bahrein as an independent State in special treaty relations with His Majesty's Government, even as we compared Nepal with Muscat.

Owing to the multitude of Penlops (high officials) who take the bulk of the revenue, the State resources are extremely small and it is difficult for the Ruler to centralize power sufficiently to maintain his administration. The country is moreover naturally poor in resources, and depends very largely on the one lakh Indian subsidy, and on an additional payment of one lakh made by the Provincial Governments of Bengal and Assam to secure co-operation in excise matters, to keep going at all.

Bhutan, though a semi-independent State, receives no relief from Indian customs duty as does Nepal, and even Kashmir.

The interactions of Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal affairs have been described under Nepal and Sikkim heads. Bhutan occupies a most important part of the North East Frontier and has lost much ground since the days when she controlled the Duars and even Cooch Behar State. Beyond the subsidy the Government of India since Warren Hastings' day have done nothing effectual to develop trade routes or otherwise to stabilize the economy of Bhutan, while in customs matters she has been treated as if she were an Indian State. She is completely and absolutely Mongolian in outlook and tradition, much more so than Nepal, or even than Sikkim with its multitude of Indian contacts and Nepalese immigrants.

### *Assam tribal areas*

Beyond the eastern border of Bhutan (only finally de-limited by the Tawang expedition of 1938) and up to the point of issue of the Brahmaputra and its great tributaries from the Himalayas, thence round to the south along the new India-Burma border lies a great belt of tribal territory. We are not here concerned with the tribes such as

the Nagas, more interesting in many ways, which fringe the India-Burma border south of the Assam Valley, for that is a territory which leads to another part of the Empire, namely Burma. But the tribes to the north of the Valley e.g., the Akas, Miris, Dafflas, Abors, Mishmis, are inter-posed between India and Tibet, or as the Chinese would have it are part of Tibet and so part of China. They are primitive and until recent years they have no history worth the name. But in 1914 a tripartite convention was drawn up between India, China and Tibet of which one object was to fix a fluid frontier between China and Tibet and another to fix a frontier between Tibet and India. China after her fashion declined to ratify this convention, but between India and Tibet, in so far as the terms of the convention affected them, they were ratified by the Lhasa authorities and Sir Henry McMahon as British representative. Article 9 of the Convention specified an agreed frontier line which has come to be known as the 'Red Line' or the 'McMahon Line' between India and Tibet. The line was marked in red on a map of which copies were given to the Lhasa Government, which acknowledged it. It lays down the international frontier between Tibet on one side and India (which then included Burma) on the other. The line lies far back in the Himalayas, starts from the North-east corner of Bhutan, includes Tawang, and crosses the Brahmaputra (variously known as the Tsangpo, or the Siang or Dihang) not far below its big bend, and thence proceeds to the nodal points that bound the Irrawadi basin.

But after 1914 came the Great War, of which a minor result was that no action was taken by the Indian Government to exert its authority up to the new frontier. Indeed the Local Government of Assam, which is chiefly concerned, was actually not made aware of the location of the frontier until some 20 years later. The Chinese cartographers meanwhile, giving expression to Kuomintang ideals, had shown a new Province of China called Sikang, partly carved out of Szechuan and partly out of Eastern Tibet (Kham), as including the whole of these tribal areas down to the administered border of Assam. They would probably include Bhutan also in this Province. The Assam Government had hitherto treated these areas as not having an outer limit, or much in the same way as the North West Frontier tribes were regarded in the days before the demarcation of the Durand Line. They had divided the parts nearest to Assam into 3 frontier tracts known from west to east as the Balipara, Sadiya and Lakhimpur frontier tracts, but in the minds of the local officers the



country beyond the points of penetration was regarded as no man's land.

The result has been that the Tibetans have established considerable influence, and in many cases actual administration, in many parts of these tribal areas on the Indian side of the "Red Line". Trade routes are closed and no intelligence of what goes on beyond the nearer hills comes through. At Tawang is a well-known monastery, and with the help of its influence the surrounding tract is administered and taxes taken by Tibet. On the Brahmaputra line (the Lower Siang or Dihang) our reports state that Tibetan encroachment is proceeding apace, and during the last three years the Tibetans have extended a measure of control to a point 70 miles south of the Red Line. A small expedition has just been sanctioned by the Government of India up the Lohit Valley to Rima to discover whether there are signs of Tibetan encroachment in that quarter also. An expedition under Captain Lightfoot visited Tawang in 1938, partly to lay the border between Bhutan and these tribal areas and partly to ascertain the degree of Tibetan interference south of the line. It reported that the Tibetans had established an oppressive rule, hard to differentiate from slavery over the Monba tribesmen of that area. As a result the Governor of Assam, who is Agent to the Governor General for these tribal areas, put forward proposals for the extension of administration over Tawang at a cost of about Rs. 1 lakh per annum. The Indian Government, actuated by the wish to incur no fresh commitments, financial or other, on this frontier, reported to the Secretary of State against these proposals. The Secretary of State, while acquiescing for the time being in this recommendation, recorded that the present state of affairs could not be regarded with equanimity and asked that the whole question should be reconsidered in 1940.

### *Tibet*

As has been seen, Tibet stands as a traditional, cultural, and to some extent, though mainly when prompted by China, as a political force behind all the States and tribes on this northeast frontier. In Nepal her influence is at present negligible; in Sikkim and Bhutan it is real, though these States have met it by placing their reliance in India; on the Assam tribal border it is encroaching. It is not necessary in this paper to trace in detail the history of the India-China-Tibet triangle since 1904<sup>a</sup>. Events have been favourable to India, for

the Chinese revolution prevented advantage being taken by the Chinese of our withdrawal, and the subsequent flight of the Dalai Lama from Lhasa in the first decade of the 20th century. Chinese troops were evicted from Lhasa, and the policy of the last Dalai Lama from that time up to his death in December 1933 rested on a friendly understanding with India. Shortly after his death the Chinese endeavoured to reassert their influence by the despatch of a highly trusted Commissioner Huang Mu Sung, and there is no doubt that the Regent was influenced by his representations. Now a new Dalai Lama is on the throne, and Mr. Wu, the Chinese Commissioner for Tibetan and Mongolian affairs is on his way to Lhasa. The Indian Government has maintained a Mission at Lhasa throughout the last three years and the Political Officer in Sikkim, who is responsible for our relations with Tibet, is on his way up to join in the inauguration ceremonies. The last Tashi (Panchen) Lama, the other high dignitary of Tibet, died a short time ago, and his reincarnation has not yet appeared.<sup>9</sup> Much may happen in the next six months against the back-ground of the double war, in Europe and in China, the discovery of a new Dalai Lama, the presence of Chinese and British officials in Lhasa, the threat from Japan in the east and from Soviet Russia in the north. What can we do, if possible in understanding with China and Tibet, to maintain India's interest on this frontier? I have tried to suggest what that interest is in the first paragraph of this paper. It has been well expressed in Sir Charles Bell's book 'Tibet: Past and Present' written in 1924. "We want Tibet as a buffer to India on the north. Now there are buffers and buffers, and some of them are of very little use. But Tibet is ideal in this respect. With the large desolate area of the Northern Plains controlled by the Lhasa Government, Central and Southern Tibet governed by the same authority, and the Himalayan States guided by, or in close alliance with, the British-Indian Government, Tibet forms a barrier equal, or superior, to anything that the world can show elsewhere."

### *The prospect*

The preceding paragraphs are intended to show that the whole of this frontier, and not only Tibet, is regarded by China as irredenta. China's tradition is to work through Tibet, and to claim for Chinese suzerainty whatever Tibet can influence. China's struggle in the Far East is likely to incline her to regain prestige along a line where

resistance will be feeblor. How far Tibet will fall in with any such plan under the present Regency is another matter. We shall know more when Mr. Gould gets to Lhasa. But it is surely an elementary precaution to take steps first to fasten in the Indian orbit all that Mongolian fringe from Nepal to the furthest tribal areas of Assam. We need the co-operation of China in Tibet, but we shall not obtain it, much less the loyal support of the border States, by a negative policy of submitting to encroachment. Nor shall we be able to induce the Tibetans to withdraw, or the Chinese to cease to abet them, by making representations at Lhasa. In 1938, when on the issue of Tawang the Tibetan Government's attention was drawn to the fact that they were administering a tract left to India by the 1914 Convention, they evaded the issue by saying that the papers relating to that agreement could not be found. The Tibetan Government have also for many years been encroaching on the Tehri-Garhwal border, and in 1935 their local officials threw down the boundary stones which marked the Sikkim frontier. There is, I think, little doubt that the best way of implementing our boundary claims is to take action locally with as little discussion at Lhasa as possible. Conversations at Lhasa are best used to save Tibetan face and not to obtain self-denying abnegations from the Tibetan Government in advance. Thus occupation or enforcement of our rights in an area where we think it essential to resist encroachment can be smoothed over later by concessions elsewhere. And at the same time everything possible should be done to strengthen the hands of the Frontier States.

In Nepal, much has been, and is being, done to maintain the old spirit of active co-operation that has lasted since 1815. Here I think it is only necessary to realise that the independence of Nepal, if ever threatened, is a vital British interest.

Bhutan and Sikkim present a different problem. Sikkim has been regarded as an Indian State, and it has been considered that she might be induced to federate. But apart from the fact that Sikkim is a Mongolian State and would scarcely fit into an Indian federation I am doubtful whether the prospect of federation is the right one for Frontier States at all. The difficulties in admission of Kalat in Baluchistan to the Federation have recently been considered, and it is probable that obstacles of a similar nature, e.g., the essential external interests of Frontier States, and the fact that in Mongol States also the ruler is often only *primus inter pares* among other dignitaries, will be found to exist in Sikkim. They certainly exist in Bhutan, even

if that State were to be considered as included in India. There is the further fact that both these States are jealous of the special position attained by Nepal. For all these reasons I am inclined to advocate a new vision for frontier States. If they can be regarded as States in special Treaty relations with H.M.G., the illogicalities to be found become less embarrassing, and even Nepal and in a greater degree Bhutan, can be considered in the same category. If it be objected that a State such as Sikkim if included in India must be an Indian State, the answer might conceivably be that it should be constituted as one of the 'any other territories' provided for in Section 311 Government of India Act. On such terms, namely that she was not an Indian State and that the issue of federation did not arise, it is possible that even Bhutan might agree to the frontier of India being drawn along her frontier with Tibet.

Bhutan needs to be strengthened, and I feel that this could best be done by two means. The system of customs rebate in force for Kashmir should be extended to Bhutan. Under this system the Indian revenue collected on goods in transit from India to Kashmir is paid over to the Kashmir Government. Kashmir's privilege flows from the old treaty with Yakub Beg over the Yarkand trade route, and she enjoys it though an Indian State. Bhutan, which is not part of India, has a stronger claim. Such aid would be of far greater advantage than an increase of subsidy: it would tend to make of Bhutan what Warren Hastings intended, namely a vestibule for central Asian trade, and would encourage the development of alternative trade routes, with all their advantages of intercourse and information, to supplement the one overcrowded way through Sikkim and Kalimpong. Such a concession would tie Bhutan irrevocably to India.

In the Assam tribal areas it is suggested that the problems be approached from much the same angle. My tour to Assam has elicited the opinion that none of the tribes north of the Brahmaputra have any fighting value and that all that is needed is some reorganisation of the Assam Rifles (a scheme has been submitted making certain increases in the northern tracts largely paid for by decreases in the areas south of the Brahmaputra at a net cost of Rs. 80,000 p.a.) to reconstitute the old 5th Battalion for the Balipara frontier. Tibetan encroachments in the Siang Valley and in Tawang could then be dealt with by the establishment of small outposts, and a small revenue could be collected. The Governor is convinced that no assistance from regulars would in any event be required. The removal of Tibetan

encroachment would almost certainly be followed by the development of trade-routes, and a greatly improved intelligence service. The opening of the Lohit (Rima) road should provide passage for all the wool of Kham (Eastern Tibet) which at present has great difficulties to encounter to reach its outlet via Sikkim. By such measures with very small expenditure it will be possible to control our own frontiers at a time when the encroacher is Tibet, with a vague China in the background. Let us as an insurance do this while the opponent is only Tibet.

In Tibet itself objectives are always intangible. The main object should be, remembering that Lhasa is far nearer to, and more approachable from, India than to (or from) China or Russia, to take advantage of our geographical position and to keep the window open. This is being done at present by means of 3 platoons of regular infantry at Yatung and Gyantse on the Lhasa road and established by treaty inside Tibet, and by our Mission at Lhasa. I regard this small force of regulars, until and unless we make a new arrangement with China and Tibet, as one of the keys of this frontier. To substitute irregulars would be difficult: I have given reasons why the Assam Rifles with their Gurkhas could not perform this duty. Above all it is desirable at this juncture to do nothing suggesting that we have not the power to maintain a position we have held for 36 years. I can indeed foresee circumstances in which it might well be necessary, on a shifting of the balance of power in this part of Central Asia, to reinforce this line in order to prevent Lhasa, falling into enemy hands. It is well that through the reliefs on this duty a number of the officers and men of the Indian Army have experience of the conditions of Tibet.

When the Mission went to Lhasa in 1936 it was intended, if possible, to assist the Tibetans with advice on the reorganisation and equipment of their army. This is an objective that might well be kept in view, possibly in consultation and collaboration with the Chinese. A further object should be the obtaining of intelligence as to Soviet and Japanese activities and ambitions in or in relation to Tibet. We receive for instance at present no news through Tibet of the movements of Soviet troops on the northern side of the Kuenlun, though we know from other sources that the Soviet have recently considerably reinforced their garrisons on Tibet's northern frontier with Sinkiang. Again the Tibetans, unlike the Persians, are peculiarly susceptible to an approach through medicine. A permanent medical

officer in Lhasa would be able to do much to keep the window open, and proposals to this end are now under consideration.

My visit to Sikkim and Assam suggests one possible improvement in organisation. Tibetan encroachment has become the chief problem in the Assam tribal areas; yet the political authority responsible for Tibet (the Political Officer, Sikkim) and the political authority responsible for the Assam tribal areas (the Governor in his capacity of A.G.G.) work in separate compartments. It is worth considering whether it might not be possible to make the Political Officer, Sikkim, the official Adviser to the Agent to the Governor General in all matters arising out of Tibetan encroachment in the Assam tribal areas. Proposals for stabilisation of this frontier would then reach the Government of India in a locally digested state, and would be made with due regard to the international aspect. Such an arrangement would in no way affect relations with Lhasa, Bhutan or Sikkim, for which the Assam authorities have no responsibility and which would be conducted by the P.O. Sikkim in direct communication with the Government of India.

I have only to add that it is to our interest as far as may be possible to induce China to cooperate with India and Tibet in resistance to the penetration threatened either by Russia or Japan, and in maintenance of Tibet as an integral international unit. The ideal in fact would be some arrangement on the footing of the semi-abortive 1914 Tripartite Convention. But in working for a concert of this kind we must secure the respect of both China and Tibet for India's frontier interests in this region and, always bearing in mind that a worse neighbour than China may succeed to her, we have to fix our minds clearly on what is the real British and Indian interest in this area. It seems to me to be two-fold—first that India cannot afford to admit any Power in supersession of China to obtain control of Lhasa and second that she must attach to herself in indissoluble union of interest all those parts of what I have called the Mongolian Fringe which look to her for protection and whose disintegration would throw open her own defences.

O. K. Caroe, 18.1.40.

# XVIII

## India, Tibet, and China, 1942-4

### I

*The Director of the Office of Strategic Services (Donovan) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 2, 1942

My dear Mr. Secretary: Two of our men, Captain Ilia Tolstoy and Lieutenant Brooke Dolan, are being sent on a mission via India and Tibet to General Stilwell\* in China.

This office, therefore, requests that the State Department should instruct the head of its diplomatic mission in New Delhi, India, to expedite the obtaining of a permit from the British authorities in India for Ilia Tolstoy and Brooke Dolan to enter Tibet, by way of India, and to be allowed freedom of travel in Tibet in so far as the British are able to grant it without the necessity of returning to India.

Our military authorities in India will verify and confirm this mission to the State Department representatives in New Delhi in order that negotiations with the British authorities, civil and military, may be facilitated.

This mission is of strategic importance and we hope will prove of long term value in the furtherance of the war effort in the Asiatic theatre.

We are keeping this project most secret and we feel it desirable to avoid any mention of the military status of these two men in any negotiations. When they personally contact American State Department and Military authorities in India, the matter can be discussed and arranged in fullest confidence with the British. Certain British authorities in India are already informed as to the nature of their mission.

Respectfully,

William J. Donovan

<sup>1</sup>For I-VII, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers: 1942: China* (United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1957).

\*Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in China, Burma, and India.

## II

*The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*

Washington, July 3, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services, is sending two members of his organisation on a special and confidential mission to China via India and Tibet. It is believed that the work of the mission in Tibet would be greatly facilitated if you were to provide it with a letter of introduction to the Dalai Lama of Tibet. A draft of such letter is attached.\* The letter is addressed to the Dalai Lama in his capacity of religious leader of Tibet, rather than in his capacity of secular leader of Tibet, thus avoiding giving any possible offense to the Chinese Government which includes Tibet in the territory of the Republic of China. It is understood that Colonel Donovan is getting in touch with your office with regard to the form of delivery of the letter, if approved by you.

HULL

## III

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Gauss)*

Washington, July 3, 1942, 10 p.m.

592. The British Embassy has informally supplied the Department with a copy of a telegram from the British Foreign Office† in which it is stated that, in reply to further representations by the Government of India, Tibet has definitely refused permit for passage of supplies to China on the ground of desire to stay out of the war; that if necessary the British Government is prepared, in association with the Chinese, to speak plainly to Tibet and to threaten economic sanctions in order to change the Tibetan attitude, but feels that prior thereto the Chinese Government should do its part to facilitate Tibetan acquiescence, as Tibetan reluctance is believed to be largely due to fear of Chinese penetration; that the British Government asked Ambassador Seymour‡ to suggest to

\**Infra*, as signed.

†Not printed.

‡Sir Horace James Seymour, British Ambassador in China.



the Chinese Government that it give definite and public undertaking of intention to respect Tibetan autonomy and to refrain from interfering in Tibet's internal administration; that, if the Chinese would do this, Great Britain would be ready to cooperate with them in exercising joint pressure; that it was pointed out that the British Government was asking no more of the Chinese in relation to Tibet than the Chinese had already strongly recommended to the British in relation to India, namely, free and willing cooperation in the joint struggle against aggression; and that subsequently Seymour reported that he had approached the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs,\* who had seemed at first sight to see nothing contrary to Chinese policy in the proposed declaration and who said that he would consider the matter and communicate again. For your information, it may be added that the telegram refers in two instances to Tibetan 'independence' and in another instance to Tibetan 'autonomy'. It is not clear whether these words are used interchangeably or not.

We should appreciate receiving such information as you may have or be in position discreetly to obtain with regard to the difficulties of supply via Tibet referred to by the British and such comments and suggestions as may occur to you. We of course desire that a practical solution be found of any existing difficulties. As you are aware, the Chinese Government has long claimed suzerainty over Tibet, the Chinese constitution lists Tibet among areas constituting the territory of the Republic of China, and this Government has at no time raised questions regarding either of these claims.

HULL

#### IV

##### *The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State*

Chungking, July 13, 1942, 11 a.m.  
(Received 2.42 p.m.)

835. Department's 592, July 3, 10 p.m. Inquiry by Embassy discloses that the Tibetan authorities have agreed to the passage through Tibet of non-military supplies for China. The term 'non-

\*Foo Ping-sheung.

military' will not be strictly interpreted. Technical details have not yet been worked out. Transit through Tibet is practicable by pack animal trains making one trip a year but the amount that can be transported (maximum estimates place it at 3000 tons annually) renders the project of minor importance as a supply route to China. The round trip requires 16 months and about half of the year travel is impracticable.

The Chinese have abandoned whatever plans they may have had for constructing a motor road and for stationing troops in Tibet, the former because the road would have no early value to the war effort due to the time required for construction and the latter because Tibetan opposition would certainly be encountered.

The Chinese plan to station technicians along the route to facilitate transportation. The Tibetan authorities are being assured that these technicians will not engage in any political activities; that they will be instructed to confine themselves to the matter of supervising transport. The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs states that this is as far as the Chinese Government is prepared to go in response to the British suggestion mentioned in the reference telegram. The Vice Minister said there was no occasion for giving assurances regarding 'autonomy'; that Tibet was considered a part of the Republic of China; but that China had no intention of altering the situation whereby internal administration in Tibet is in fact autonomous.

GAUSS

V

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs  
(Hamilton)*

(Washington), July 18, 1942

Reference Chungking's 835, July 13, 11 a.m. and attached file in regard to questions relating to Tibet.

It would appear from Chungking's reference telegram that the Tibetan authorities have agreed to the transit of non-military supplies for China through Tibet, and that a strict interpretation will not be made of the term 'non-military'. It is believed that this information should be brought informally and orally to the atten-

tion of the British Embassy through Mr. Hayter of that Embassy by the Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

It is further believed that we might orally and in strict confidence communicate to Mr. Hayter the information contained in and the views of the Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed in the last paragraph of the reference telegram. We might at the same time mention that suzerainty over Tibet has long been claimed by the Chinese Government, and that Tibet is listed in the Chinese constitution among areas constituting the territory of the Republic of China, adding that this Government has at no time raised questions concerning either of these claims.\*

M (axwell) M. H (amilton)

## VI

*Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in China (Vincent) to the Ambassador in China (Gauss)†*

(Chungking), July 30, 1942

In my recent conversation with Dr. T. F. Tsiang, Director of the Political Affairs Department of the Executive Yuan, the question of transportation of materials for China via Tibet was briefly touched upon.

Dr. Tsiang told me in confidence that the matter had been discussed that morning at the weekly meeting of the Executive Yuan. He said that there seemed to be general agreement to eliminate from the transport project political considerations and factors. With this idea in mind it had apparently been decided to accede to the Tibetan request that no materials of war (munitions et cetera) be shipped in transit through Tibet from India to China. Dr. Tsiang said that, considering the annual capacity of the route, which he placed at 1,000 tons, the amount of direct war materials that could be brought in would be unimportant and that it would be just as well to utilize this route to transport medical supplies, gasoline,

\*Marginal note by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Smyth): 'Mr. Hayter called at the Department on July 21, 1942, and was informed along the lines of the above memorandum.'

†Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in his despatch No. 555, July 30; received September 1.

and other materials essential to the prosecution of the war. He explained that his figure of 1,000 tons a year was lower than the original estimate of 3,000 tons but that investigation had revealed that the previous figure had been much too high. (In a conversation with Mr. Richardson, an Englishman attached to the Indian Agent-General in Chungking, who is familiar with transport conditions in India, I was told that maximum annual capacity for transport materials would probably not exceed 700 tons).

Dr. Tsiang recommended that, in order to overcome Tibetan fears that the transit of materials would be used as an excuse for Chinese political penetration, a commercial company be organised to handle transport and that Tibetans and Indians as well as Chinese participate in the company. He indicated that his recommendation was favourably received by the Executive Yuan. It was preferable, he thought, to the British proposal that a joint Anglo-Chinese-Tibetan commission be organised to handle transport.

Dr. Tsiang was interested in telling me of remarks Dr. Kung\* had made at the Executive Yuan meeting in regard to Tibetan political status, that it was about time that Chinese relations with Tibet were put on a realistic footing and that Tibet be recognised for what it was—a 'self-governing dominion'. At the Executive Yuan meeting, Dr. Kung had taken up the same theme. He had gone back into the classic period of Chinese history and ended with reference to the teachings of Dr. Sun Yat-sen to support his recommendation (identical with that of Dr. Tsiang) that Tibet be considered and treated in the Chinese political system as a self-governing dominion.

John Carter Vincent

## VII

### *The British Embassy to the Department of State†*

Copy of a Telegram from the Foreign Office dated the 15th  
August, 1942

Government of India have been informed by the Chinese Commissioner there that the Chinese Government have accepted Tibetan

\*H. H. Kung, Chinese Minister of Finance.

†Handed to the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Smyth) by the Second Secretary of the British Embassy (Barclay) on August 27.

stipulations in regard to the despatch of 'non-military supplies' (which would include petroleum, but not arms, ammunition and explosives); that they have selected the Gyalam as the supply route with Batang as delivery point; and that they appeared to think that contract with Tibetan transport firm must be negotiated by special representative of the Ministry of Communications.

2. The above, taken along with the Chinese attitude towards the suggested formal declaration of Tibetan autonomy, which His Majesty's Ambassador at Chungking has been informed would 'present numerous difficulties', and their proposal to station Ministry of Communications experts to organise the service along the Tibetan section of the route, would seem to indicate that the Chinese are more anxious to extend their influence in Eastern Tibet than to obtain supplies which in any event they do not estimate at more than a maximum of 3,000 tons a year. Nevertheless we are pursuing organisation of the route and have decided not to press for the declaration suggested. Our attitude of support for Tibetan autonomy still stands and we propose to continue to consult the Tibetan Government as and when necessary regarding detailed arrangements necessary in respect of the Tibetan section. In particular the Chinese proposal to appoint supervisors appears unnecessary, apart from the political objections involved, and it has been suggested to the Chinese Commissioner that any difficulties which might arise could be solved by joint intervention by the British and Chinese representatives at Lhasa.

3. The present position is that the Tibetan Government have now agreed during the current year only to the despatch from India for China of non-military supplies, preferably via the Changlam to Jyekundo, avoiding Lhasa, and as they cannot undertake to handle transport themselves they suggest that a contract should be made with a Tibetan firm for this year only. As regards the appointment of Chinese technicians or experts, no such request has, they state, been received from the Chinese representative at Lhasa and if made will be refused, since in the Tibetan Government's view neither British nor Chinese supervisors should travel up and down the supply route in Tibetan territory.

4. The time limit need not perhaps be taken too seriously. The main thing is to get supplies moving along this route and it should be possible to stipulate for the contract made with the Tibetan transport firm to run for one year with the option of renewal. The

Chinese Government have now been asked to agree (a) to the selection of the Changlam as the main route and of Jyekundo as the delivery point, and to the stationing of a British representative at the latter place; (b) to dispense with liaison officers or supervisors; and (c) to delegation of authority to the British and Chinese representatives at Lhasa to negotiate a contract with Tibetan carriers.

(In a memorandum dated September 15, 1942, the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) made the following comment: 'It will be recalled that on July 21, 1942, Mr. Hayter of the British Embassy was informed orally and in strict confidence by Mr. Smyth of FE that suzerainty over Tibet has long been claimed by the Chinese Government, that Tibet is listed in the Chinese constitution among areas constituting the territory of the Republic of China, and that this Government has at no time raised questions concerning either of these claims. (See endorsement on attached FE memorandum of July 18, 1942). It is accordingly believed that we need make no comment to the British Embassy at the present time with regard to the attitude of the British Foreign Office on the subject of Tibetan Autonomy'. (893.24/1445a).

### VIII

*The Secretary of State to the Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in India (Phillips)*<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 22, 1943, 11 p.m.

41. We would like to know whether overland shipment of non-military war supplies through Tibet for China has materialized. Will you please contact Chinese Commissioner Shen\* regarding this matter as contemplated in discussions with Commissioner Shen last August by Franklin Ray?† Should this be the case, please notify us quantities and types of such goods as have been shipped to date. Please give this information by months.

<sup>1</sup>For VIII-XXVII, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers: 1943: China* (United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1956).

\*S. H. Shen, Chinese Commissioner in India.

†J. Franklin Ray, Jr., Lend-Lease Administration Representative.

We would like to know whether such forwardings have included any Lend-Lease supplies.

HULL

IX

*The Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in India  
(Phillips) to the Secretary of State*

New Delhi, January 26, 1943, 4 p.m.

(Received 4:27 p.m.)

75. Chinese Commissioner, just returned from consultation at Chungking, says no supplies have yet been shipped to China through Tibet. Practicability of this route is now being reconsidered in Chungking and from Commissioner's remarks it is inferred decision of Chinese Government likely to be negative (reference Department's 41, January 22, 11 p.m.).

Commissioner believes that after allowing for essential Tibetan traffic the actual annual capacity of this route, so far as through shipment to China is concerned, would be nearer 1,000 tons than the 3 to 4,000 originally estimated.

Political difficulties are also involved. Tibetans are uncooperative apparently distrusting intentions of both India and China and fearing undue expansion of their influence. India lays blame for this attitude on China, and vice versa. Tibetans apparently made difficulties over proposed stationing of British, Indian and Chinese officials along route to check shipments and for a time consideration was given to possibility of turning goods over to ordinary caravans for unsupervised transportation to Chinese border. A trial shipment of 50 tons was made ready in India but is being held up pending Chungking decision expected within a month.

Suggest if you have not already done so, you check with Victor\* possible reports on this route from two representatives† now at Lhasa.

PHILLIPS

\*Code name for Office of Strategic Services.

†Capt. Ilia Tolstoy and Lt. Brooke Dolan.

## X

*The Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in India  
(Phillips) to the Secretary of State*

New Delhi, February 8, 1943, 7 p.m.

(Received 9.55 p.m.)

113. Report on supply routes to China by Gordon Bowles is being air mailed.\* He quotes Foreign Office official here as saying Government of India has no objection to use of Tibetan routes but refuses to reopen discussions except on basis of joint arrangements with both Chinese and Tibetan Governments. Bowles understands from Chinese Commissioner that his Government, considering Tibet an integral part of China, will reject any proposal for tripartite negotiations including Tibetan Government. Commissioner believes China will not sacrifice principle involved for the small quantity of goods which might thus be received.

Inform Stettinius† and Stone.‡ Also refer Department's 41, January 22, 11 p.m.

PHILLIPS

## XI

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Alger Hiss,  
Assistant to the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)*

(Washington), March 20, 1943

Colonel M. Preston Goodfellow of O.S.S. called me on the telephone and said that the two men from O.S.S. sent to Tibet have reported that the Cabinet of Tibet has through them requested a complete radio transmitting set for use for broadcasting within Tibet. Colonel Goodfellow went on to say that O.S.S. consider that the two men now in Tibet have done a good job of establishing friendly relations with the Tibetan authorities and that it would be helpful to our war effort in "the general area" if the set should be sent. Colonel Goodfellow asked whether I thought the Department of State would be interested in this question and upon my saying

\*Not printed; for correspondence on this subject, see pp. 614 ff.

†Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease Administrator.

‡William T. Stone, Assistant Director, Board of Economic Warfare.



that in my opinion we would, he asked me to ascertain informally the views of the Department or the manner in which the Department would like to have the question raised with it by O.S.S. I undertook to do this and to inform him of the results of my inquiries as soon as possible.

## XII

### *Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Atcheson)*

(Washington), March 30, 1943

Reference the suggestion made by the Office of Strategic Services to ship to Tibet a radio transmitter which the Cabinet Ministers of the Tibetan Government have requested through the two representatives of the Office of Strategic Services who are now in that country.

After careful consideration of this matter in so far as it may affect our relations with China, we are of the opinion that to supply a radio transmitting set to the Tibetans would be politically embarrassing and cause irritation and offence to the Chinese for the following reasons:

(1) In November 1941 the Chinese requested that we allocate under Lend-Lease and ship to them a radio transmitter. This request we have not complied with because of shipping and air transport limitations.

(2) The question of supplying China with the equipment she desires is a particularly delicate one at the present time. It is almost certain that to supply the Tibetans with a radio transmitter when we have failed to meet a similar request made by the Chinese over a year ago would give offense to the Chinese.

(3) The Chinese Government claims suzerainty over Tibet. Therefore, in all probability, the Chinese Government would not welcome the introduction into Tibet of such a potent facility as a radio transmitter, particularly as the Chinese are not likely to have any actual control over the transmitter or the material—broadcast.

(4) The Chinese probably have no objection to and may even welcome the dispatch of American "visitors" to Tibet from time to time but it is hardly conceivable that they would look with favour

upon our supplying the Tibetans with any equipment which might be used against them in any way.

We therefore recommend, from the point of view of our relations with China, that these considerations be brought to the attention of the Office of Strategic Services; that that agency be urged to drop the proposal to ship a radio transmitter to the Tibetans and that some other gift be substituted therefor.

G(eorge) A(tcheson), Jr.

### XIII

#### *The British Embassy to the Department of State Aide Memoire*

On the 15th March, Mr. Eden\* had a conversation in Washington with Dr. T. V. Soong† during the course of which the latter raised the question of Tibet. Dr. Soong said that Mr. Eden would doubtless be aware of the fact that the Government of China had always regarded Tibet as a part of the Republic, and that during his visit to India Chiang Kai-shek‡ had not been wholly reassured by what he had learnt of the attitude of the Government of India on this question. The Generalissimo had said that when a suggestion had been made for opening up a route through Tibet to China the British Government had appeared reluctant to agree. Mr. Eden replied that his impression was that the reluctance referred to was caused by the physical difficulties involved and not by any political ones. As, however, Mr. Eden was not sufficiently fully or recently briefed on his subject, the point was not discussed further.

On receipt of an account of the above conversation the Viceroy§ has telegraphed from New Delhi giving the facts on the Tibetan question and adding his comments on Dr. Soong's remarks regarding firstly, Tibet's position on the map of Asia, and secondly, the attitude of the Government of India to trans-Tibetan communications. Lord Linlithgow adds that he does not consider that Dr.

\*Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

†Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

‡Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Chinese Executive Yuan (Premier), visited India in February 1942.

§Marquess of Linlithgow.

Soong's remarks represent accurately the real position, which is briefly as follows.

I. Tibet acknowledged the suzerainty of the Manchu Empire; when, however, that Empire fell the Tibetans expelled the Chinese troops that were at that time in Lhasa and secured the return of the Dalai Lama from China (India?). In 1913 a Tripartite Conference was held in Simla between representatives of Tibet and of the Chinese and British Governments in an endeavour to resolve the existing differences relating both to the constitutional position as between China and Tibet and to the boundaries separating Tibet from India and China. The resulting convention, which was initialled by the delegates of all three parties, recognised that Tibet was under the suzerainty of China but acknowledged the autonomy of Outer Tibet. The convention was ratified by Tibet and the Government of India; (the Chinese Republic, however, declined to ratify and the Tibetan attitude has subsequently been that, in view of this Chinese refusal, Tibet, is not bound to admit Chinese suzerainty and is an entirely independent state. In 1934 the Chinese Government sent Huang Mu Sung to Lhasa on a mission of condolence on the death of the thirteenth Dalai Lama; through Huang Tibet was offered a settlement of the boundary issue in return for Tibetan acceptance of subordination to China, with Chinese control of Tibet's foreign relations. This overture the Tibetan Government rejected). Shortly before the installation of the new Dalai Lama in 1940 the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs,\* explaining the intention to send a Chinese representative to the ceremonies, stated that: 'The representative has been instructed by the Chinese Government to say that China would at all times be ready to help Tibet, if Tibet desired it, but that China promised not to interfere in the development of Tibet along Tibetan lines'. The Minister of Foreign Affairs also said: 'The Tibetan Government must not continue to think that China has any bad intentions towards Tibet'. The British representative who attended the ceremonies was instructed to inform the Tibetan Government of these statements of the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Ever since the abortive 1913 Convention<sup>a</sup> the attitude of the Government of India has been that they wished to secure agreement between China and Tibet and were willing to advise the

\*Wang Chung-hui.

Tibetan Government to admit formal Chinese suzerainty, although such an admission would in no sense constitute Tibet a Province of China. (The Government of India have always held that Tibet is a separate country in full enjoyment of local autonomy, entitled to exchange diplomatic representatives with other powers). The relationship between China and Tibet is not a matter which can be unilaterally decided by China, but one on which Tibet is entitled to negotiate, and on which she can, if necessary, count on the diplomatic support of the British Government along the lines shown above.

II. On the question of trans-Tibetan communications, Lord Linlithgow recalls that for purely practical reasons of geography and meteorology, the Government of India was unable to encourage the Chinese suggestion of building a highway from Western Szechuan through Eastern Tibet to Assam—a project which, if not entirely impossible, would have taken years to complete. It should on the other hand be recalled that the initiative for the organisation for a pack route from Kalimpong via Central Tibet to China was taken by the Government of India. In spite of two rebuffs from Lhasa, the Government of India persisted and was finally successful. The Chinese Government on the other hand, although their representative in Lhasa was kept informed of these negotiations, made no effort to participate in them: when the time came to work out practical details the Chinese Government made certain stipulations in regard to supervision of this route by Chinese officials, stipulations which the Tibetan Government were unable to accept. The Chinese Government moreover opposed any form of tripartite agreement in which the British Government would participate. In spite of this attitude taken up by the Chinese Government, the Government of India did not cease to exhort the Chinese Commissioner in India to continue his efforts to despatch goods to China via Tibet through trade channels, and promised all assistance from the Indian end. Lack of further progress has been due to the unforthcoming attitude of the Chinese and to the Tibetan Government's suspicion of Chinese intentions.

Washington, April 19, 1943.

## XIV

*The Charge in India (Merrell) to the Secretary of State*

New Delhi, May 14, 1943, 4 p.m.  
(Received 8:50 p.m.)

340. Government of India press note announces Tibet has agreed to transportation through its territory of non-military supplies for China.

Chinese representatives here were not aware that these arrangements had been concluded until press article appeared, and they believe Chungking was similarly uninformed. They have subsequently been told that Government of India pressed Tibet to act favourably on this long standing question on grounds that continued refusal would lead to serious deterioration in relations between Tibet and China. Tibet finally agreed but only on condition that (1) no military supplies of any sort be thus transported; and (2) no foreign supervision of shipments while in Tibet would be permitted. It accordingly does not appear likely that Lend-Lease goods will be shipped from India to China via Tibet. In opinion of Chinese officers here, the route with annual capacity estimated at from 1 to 3000 tons will probably be used only for Chinese civilian supplies purchased in India.

Repeated to Chungking with request Bowles be informed.

MERRELL

## XV

*The Department of State to the British Embassy**Aide Memoire*

The Department of State appreciates the courtesy of the British Embassy in acquainting this Government, in the Embassy's aide-memoire of April 19, 1943, with the attitude of the Government of India in regard to the Tibetan question and with developments in the project of a pack animal supply route to China via Tibet.

The Government of the United States has made note of the steps taken and the attitude shown by the Government of India towards establishing a supply route to China through Tibet. This Government of course hopes that any existing difficulties may be

resolved in a way acceptable to all concerned.

With regard to the position of Tibet in Asia, the British Government has been so good as to give an account of its historical attitude. For its part, the Government of the United States has borne in mind the fact that the Chinese Government has long claimed suzerainty over Tibet and that the Chinese constitution lists Tibet among areas constituting the territory of the Republic of China. This Government has at no time raised a question regarding either of these claims. The Government of the United States does not believe that a useful purpose would be served by opening at this time a detailed discussion of the status of Tibet.

Washington, May 15, 1943.

## XVI

### *The Charge in India (Merrell) to the Secretary of State*

New Delhi, May 15, 1943, 7 p.m.

(Received May 16, 12:46 a.m.)

344. I was informed by Weightman, Joint Secretary External Affairs, in strictest confidence this morning that the announcement regarding a route through Tibet reported in my 340, May 14 was made at this time in order that China might not attempt to justify any aggression against Tibet by saying that all possibility of transport from India across Tibet was denied China. British Government had endeavoured last August to persuade Tibetan authorities to open such a route and latter had said they would do so only if a tripartite agreement between Tibet, China and India were reached. Chinese Government had declined to consider such an agreement on ground that Tibet is considered a part of China. As a result of the announcement, Weightman states, (that) Generalissimo recently made (known) of his intention of retaking all lost territory including Tibet and of a report heard through "a leak" to effect that (he?) ordered governors of Sikang, Yunnan and Chinghai to send troops to Tibetan border (only the last mentioned complying). British through their Mission at Lhasa successfully prevailed upon the Tibetans to agree to consent to the use of a route under the conditions mentioned in my telegram 340.

Weightman believes that Embassy in Chungking has been informed of information obtained through the leak and that British

Ambassador in Washington\* has discussed matter with Department.

I have just received a letter from Tolstoy dated Sog, Tibet, April 17 in which he says that he had heard night before that Tibetan and Chinese troops are advancing toward each other and that Chinese troops had received their orders from Central Government. He also had heard a rumor from a Tibetan officer that Chinese had asked Government to invade Tibet and had been refused. Weightman states that no such request was received.

Tolstoy has apparently informed British at Lhasa that he is reporting on situation in a telegram which is presumably one Mission is relaying to Victor under today's date. Weightman requests that substance of this telegram be retransmitted here in one of Mission's codes or conveyed to British Embassy in Washington.

Repeated to Chungking.

MERRELL

## XVII

### *The Secretary of State to the Charge in China (Atcheson)*

Washington, May 18, 1943, 7 p.m.

633. British Embassy here has received information from British Embassy at Chungking to the effect that a force of 10,000 Chinese troops has been concentrated along the Tibetan borders. British Embassy stated this information is based on a report received from 'an American officer'† who recently returned to Chungking from Sining, Chinghai. It has also been learned from the British Embassy that this report has caused the British Government some concern and that in consequence the British Ambassador recently called on the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs to discuss this matter; that the Vice Minister indicated he had no information substantiating this report but took occasion to reiterate the position of the Chinese Government vis-a-vis Tibet.

The Department would appreciate receiving any information the Embassy may have in regard to the foregoing, but desires that

\*Viscount Halifax.

†Lt. S. H. Hitch, Assistant Naval Attache in China.

you (may) not make inquiries in this connection except very discreetly in official American circles.

HULL

### XVIII

#### *The Charge in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State*

Chungking, May 25, 1943, 2 p.m.  
(Received May 25, 11:23 a.m.)

777. Department's 633, May 18, 7 p.m. American officer referred to is an Assistant Naval Attache who visited Sining briefly in latter part of April in company with an Assistant Military Attache. Information given former by Secretary of Chinghai Government was that 10,000 Chinghai troops had been moved toward Tibetan border (actual location is probably north border of Sikang as shown on Chinese maps) in obedience to Generalissimo's orders. Governor of Sikang is also understood to have been asked to permit passage of Central Government troops towards Tibet or in lieu of this to despatch his own troops. Governor Liu Wen-hui has reportedly refused to do either (see New Delhi's 344, May 15, 7 p.m.).

Chinese objectives in these moves seem to be: (1) to bring pressure on Tibet to permit opening two nd (to the?) Central Government (and?) control of transportation routes and transit of military supplies (Tibetans apparently remain intransigent on this question and in 1942 attacked Ministry of Communications route survey party, killing chief); (2) to gain a foothold for the Central Government in the presently independent province of Sikang and Chinghai; (3) eventually to bring Tibet under effective Chinese control. Chinese pretext is that Tibetans instigated by Japanese agents and aided by Japanese arms and planes are planning offensive action against Chinese border provinces.

While there is some basis for belief in presence in Tibet of a few Japanese agents, reports of Japanese activity and Tibetan aggressiveness are believed exaggerated.

In their present nationalistic state of mind the Chinese may be



expected to resent any active British interest in Tibetan affairs.  
More detailed report follows by despatch.\*

Atcheson

## XIX

### *Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs*

(Washington), May 31, 1943.

Sir George Sansom† called at my request and I told him that we had received a telegram dated May 15 from our Mission in New Delhi (New Delhi's 344, May 15, 7 p.m.) in which telegram it was stated (1) that the American representative at Lhasa had informed the British that he was reporting on the situation in Tibet and (2) that Weightman, Joint Secretary of External Affairs at New Delhi, had requested that the substance of that report be conveyed to the British Embassy in Washington. I told Sir George that we had made inquiry of the War Department and had obtained a paraphrase of a telegram which embodied the report apparently referred to (a message from Ferris,‡ dated New Delhi, May 16, to the War Department). I let Sir George read the telegram. He said that he had had practically all of the information in the telegram except the statement contained in the last sentence to the effect that according to the British the reincorporation of Tibet was among the objectives laid down by General Chiang Kai-shek in a book recently published, presumably by the Chinese Government.

Sir George then told me that at a Pacific Council meeting in Washington on May 20 Mr. T.V. Soong had said in reply to Mr. Churchill§ that there was not and would not be a concentration of Chinese troops against Tibet though the Chinese Government claimed that Tibet was a part of China; and that the Prime Minister had replied that no one contested Chinese suzerainty and that the essential thing now was to avoid making any new difficulties.

\*Apparently not sent.

†British Minister.

‡Brig. Gen. Benjamin G. Ferris, Acting Chief of Staff to General Stilwell.

§Winston Churchill, British Prime Minister.

Sir George also let me have an extract from a telegram dated May 25 from the British Foreign Office. He said that the matter was of no importance but he thought that the Tibetan reply quoted therein was rather amusing. This extract was as follows:

“As regards assurance concerning alleged Japanese activities in Tibet, Tibetan reply states in part as follows: ‘Tibet being a country entirely devoted to religion we rigorously guard our frontiers from intrusion and emphatically deny having any dealings or understandings with other foreign powers’.”

J(oseph) W. B(allantine)

## XX

### *The British Embassy to the Department of State\**

#### *Status of Tibet*

(Policy of His Majesty's Government towards Tibetan relations with China).

Until the Chinese Revolution of 1911 Tibet acknowledged the suzerainty of the Manchu Empire and a measure of control from Peking which fluctuated from military occupation to a mere nominal link. Since 1911 Tibet has enjoyed *de facto* independence. His Majesty's Government made repeated attempts after 1911 to bring the Chinese Republic and the Tibetan Government together on the basis that Tibet should be autonomous under the nominal suzerainty of China, but these attempts always broke down on the question of the boundary between China and Tibet, and eventually in 1921 His Majesty's Government presented the Chinese Government with a declaration to the effect that they did not feel justified in withholding any longer their recognition of the status of Tibet as an autonomous state under the suzerainty of China, and that they intended dealing on that basis with Tibet in the future.

2. The Chinese Government have since 1921 attempted to an increasing extent to import some substance into their suzerainty over Tibet, while the Tibetans repudiate any measure of Chinese

\*Handed to the Advisor on Political Relations (Hornbeck) on September 14 by Sir George Sansom of the British Embassy.

control. There have been several recent indications that the Chinese Government intend to press their claim that Tibet is part of China, and the point is likely to come up whenever any question affecting Tibet is under discussion with the Chinese Government. Thus, last year they proposed, contrary to the wishes of the Tibetan Government, to post officials in Tibet to supervise the organisation of a supply route to China and when Mr. Eden was in Washington in March, Dr. T. V. Soong said in connexion with this route that his Government had always regarded Tibet as part of the Republic of China.

3. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government have reconsidered their attitude towards this question, having regard in particular to the consideration that any unconditional recognition of Chinese suzerainty would weaken their position in defending Tibet's claim to autonomy. While they are bound by a promise to the Tibetan Government to support them in maintaining the practical autonomy of Tibet, which is of importance to the security of India and to the tranquility of India's north east frontier, on the other hand Great Britain's alliance with China makes it difficult to give effective material support to Tibet. It is therefore desirable as far as possible to prevent the dispute between China and Tibet regarding the latter's status coming to a head at present. Nevertheless, at some stage discussion with the Chinese Government regarding this matter is probably inevitable. It has therefore been decided that in any such discussions the following line should be taken insofar as the circumstances render it necessary:

(a) It should be pointed out that Tibet has in practice regarded herself as autonomous and has maintained her autonomy for over 30 years.

(b) It can be stated categorically that neither His Majesty's Government nor the Government of India have any ambitions in Tibet other than the maintenance of friendly relations.

(c) It should be recalled that the attitude of His Majesty's Government has always been that they recognise Chinese suzerainty, but that this is on the understanding that Tibet is regarded as autonomous.

(d) It should be stated that this is still their position and any unconditional admission of Chinese suzerainty should be avoided. Any amicable arrangement which China felt disposed to make with Tibet whereby the latter recognised Chinese suzerainty in return

for an agreed frontier and an undertaking to recognise Tibetan autonomy would be welcomed by His Majesty's Government and the Government of India. The two latter Governments would be glad to offer any help desired by both parties to this end.

4. The foregoing would make it clear that His Majesty's Government do not feel themselves committed to regard China as the suzerain unless she in turn agrees to Tibetan autonomy. For the present, it is better that the matter should be left at that. But at a later stage it may prove necessary to add that:

(e) If the Chinese Government contemplate the withdrawal of Tibetan autonomy, His Majesty's Government and the Government of India must ask themselves whether in the changed circumstances of today, it would be right for them to continue to recognise even a theoretical status of subservience for a people who desire to be free and have, in fact, maintained their freedom for more than thirty years.

5. His Majesty's representatives should be guided by the foregoing considerations in any questions regarding the status of Tibet which may arise.

Foreign Office, (London) 22 July, 1943.

## XXI

### *The British Embassy to the Department of State\**

#### Tibet

Since the Chinese Revolution of 1911, when Chinese forces were withdrawn from Tibet, Tibet has enjoyed *de facto* independence. She has ever since regarded herself as in practice completely autonomous and has opposed Chinese attempts to reassert control.

Since 1911, repeated attempts have been made to bring about an accord between China and Tibet. It seemed likely that agreement could be found on the basis that Tibet should be autonomous under the nominal suzerainty of China, and this was the basis of the draft tripartite (Chinese-Tibetan-British) convention of 1914 which was initialled by the Chinese representative but was not

\*Notation at top in ink, presumably by Sir George Sansom of the British Embassy who handed this paper to Dr. Hornbeck on September 14: 'Copy of Memorandum sent to Dr. Soong (in London) by Mr. Eden August 5, 1943, in personal letter'.

ratified by the Chinese Government. The rock on which this convention and subsequent attempts to reach an understanding were wrecked was not the question of autonomy (which was expressly admitted by China) but was the question of the boundary between China and Tibet, since the Chinese Government claimed sovereignty over areas which the Tibetan Government claimed belonged exclusively to their autonomous jurisdiction.

The boundary question, however, remained insuperable and, since the delay in reaching agreement was hampering the development of more normal relations between India and Tibet, eventually in 1921 the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Lord Curzon) informed the then Chinese Minister (Dr. Wellington Koo) that the British Government did not feel justified in withholding any longer their recognition of the status of Tibet as an autonomous State under the suzerainty of China, and intended dealing on this basis with Tibet in the future.

This is the principle which has since guided the attitude of the British Government towards Tibet. They have always been prepared to recognise Chinese suzerainty over Tibet but only on the understanding that Tibet is regarded as autonomous. Neither the British Government nor the Government of India have any territorial ambitions in Tibet but they are interested in the maintenance of friendly relations with, and the preservation of peaceful conditions in, an area which is coterminous with the North-East frontier of India. They would welcome any amicable arrangements which the Chinese Government might be disposed to make with Tibet whereby the latter recognised Chinese suzerainty in return for an agreed frontier and an undertaking to recognise Tibetan autonomy and they would gladly offer any help desired by both parties to this end.

## XXII

### *The Charge in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State*

No. 1598

Chungking, September 20, 1943  
(Received October 14)

Sir: I have the honour to enclose\* a copy of despatch No.

\*Enclosures not printed.

117, August 11, 1943, from the Embassy Officer at Chengtu\* entitled 'Four Facets of the Tibetan Problem'. The four 'facets', or points of view, mentioned by Mr. Smith are those of (1) the Central Government, which desires the extension of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet in fact as well as in name, (2) the Tibetans, who apparently want only to be left alone, (3) the British, who oppose direct Chinese control over Tibet, and (4) the Chinese border warlords who are busy 'playing both ends against the middle' in an effort to bolster their own positions.

*Summary.* Information obtained from an advisor on Tibetan affairs to the Szechwan Provincial Government and former minor official in a border region of Tibet is to the effect that there are at least eight Japanese bonzes<sup>o</sup> living in Tibet but that they are so closely watched that their activities are not dangerous to the cause of the United Nations, that, probably in April of this year, Chiang Kai-shek issued orders to the Chairmen of the three provinces bordering on Tibet to move their troops further into Tibetan controlled areas; but that due to lack of ability or desire on the part of the Chairmen the scheduled 'drive' amounted only to a few minor border incidents. This informant, as well as President Y. P. Mei of Yenching University and another Yenching professor with special knowledge of Tibet,† expressed the opinion that any attempt to extend Chinese control over Tibet by force would be bitterly resented by the Tibetans (enclosure No. 2). In background 'Notes on Tibet' (obtained from a British Indian official) written by a private scholar who is said to have access to official British sources of information (enclosure No. 3) the nationality and culture of the Tibetans as distinct from those of the Chinese are stressed; mention is made of the British policy of supporting "Tibetan independence or complete autonomy...‡ based on the interest of India in peaceful and orderly conditions along the frontier"; and it is pointed out that "the new China" (as contrasted with the "Manchu dynastic empire") "is based on a purely Chinese nationalism and as Tibet ...has now for a generation been independent *de facto* of Chinese rule, there does not seem to be any good ground on which China

\*Horace H. Smith.

†Professor Li An-che.

‡Omissions indicated in the original.

can now assert an unqualified right of sovereignty. . . .” A quotation from a translation of China’s *Destiny* by Chiang Kai-shek (enclosure No. 4) indicates that the Generalissimo feels that China should make “plans” for “the restoration of our national sovereignty” over Tibet. *End of summary.*

There have been increasing indications in recent months that the Chinese Central Government desires, and as soon as it feels in a position to, will attempt to extend its control over Tibet by force of arms. It is almost a foregone conclusion that Tibet will resist such encroachment by all means at its command, including, presumably, appeals to Great Britain and to the United States.

For over a quarter of a century Great Britain has opposed the exercise by China of direct control over Tibet and there has been no indication that this policy will be modified in the near future.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.

### XXIII

#### *The Secretary of State to the Charge in China (Atcheson)*

Washington, September 21, 1943, 10 p.m.

1340. Reference Embassy’s 777, May 25, 2 p.m., in regard to reported Chinese troop concentrations along the Tibetan border.

1. British Embassy has brought to the Department’s attention a further report received from the Government of India to the effect that the strength of Chinese troops in the vicinity of Yashu, Chinghai, has been considerably increased; that additional arms and supplies are being shipped into that area; that the Tibetans are reported to have increased their own forces and that considerable tension exists. The Government of India has instructed its representatives at Lhasa to endeavour to verify the above information and to suggest to the Tibetan authorities that they take steps to prevent their own troops from provoking frontier incidents.

This further report regarding Chinese troop concentrations in the Chinghai-Tibet border area appears to be substantiated, at least in part, by the information contained in the Embassy’s despatch no. 1482, August 17.

2. The Department suggests that the Embassy if it receives

no objection make inquiry of the Foreign Office in regard to these reported troop concentrations and discreetly indicate as on your own initiative a concern over the possibility that these troop movements, if they are actually being carried out, might result in armed clashes between Chinese and Tibetan troops and furthermore that such an unfortunate development could not fail adversely to affect the cooperative efforts being made to defeat the Japanese and restore peace and tranquility in the Far East.

HULL

XXIV

*The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State*

Chungking, September 28, 1943, 10 a.m.  
(Received 5:37 p.m.)

1817. Department's 1340, September 21. At a suitable opportunity during a dinner party on September 25 Counsellor mentioned to Vice Foreign Minister Victor Hoo that we had heard reports emanating from India to the effect that there had been some additional troop concentrations on the Chinghai-Tibetan border. Dr. Hoo did not at first deny the reports but said that the Chinese troops will certainly do nothing and then said that there had been some Chinese troops near the Tibetan border, that he had not heard this latest report, and that the report was incorrect. He made a further statement that in any case we will do nothing.

We have not received here any confirmation of the British reports.

Gauss

XXV

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Gauss)*

Washington, September 29, 1943, 10 p.m.

1398. Reference Department's 1374 of September 27, 1943, 4 p.m. and prior communications.

In a conversation with an officer of the Department on September 28 Dr. T. V. Soong introduced the subject of Tibet. He said that



while in London he had talked with the BFO\* on that subject and that a few days ago Sir George Sansom of the British Embassy here had come to him under instructions and had spoken of the BFO's uneasiness in the presence of rumors that the Chinese were assembling troops on the Tibetan border. Dr. Soong said that he had stated to Sir George that the Chinese regard Tibet as an integral part of China; regard relations with the Tibetans as an internal problem; and that, although he, Soong, is not fully informed regarding troop movements, he doubts the rumors regarding massing of troops, he is not aware of any reason why there should be trouble with the Tibetans, etc., he would suggest that the British not make representations at Chungking implying a special British interest in Tibetan problems as problems involving an area or a people independent of China. Dr. Soong went on to say that in their study of geography the Chinese have long been taught that Tibet is a part of China and they have no thought whatever that this is open to question; and he further said that the question of Tibet is obviously of greater practical importance to the Chinese and the Tibetans than to the people of any other country.

It was pointed out to Dr. Soong, without argumentation, that by virtue of its geographical position, Tibet naturally is a subject of particular interest not only to China but also to India. Dr. Soong readily admitted this but affirmed that politically and in law Chinese claims regarding Tibet stand on far firmer ground than do British claims.

If you have not already made an approach along the lines suggested in the final paragraph of the Department's 1340, September 21 10 p.m. you are authorised to leave in abeyance for the present any action on that suggestion.

BERLE

## XXVI

*The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State*

Chungking, October 4, 1943, 3 p.m.  
(Received October 27).

A-67, Department's 1398, September 29, Embassy's 1817, Sep-

\*British Foreign Office.

tember 28, and previous. We have been informed by a high Government official that he has not heard of recent additional troop concentrations on the Tibet-Chinghai border but that he understands that "some" airfields are being constructed there by the Chinese. He intimated that the fields are possibly for the purpose of "pressure" to be applied later on. The informant remarked incidentally that it was curious how much trouble was taken over outlying regions such as Tibet and Outer Mongolia which are of absolutely no economic value to China.

Gauss

## XXVII

### *The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State*

No. 1810

Chungking, November 13, 1943.

(Received December 3.)

Sir: I have the honour to refer to the Embassy's despatch No. 1598, September 20, 1943 in regard to Sino-Tibetan relations and to enclose a copy of despatch No. 170, October 28, 1943 from the Embassy officer at Chengtu\* in regard to a proposed missionary sponsored educational mission to Tibet.† The despatch contains a summary of its contents.

In spite of the alleged willingness of some Tibetans to welcome foreign educational missionary work in their country, the Embassy has received no information indicating that a relaxation may be expected of the well known Tibetan policy of exclusion (see, for example, Embassy's despatch No. 1482, August 17, 1943). The history of missionary effort in China does not provide any basis for assuming that the proposed educational mission under reference (or the contemplated Seventh Day Adventist medical mission mentioned in Mr. Smith's despatch) is likely to be conducted with sufficient tact to avoid arousing Tibetan opposition. The projects under reference may therefore very well develop, even if the good intentions of the initiators are taken for granted, into attempts at missionary penetration of Tibet which are likely to give rise to

\*Not printed.

†E. H. Cressy of the National Christian Council of China was sponsor of the proposed mission.

Tibetan opposition and result in friction and situations which cannot be embarrassing to the American Government. It is also possible that the missionary interests concerned may find it necessary, as the price they may pay for indispensable Chinese support, to allow themselves to be used to some extent as agents of Chinese political penetration of Tibet.

The usual Chinese approach to the Tibetan problem is well illustrated by the incident reported in the enclosure to the Embassy's despatch No. 1793, November 9, 1943.\* The Chinese authorities in Kansu, wishing to discourage Tibetan assistance to rebels operating in areas adjacent to those inhabited by Tibetans, dropped leaflets in which the Tibetans were addressed as "barbarians" and threatened with bombing if they sheltered rebels.

It is the Embassy's opinion that under present condition American interests would not benefit from the missionary projects under reference but on the contrary the projects might result in serious embarrassment to the Government. Therefore, if and when the Embassy is approached by the missionary interests concerned, we will expect to offer them no encouragement in regard to the projects.

Respectfully yours,

C. E. Gauss

## XXVIII

*The Director of the Office of Strategic Services (Donovan) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>*

Washington, April 14, 1944.

My dear Mr. Secretary: Upon the suggestion of Major I. A. Tolstoy who was head of a mission in Tibet in 1942 and 1943,† I submit for your consideration the possibility of sending certain supplies from India into China by way of Tibet by means of pack animals. I am also writing to Mr. Lauchlin Currie of the FEA,

\*Not printed.

<sup>1</sup>*Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers: 1944: China* (United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1957).

†See *Foreign Relations, 1942, China*, pp. 624-628, *Passim*, and *ibid.*, 1943, *China*, pp. 622-637, *passim*.

to whom Major Tolstoy has spoken concerning this matter.

British authorities in India have estimated that in a year's time, with proper organisation, transportation of 4000 tons yearly could be handled in that manner.

It is evident that this amount could be of little material assistance to the armed forces in the China Theater. The amount that could be transported, however, would be of great use in the OSS operations in China; the amount so carried would be double that of the OSS monthly supply allowance flown over the "Hump"<sup>a</sup>.

It is likewise evident that the intelligence byproduct of such a route is not to be ignored.

The political situation in Tibet is such that we would wish to do nothing unless and until you were willing to have your Department take the necessary preliminary steps for the coordination and participation of Chinese and British authorities. Likewise, negotiations would have to be carried on with Lhasa. Major Tolstoy believes that it would take from six to eight months from the Indian border to China for a shipment to go through even under adverse conditions; that it would be necessary to have our representatives accompany the shipments; and that the entire transportation could be handled by certain responsible Tibetan traders who are either in India themselves or who have their representatives on the Indian border. Major Tolstoy feels that, in dealing with Tibet, it would be advisable to emphasize that the goods are for Americans who are in China now. Other factors which might be helpful in inducing Tibetan consent and insuring safe delivery of supplies are:

a. If the Dalai Lama's office was informed of the shipment of, or has already received, the present that was sent by OSS to the Dalai Lama.

b. If the US Government would purchase the supplies of wool which the Tibetans now have on their hands. (Almost all of the wool before the war was purchased by the United States from Tibet). The total amount would not be more than one shipload.

I am prompted to bring this to your attention because of the contingency, no matter how remote, that the present Japanese drive into Imphal might have such a measure of success as to endanger the continuous use of our air transport over the "Hump".

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

# XIX

## New Delhi-Peking: Exchange of Notes: 1950<sup>1</sup>

(1) Memorandum of the Government of the Republic of India on the question of Tibet, delivered by the Indian Ambassador on 21 October, 1950, to the Chinese Foreign Ministry in Peking.

The Central People's Government are fully aware of the views of the Government of India on the adjustment of Sino-Tibetan relations. It is, therefore, not necessary to repeat that their interest is solely in a peaceful settlement of the issue. My government are also aware that the Central People's Government have been following a policy of negotiations with the Tibetan authorities. It has, however, been reported that some military action has taken place or is about to take place, which may affect the peaceful outcome of these negotiations.

The Government of India would desire to point out that a military action at the present time against Tibet will give those countries in the world which are unfriendly to China a handle for anti-Chinese propaganda at a crucial and delicate juncture in international affairs. The Central People's Government must be aware that opinion in the United Nations has been steadily veering round to the admission of China into that organisation before the close of the present session. The Government of India feel that military action on the eve of a decision by the (General) Assembly will have serious consequences and will give powerful support to those who are opposed to the admission of the People's Government to the United Nations and the Security Council.

At the present time when the international situation is so delicate, any move that is likely to be interpreted as a disturbance of the peace may prejudice the position of China in the eyes of the world. The Government of India's firm conviction is that one of the principal conditions for the restoration of a peaceful atmosphere is the recognition of the position of the People's Republic of China, and its association with the work of the U N. They feel that an in-

<sup>1</sup>Margaret Carlyle (Editor) *Documents on International Affairs 1949-50*, (Oxford, 1953), pp. 550-556. Also see *Hsinhua* (Peking), Supplement No. 59, 21 November, 1950.

cautious move at the present time even in a matter which is within its own sphere will be used by those who are unfriendly to China to prejudice China's case in the U N and generally before neutral opinion. The Government of India attach the highest importance to the earliest settlement of the problem of Chinese representation in international organizations and have been doing everything in their power to bring it to a successful conclusion. They are convinced that the position of China will be weakened if through military action in Tibet those who are opposed to China's admission are now given a chance to misrepresent China's peaceful aims.

The Government of India feel that the time factor is extremely important. In Tibet there is not likely to be any serious military opposition and any delay in settling the matter will not therefore affect Chinese interests, or a suitable final solution. The Government of India's interest in this matter is, as we have explained before, only to see that the admission of the People's Government to the UN is not again postponed due to the causes which could be avoided and further that, if possible, a peaceful solution is sought while military action may cause unrest and disturbance on her own borders.

(2) Note of the Government of the Republic of India on the question of Tibet delivered by the Indian Ambassador in Peking on 28 October, 1950.

Embassy of India in China, Peking. 28 October, 1950.

Excellency, I have the honour to convey to your Excellency the following communication from the Government of India.

*Begins:* We have seen with great regret reports in newspapers of official statements made in Peking to the effect that "People's Army units have been ordered to advance into Tibet."

We have received no intimation of it from your ambassador here or from our ambassador in Peking.

We have been repeatedly assured of the desire of Chinese Government to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means and negotiations. In an interview which India's ambassador had recently with the vice-foreign minister, the latter, while reiterating the resolve of the Chinese Government to "liberate" Tibet, had expressed a

continued desire to do so by peaceful means.

We informed the Chinese Government through our ambassador of the decision of the Tibetan delegation to proceed to Peking immediately to start negotiations. This delegation actually left Delhi yesterday (25th). In view of these facts, the decision to order an advance of China's troops into Tibet appears to us most surprising and regrettable.

We realise there has been delay in the Tibetan delegation proceeding to Peking. This delay was caused in the first instance by the inability to obtain visas for Hong Kong, for which the delegation was in no way responsible.

Subsequently, the delegation came back to Delhi because of the wishes of the Chinese Government that preliminary negotiations should first be conducted in Delhi with the Chinese ambassador.

Owing to lack of knowledge on the part of the Tibetan delegation of dealing with other countries and the necessity of obtaining instructions from their government, who in turn had to consult their assemblies, certain further delay took place.

The Government of India do not believe any foreign influence hostile to China has been responsible for the delay in the delegation's departure.

*Two.* Now that the invasion of Tibet has been ordered by the Chinese Government, peaceful negotiations can hardly be synchronised with it and there will naturally be fear on the part of the Tibetans that negotiations will be under duress. In the present context of world events, the invasion by Chinese troops of Tibet cannot but be regarded as deplorable and, in the considered judgment of the Government of India, not in the interest of China or of peace.

The Government of India can only express their deep regret that in spite of the friendly and disinterested advice repeatedly tendered by them, the Chinese Government should have decided to seek a solution of the problem of their relations with Tibet by force instead by the slower and more enduring method of peaceful approach.

*Ends.*

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

K. M. Panikkar

(3) Reply of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China on 30 October, 1950, to the memorandum and note of the Indian Government on the question of Tibet.

On October 21, 1950, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China received from H. E. Ambassador Panikkar an *aide memoire* of the Government of India on the question of Tibet. On October 28, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chou En-lai, further received a communication from the Government of India as conveyed by H. E. Ambassador Panikkar.

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China would like to make it clear:

Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory and the problem of Tibet is entirely a domestic problem of China. The Chinese People's Liberation Army must enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people, and defend the frontiers of China. This is the resolved policy of the Central People's Government.

The Central People's Government has repeatedly expressed the hope that the problem of Tibet may be solved by peaceful negotiations, and it welcomes, therefore, the declaration of the local authorities of Tibet to come to Peking at an early date to proceed with peaceful negotiations.

Yet, the Tibetan delegation, under outside instigation, has intentionally delayed the date of its departure for Peking. The Central People's Government, however, has not abandoned its desire to proceed with peaceful negotiations.

But regardless of whether the local authorities of Tibet wish to proceed with peaceful negotiations, and whatever results may be achieved by negotiations, the problem of Tibet is a domestic problem of the People's Republic of China and no foreign interference shall be tolerated.

In particular, the problem of Tibet and the problem of the participation of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations are two entirely unrelated problems.

If those countries hostile to China attempt to utilise as an excuse the fact that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China is exercising its sovereign rights in its territory of Tibet and threaten to obstruct the participation of the People's Republic of China in the UN Organisation, it is then but



another demonstration of the unfriendly and hostile attitude of such countries towards China.

Therefore, with regard to the viewpoint of the Government of India on what it regards as deplorable, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China cannot but consider it as having been affected by foreign influences hostile to China in Tibet and hence express their deep regret.

October 30, 1950.

(4) Note of the Government of the Republic of India on the question of Tibet dated 1 November, 1950.

Embassy of India in China, Peking. November 1, 1950.

Excellency, I have the honour to convey to your Excellency the following communication from the Government of India.

*Begins:* The Indian Ambassador in Peking has transmitted to the Government of India the note handed to him by the vice-foreign minister of the People's Republic of China on October 30. The Government of India have read with amazement the statement in the last paragraph of the Chinese Government's reply that the Government of India's representation to them was affected by foreign influences hostile to China and categorically repudiate it.

At no time has any foreign influence been brought to bear upon India in regard to Tibet. In this, as in other matters, the Government of India's policy has been entirely independent and directed solely towards a peaceful settlement of international disputes and avoidance of anything calculated to increase the present deplorable tensions in the world.

*Two.* The Government of China are really mistaken in thinking that the Tibetan delegation's departure to Peking was delayed by outside instigation. In their previous communications the Government of India have explained at some length the reasons why the Tibetan delegation could not proceed to Peking earlier. They are convinced that there has been no possibility of foreign instigation.

*Three.* It is with no desire to interfere or to gain any advantage that the Government of India have sought earnestly that a settlement of the Tibetan problem should be effected by peaceful negotiations, adjusting legitimate Tibetan claims to autonomy within the frame-

work of Chinese suzerainty. Tibetan autonomy is a fact, which, judging from reports that they have received from the Indian ambassador in China and also from other sources, the Chinese Government were themselves willing to recognise and foster.

The Government of India's repeated suggestions that Chinese suzerainty over Tibet and Tibetan autonomy should be reconciled by peaceful negotiations were not, as the Chinese Government seem to suggest, unwarranted interference in India's internal affairs, but well-meant advice by a friendly government which has a natural interest in the solution of the problems concerning its neighbours by peaceful methods.

*Four.* Wedded as they are to ways of peace the Government of India have been gratified to learn that the Chinese Government were also desirous to effect a settlement in Tibet through peaceful negotiations. Because of this, the Government of India advised the Tibetan Government to send their delegation to Peking, and were glad that this advice was accepted. In the interchange of the communications which had taken place between the Government of India and the Government of China, the former received repeated assurances that a peaceful settlement was aimed at.

In the circumstances, the surprise of the Government of India was all the greater when they learnt that military operations had been undertaken by the Chinese Government against a peaceful people. There has been no allegation that there has been any provocation or any resort to non-peaceful methods on the part of the Tibetans. Hence, there is no justification whatever for such military operations against them. Such a step involving an attempt to impose a decision by force, could not possibly be reconciled with a peaceful settlement. In view of these developments, the Government of India are no longer in a position to advise the Tibetan delegation to proceed to Peking, unless the Chinese Government think it fit to order their troops to halt their advance into Tibet and thus give a chance for peaceful negotiations.

*Five.* Every step that the Government of India have taken in recent months has been to check the drift to war all over the world. In doing so, they have often been misunderstood and criticised, but they have adhered to their policy regardless of the displeasure of great nations. They cannot help thinking early operations by the Chinese Government against Tibet have greatly added to the tensions of the world in general, which they are sure the Government of

China also wish to avoid.

*Six.* The Government of India have repeatedly made it clear that they have no political or territorial ambitions in Tibet and they do not seek any novel or privileged position for themselves or for their nationals in Tibet. At the same time they have pointed out that certain rights have grown out of usage and agreements which are natural between neighbours with close cultural and commercial relations.

These relations have found expression in the presence of an agent of the Government of India in Lhasa, the existence of trade agencies at Gyantse and Yatung and the maintenance of post and telegraph offices at the trade route up to Gyantse. For the protection of this trade route a small military escort has been stationed at Gyantse for over 40 years. The Government of India are anxious that these establishments which are to the mutual interests of India and Tibet, and do not detract in any way from Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, should continue. The personnel at the Lhasa mission and the agencies at Gyantse have accordingly been instructed to stay at their posts.

*Seven.* It has been the basic policy of the Government of India to work for friendly relations between India and China, both countries recognizing each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and mutual interests.

Recent developments in Tibet have affected friendly relations and the interest of peace all over the world; this the Government of India deeply regret.

In conclusion, the Government of India can only express their earnest hope that the Chinese Government will still prefer the methods of peaceful negotiations and settlement to a solution under duress and by force. *Ends.*

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

K. M. Panikkar

H. E. Minister for Foreign Affairs  
Central People's Government of P.R.C.  
Peking.

(5) Reply dated 16 November, 1950, of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to the note of

the Government of the Republic of India on the question of Tibet.

On November 1, 1950, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China received from H. E. Ambassador Panikkar a communication from the Government of the Republic of India on the problem of Tibet.

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in its past communications with the Government of the Republic of India on the question of Tibet has repeatedly made it clear that Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory. The problem of Tibet is entirely a domestic problem of China. The Chinese People's Liberation Army must enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people and defend the frontiers of China. This is the firm policy of the Chinese Government. According to the provisions of the common programme adopted by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the regional autonomy granted by the Chinese Government to the national minorities inside the country is an autonomy within the confines of Chinese sovereignty.

This point has been recognised by the Indian Government in its *aide memoire* to the Chinese Government dated August 26, 1950. However, when the Chinese Government actually exercised its sovereign rights and began to liberate the Tibetan people and drive out foreign forces and influences to ensure that the Tibetan people will be free from aggression and will realise regional autonomy and religious freedom, the Indian Government attempted to influence and obstruct the exercise of its sovereign rights in Tibet by the Chinese Government. This cannot but make the Chinese Government greatly surprised.

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China sincerely hopes that the Chinese People's Liberation Army may enter Tibet peacefully to perform the sacred task of liberating the Tibetan people and defending the frontiers of China. It has therefore long since welcomed the delegation of the local authorities of Tibet, which has remained in India, to come to Peking at an early date to proceed with peace negotiations. Yet the said delegation, obviously as a result of continued outside obstruction, has delayed its departure for Peking. Further, taking advantage of the delay of the negotiations, the local authorities of Tibet have deployed strong armed forces at Chengtu in Sikang province in the

interior of China, in an attempt to prevent the Chinese People's Liberation Army from liberating Tibet.

On August 31, 1950, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Indian Government through Ambassador Panikkar that the Chinese People's Liberation Army was going to take action soon in West Sikang according to set plans, and expressed the hope that the Indian Government would assist the delegation of the local authorities of Tibet so that it might arrive in Peking in mid-September. The Chinese Charge d'Affaires, Shen Chien, and later Ambassador Yuan Chung-hsien, both in person, told the said delegation that it was imperative that it should hasten to Peking within September, or that the said delegation should bear the responsibilities and be held responsible for all the consequences resulting from the delay. In mid-October, Chinese Ambassador Yuan again informed the Indian Government of this. Yet still owing to outside instigation the delegation of the local authorities of Tibet fabricated various pretexts and remained in India.

Although the Chinese Government has not given up its desire of settling the problem of Tibet peacefully it can no longer continue to put off the set plan of the Chinese People's Liberation Army to proceed to Tibet. And the liberation of Chengtu further proved that through the instrument of Tibetan troops, foreign forces and influences were obstructing the peaceful settlement of the problem of Tibet. But regardless of whether the local authorities of Tibet wish to proceed with peace negotiations and regardless of whatever results may be achieved by negotiations, no foreign intervention will be permitted. The entry into Tibet of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the liberation of the Tibetan people are also decided.

In showing its friendship with the Government of the Republic of India, and in an understanding of the desire of the Indian Government to see the problem of Tibet settled peacefully, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China had kept the Indian Government informed of its efforts in this direction. What the Chinese Government cannot but deeply regret is that the Indian Government, in disregard of the facts, has regarded a domestic problem of the Chinese Government—the exercise of its sovereign rights in Tibet—as an international dispute calculated to increase the present tensions in the world.

The Government of the Republic of India has repeatedly expres-

sed its desire of developing Sino-Indian friendship on the basis of mutual respect for territory, sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit, and of preventing the world from going to war. The entry into Tibet of the Chinese People's Liberation Army is exactly aimed at the protection of the integrity of the territory and the sovereignty of China. And it is on this question that all those countries who desire to respect the territory and sovereignty of China should first of all indicate their real attitude towards China.

In the meantime, we consider that what is now threatening the independence of nations and world peace is precisely the forces of these imperialist aggressors. For the sake of maintenance of national independence and defence of world peace, it is necessary to resist the forces of these imperialist aggressors. The entry into Tibet of the Chinese People's Liberation Army is thus an important measure to maintain Chinese independence, to prevent the imperialist aggressors from dragging the world towards war, and to defend world peace.

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China welcomes the renewed declaration of the Indian Government that it has no political or territorial ambitions in China's Tibet and that it does not seek any new privileged position. As long as our two sides adhere strictly to the principles of mutual respect for territory, sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit, we are convinced that the friendship between China and India should be developed in a normal way, and that the problems relating to Sino-Indian diplomatic, commercial and cultural relations with respect to Tibet may be solved properly and to our mutual benefit through normal diplomatic channels.

Peking, November 16, 1950.

# XX

## AGREEMENT

*Between*

### *THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TRADE AND INTERCOURSE*

*Between*

### *TIBET REGION OF CHINA AND INDIA<sup>1</sup>*

The Government of the Republic of India and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China.

Being desirous of promoting trade and cultural intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India and of facilitating pilgrimage and travel by the peoples of China and India.

Have resolved to enter into the present Agreement based on the following principles:

- (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,
- (2) mutual non-aggression,
- (3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs,
- (4) equality and mutual benefit, and
- (5) peaceful co-existence.

And for this purpose have appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries:

The Government of the Republic of India, H. E. Nedyam Raghavan, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of India accredited to the People's Republic of China; the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, H. E. Chang Han-fu, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central People's Government, who, having examined each other's credentials and finding them in good and due form, have agreed upon the following:—

#### Article I

The High Contracting Parties mutually agree to establish Trade Agencies:

1. The Government of India agrees that the Government of

<sup>1</sup>Notes, Memoranda and Letters exchanged between the Governments of India and China (Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 1959), pp. 98-101.

China may establish Trade Agencies at New Delhi, Calcutta and Kalimpong.

- (2) The Government of China agrees that the Government of India may establish Trade Agencies at Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok.

The Trade Agencies of both Parties shall be accorded the same status and same treatment. The Trade Agents of both Parties shall enjoy freedom from arrest while exercising their functions, and shall enjoy in respect of themselves, their wives and children who are dependent on them for livelihood freedom from search.

The Trade Agencies of both Parties shall enjoy the privileges and immunities for couriers, mail-bags and communications in code.

### Article II

The High Contracting Parties agree that traders of both countries known to be customarily and specifically engaged in trade between Tibet Region of China and India may trade at the following places:

- (1) The Government of China agrees to specify (1) Yatung, (2) Gyantse and (3) Phari as markets for trade. The Government of India agrees that trade may be carried on in India, including places like (1) Kalimpong, (2) Siliguri and (3) Calcutta, according to customary practice.
- (2) The Government of China agrees to specify (1) Gartok, (2) Pulanchung (Taklakot), (3) Gyanima-Khargo, (4) Gyanima-Chakra, (5) Ramura, (6) Dongbra, (7) Puling-Sumdo, (8) Nabra, (9) Shangtse and (10) Tashigong as markets for trade; the Government of India agrees that in future, when in accordance with the development and need of trade between the Ari District of Tibet Region of China and India, it has become necessary to specify markets for trade in the corresponding district in India adjacent to the Ari District of Tibet Region of China, it will be prepared to consider on the basis of equality and reciprocity to do so.

### Article III

The High Contracting Parties agree that pilgrimage by religious believers of the two countries shall be carried on in accordance with the following provisions:

- (1) Pilgrims from India of Lamaist, Hindu and Buddhist faiths



may visit Kang Rimpoche (Kailas) and Mavam Tso (Manasarovar) in Tibet Region of China in accordance with custom.

- (2) Pilgrims from Tibet Region of China of Lamaist and Buddhist faiths may visit Banaras, Sarnath, Gaya and Sanchi in India in accordance with custom.
- (3) Pilgrims customarily visiting Lhasa may continue to do so in accordance with custom.

#### Article IV

Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes and route:

- (1) Shipki La pass, (2) Mana pass, (3) Niti pass, (4) Kungri Bingri pass, (5) Darma pass, and (6) Lipu Lekh pass.

Also, the customary route leading to Tashigong along the valley of the Shangatsangpu (Indus) River may continue to be traversed in accordance with custom.

#### Article V

For travelling across the border, the High Contracting Parties agree that diplomatic personnel, officials and nationals of the two countries shall hold passports issued by their own respective countries and visaed by the other Party except as provided in Paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of this Article.

(1) Traders of both countries known to be customarily and specifically engaged in trade between Tibet Region of China and India, their wives and children who are dependent on them for livelihood and their attendants will be allowed entry for purposes of trade into India or Tibet Region of China, as the case may be, in accordance with custom on the production of certificates duly issued by the local government of their own country or by its duly authorized agents and examined by the border check-posts of the other Party.

(2) Inhabitants of the border districts of the two countries who cross the border to carry on petty trade or to visit friends and relatives may proceed to the border districts of the other party as they have customarily done heretofore and need not be restricted to the passes and route specified in Article IV above and shall not be required to hold passports, visas or permits.

(3) Porters and mule-team drivers of the two countries who cross the border to perform necessary transportation services need not

hold passports issued by their own country, but shall only hold certificates good for a definite period of time (three months, half a year or one year) duly issued by the local government of their own country or by its duly authorised agents and produce them for registration at the border checkpoints of the other Party.

(4) Pilgrims of both countries need not carry documents of certification but shall register at the border checkpoints of the other Party and receive a permit for pilgrimage.

(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraphs of this Article, either Government may refuse entry to any particular person.

(6) Persons who enter the territory of the other Party in accordance with the foregoing paragraphs of this Article may stay within its territory only after complying with the procedures specified by the other Party.

#### Article VI

The present Agreement shall come into effect upon ratification by both Governments and shall remain in force for eight (8) years. Extension of the present Agreement may be negotiated by the two Parties if either Party requests for it six (6) months prior to the expiry of the Agreement and the request is agreed to by the other Party.

Done in duplicate in Peking on the twenty-ninth day of April, 1954, in the Hindi, Chinese and English languages, all texts being equally valid.

(Sd.) Nedyam Raghavan,  
Plenipotentiary of the  
Government of the  
Republic of India.

(Sd.) Chang Han-fu,  
Plenipotentiary of the  
Central People's  
Government, People's  
Republic of China.

#### *Notes Exchanged*

#### NOTE

Peking, April 29, 1954

Your Excellency Mr. Vice-Foreign Minister,

In the course of our discussions regarding the Agreement on Trade

and Intercourse Between the Tibet Region of China and India, which has been happily concluded today, the Delegation of the Government of the Republic of India and the Delegation of the Government of the People's Republic of China agreed that certain matters be regulated by an exchange of Notes. In pursuance of this understanding, it is hereby agreed between the two Governments as follows:

(1) The Government of India will be pleased to withdraw completely within six (6) months from date of exchange of the present notes the military escorts now stationed at Yatung and Gyantse in Tibet Region of China. The Government of China will render facilities and assistance in such withdrawal.

(2) The Government of India will be pleased to hand over to the Government of China at a reasonable price the postal, telegraph and public telephone services together with their equipment operated by the Government of India in Tibet Region of China. The concrete measures in this regard will be decided upon through further negotiations between the Indian Embassy in China and the Foreign Ministry of China, which shall start immediately after the exchange of the present notes.

(3) The Government of India will be pleased to hand over to the Government of China at a reasonable price the twelve (12) rest houses of the Government of India in Tibet Region of China. The concrete measures in this regard will be decided upon through further negotiations between the Indian Embassy in China and the Foreign Ministry of China, which shall start immediately after the exchange of the present notes. The Government of China agrees that they shall continue as rest houses.

(4) The Government of China agrees that all buildings within the compound walls of the Trade Agencies of the Government of India at Yatung and Gyantse in Tibet Region of China may be retained by the Government of India. The Government of India may continue to lease the land within its Agency compound walls from the Chinese side. And the Government of India agrees that the Trade Agencies of the Government of China at Kalimpong and Calcutta may lease lands from the Indian side for the use of the Agencies and construct buildings thereon. The Government of China will render every possible assistance for housing the Indian Trade Agency at Gartok. The Government of India will also render every possible assistance for housing the Chinese Trade Agency at

New Delhi.

(5) The Government of India will be pleased to return to the Government of China all lands used or occupied by the Government of India other than the lands within its Trade Agency compound walls at Yatung.

If there are godowns and buildings of the Government of India on the above-mentioned lands used or occupied and to be returned by the Government of India and if Indian traders have stores, godowns or buildings on the above-mentioned lands so that there is a need to continue leasing lands, the Government of China agrees to sign contracts with the Government of India or Indian traders, as the case may be, for leasing to them those parts of the land occupied by the said godowns, buildings or stores and pertaining thereto.

(6) The Trade Agents of both Parties may, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the local governments, have access to their nationals involved in civil or criminal cases.

(7) The Trade Agents and traders of both countries may hire employees in the locality.

(8) The hospitals of the Indian Trade Agencies at Gyantse and Yatung will continue to serve personnel of the Indian Trade Agencies.

(9) Each Government shall protect the person and property of the traders and pilgrims of the other country.

(10) The Government of China agrees, so far as possible, to construct rest houses for the use of pilgrims along the route from Pulan-chung (Taklakot) to Kang Rimpoche (Kailas) and Mavam Tso (Manasarovar); and the Government of India agrees to place all possible facilities in India at the disposal of pilgrims.

(11) Traders and pilgrims of both countries shall have the facility of hiring means of transportation at normal and reasonable rates.

(12) The three Trade Agencies of each Party may function throughout the year.

(13) Traders of each country may rent buildings and godowns in accordance with local regulations in places under the jurisdiction of the other Party.

(14) Traders of both countries may carry on normal trade in accordance with local regulations at places provided in Article II of the Agreement.

(15) Disputes between traders of both countries over debts

and claims shall be handled in accordance with local laws and regulations.

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of India I hereby agree that the present Note along with Your Excellency's reply shall become an agreement between our two Governments which shall come into force upon the exchange of the present Notes.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express to Your Excellency Mr. Vice-Foreign Minister, the assurance of my highest consideration.

N. Raghavan,  
Ambassador Extraordinary  
and Plenipotentiary of  
the Republic of India.

His Excellency Mr. Chang Han-fu,  
Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs,  
Central People's Government,  
People's Republic of China.

# Notes

## *Page 1*

<sup>a</sup>See 'Biographical Sketches', vol. I.

<sup>b</sup>See 'Biographical Sketches', vol. I.

<sup>c</sup>Italian 'Opera Buffa'; comic opera, especially an operatic extravaganza.

<sup>d</sup>Yuan Shik-kai; see 'Biographical Sketches', vol. I.

<sup>e</sup>See 'Biographical Sketches', vol. I.

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<sup>a</sup>A sea-side resort, not far from Peking.

<sup>b</sup>British Consul at Chengtu.

## *Page 4*

<sup>a</sup>Chinese sea-port, off the Shantung coast.

## *Page 5*

<sup>a</sup>Also spelt as Leiwuche; better known as Riwoche.

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<sup>a</sup>Also rendered as Chamdo.

<sup>b</sup>Also rendered as Ma-kham.

<sup>c</sup>Also rendered as Gonjoh.

<sup>d</sup>Also rendered as De-ge.

<sup>e</sup>More correctly Yunnan, Chinese province bordering Burma.

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<sup>a</sup>Commander of Chinese troops at Batang.

<sup>b</sup>Also rendered as Champa Tendar Kalon.

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<sup>a</sup>Eric Teichman.

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<sup>a</sup>In essence, Jordan was opposed (his telegram of 1 July) to consulting Tibet in advance for fear it would entail 'prolonged delay'; Delhi, while keen (telegram, dated 27 June) that Tibet be kept 'fully informed', was averse 'in any case' to a breakdown of negotiations.

<sup>b</sup>See 'Biographical Sketches', vol. I.

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<sup>a</sup>See 'Biographical Sketches', vol. I.

<sup>b</sup>Chinese Commander who was the last to leave Lhasa (1912) with the remnants of the force he had brought in 1910.

<sup>c</sup>Appointed 'Commander-in-Chief' of the 'Chinese Western Expeditionary Force', Ying Chung-heng headed a levy of 100,000 men charged with the task of proceeding to Lhasa to help restore Chinese sovereignty. Known as the slayer of 'butcher Chao (Chao Erh-feng),' in June (1912), at Chengtu, Ying reiterated his

resolve; in July, he had reached Tachienlu. By September, he claimed to have cleared the road to Batang for an assault on Chamdo. On 1 October (1912) he had formally inaugurated a new administration of the Marches at Tachienlu.

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<sup>a</sup>Chao Erh-feng later succeeded him (i.e. Feng Chuan) as Warden of the March country.

<sup>b</sup>All three are in Inner Mongolia; Kalgan, capital of the province of Cachar; Jehol, being the eastern-most province of Inner Mongolia, bordering Peking.

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<sup>a</sup>Chinese reply handed over to Jordan in Peking on 29 June (1914) accepted the 'inclusion of the country south of Kuen Lun range into Inner Tibet'.

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<sup>a</sup>Viz., at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919.

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<sup>a</sup>See 'Biographical Sketches', vol. I.

*Page 26*

<sup>a</sup>Louis King, Assistant to the British Consul General, Chengtu, 1913-16.

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<sup>a</sup>By the treaty of Shantung (4 February, 1922), Japan returned Kiao-chow to China. This was part of the decisions taken at the nine-power Washington Conference, 12 November, 1921-6 February, 1922.

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<sup>a</sup>*Re infecta*: the business being unfinished.

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<sup>a</sup>After superannuation in 1918, Bell was re-employed in 1920 for about a year.

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<sup>a</sup>Reference is to the Tashi (more correctly, Panchen) Lama.

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<sup>a</sup>The Sikkimese Police Officer who, on behalf of the Indian government, attended on the 13th Dalai Lama during the latter's sojourn in India, 1910-12.

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W. M. McGovern, *To Lhasa in Disguise*, London, 1924.

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<sup>a</sup>Later invested with the title of Rai Bahadur, he was Special Assistant to the Political Officer in Sikkim.

<sup>b</sup>Abbreviation for 'group'.

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<sup>a</sup>Reference is to Bell's report, at *Supra*, pp. 32-4.

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<sup>a</sup>Variously known as Yuggon Dzasa, Kunchok Jungnay or Dzasa Tsetrung, he was a confidant of the Dalai Lama and had, since 1922, been in charge of 'the Lama temple' in Peking. His visit to Lhasa, in 1930, was said to underline sustained Kuomintang overtures for closer relations with the Tibetan ruler.

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<sup>a</sup>In fact, Bell visited Shingatsé in 1906, *not* 1908.

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<sup>a</sup>More correctly Liu Wen-hui, local Chinese commander in Szechuan, then engaged in civil strife with his rival, Liu Hsing. Later he was to be worsted in battle.

<sup>b</sup>Then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

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<sup>a</sup>Possibly Nyingsha.

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<sup>a</sup>Should read Ganden, largest of the three monasteries just outside Lhasa.

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<sup>a</sup>Should read, 'to obtain (from) Foreign Office'.

<sup>b</sup>Abbreviation for Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>c</sup>Abbreviation for Government of India.

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<sup>a</sup>Sir Denys Bray, then member of the Secretary of State's India Council.

<sup>b</sup>Reference is to Sir Miles Lampson, then British Minister in Nanking.

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<sup>a</sup>General Huang Mu-sung was briefly President of the Kuomintang's Committee for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, popularly C.M.T.A., and spent six months (April-October 1934) in Lhasa to help persuade its post-13th Dalai Lama regime accept Chinese overlordship.

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<sup>a</sup>Lt. Col. Daukes was then (1934) British Minister to the court of Nepal; for details see Biographical Sketches.

<sup>a</sup>Should read September, *not* November.

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<sup>a</sup>Should read Tsetang.

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<sup>a</sup>*Supra*, pp. 64-9.

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<sup>a</sup>H. E. Richardson, then (British) India's representative at Lhasa. Extremely knowledgeable on the country and its people; his *Tibet and its History*, Oxford, 1962, is a definitive study.



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<sup>a</sup>Reference is to Ronald John Henry Kaulback who had, along with Kingdon-Ward, journeyed through Assam and Eastern Tibet in 1933. He returned to Tibet in 1935 to discover the source of Salween river. Later, in 1938, he spent about 18 months in Upper Burma hunting and collecting zoological specimens for the British Museum.

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<sup>a</sup>This would be incorrect. The fact is that in 1914, the Russians had raised serious objections to the terms of the Simla Convention: took strong exception to its publication unless a full agreement had been reached on some of its principal clauses and brought in the question of major concessions in Afghanistan as a necessary preliminary. For a detailed discussion see the author's *The McMahon Line and After*, 1974, pp. 247-60.

In 1924, the newly-installed Soviet regime repudiated the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907.

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<sup>a</sup>References are to locations in the relevant cartographic sheets of the Survey of India sketch maps.

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<sup>a</sup>For a detailed study of the war and its impact see John Pemble, *The Invasion of Nepal: John Company at War*, Oxford, 1971.

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<sup>a</sup>For an in-depth analysis see Kanchanmoy Mojumdar, *Political Relations between India and Nepal, 1877-1923*, New Delhi, 1973 and Asad Husain, *British India's Relations with the Kingdom of Nepal, 1857-1947*, London, 1970.

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<sup>a</sup>For a brief account see the author's 'Sikkim and Bhutan: an historical conspectus', *JIH*, XLVI, 1, No. 136, April 1968, pp. 89-124.

<sup>b</sup>George Bogle. Born, 1746; educated, Glasgow and Edinburgh University; entered East India Company's service in 1769; was appointed by Warren Hastings to lead an embassy to the Tashi Lama for the purpose of opening up trade and friendly relations with Tibet; returned to India, 1775; in 1779, he was appointed Collector of Rangpur and established an annual fair to encourage trade with Bhutan and Tibet. A second embassy was contemplated but the Tashi Lama had in the meantime left for Peking; Bogle proposed meeting him there but died, at Calcutta, 3 April, 1787. His papers were later edited by Clements R. Markham and published as *Narratives of the Mission of George Bogle to Tibet and of the Journey of Thomas Manning to Lhasa*, London, 1876.

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<sup>a</sup>Robert Boileau Pemberton. Born, 1798; entered the Indian army, 1817; saw active service in Manipur, employed there in survey and exploration work and on similar duties on the North-Eastern Frontier; promoted Captain in July, 1835; sent as special envoy to Bhutan, 1838; his *Report on Bhutan*, Calcutta,

1839, and despatches from the North-Eastern Frontier provided, for a long time, the best information available on these lands; appointed Governor General's Agent in Murshidabad and died there, 26 June, 1840.

<sup>b</sup>For two old but excellent, first-hand, accounts see Lord Ronaldshay, *Lands of the Thunderbolt: Sikkim, Chumbi and Bhutan*, London, 1923 and J. C. White, *Sikkim and Bhutan*, London, 1909.

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<sup>a</sup>For an authoritative account under the Raj, see H. E. Richardson, *Tibet and Its History*, Oxford, 1962.

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<sup>a</sup>For the relationship between the two Lamas, see the author's *Tibetan Polity 1904-37*, Wiesbaden, 1976.

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<sup>a</sup>The (Simla) Convention was concluded in 1914, *not* 1913.

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<sup>a</sup>European name for the Buddhist clergy of east Asia, particularly Japan.

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<sup>a</sup>The 'Hump': a term coined by U.S. fliers during World War II who negotiated the hazardous air ferry from eastern India to western China (Kunming was the terminal) over the Himalayan 'hump'-ranges of Eastern end forming a formidable barrier. Starting as a trickle in July 1942 with no air cover or protection, the 'hump' fliers who wrote a brilliant saga of bravery and self-denial, brought to the beleaguered Kuomintang regime much-needed supplies of gasoline and other equipment. With the organization of the U.S. 14th Air force in 1943, the shuttle became a little safer and the supplies grew in volume.

## Biographical Sketches

### ALSTON, Sir Beilby Francis

Born, 1868; educated, privately and abroad; clerk in Foreign Office, 1890; acting 3rd Secretary in Diplomatic Service at Copenhagen, 1895; Acting 2nd Secretary and Charge d'Affaires at Buenos Aires, 1896-7; various diplomatic assignments, 1898-1910; Counsellor of H. M. Legation, 1911-12 and Charge d'Affaires at Peking, 1913, 1916-17; Deputy High Commissioner, Siberia, 1918-19; Minister Plenipotentiary, Tokyo, 1919-20; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to China, 1920-2; Minister to the Argentina Republic and Paraguay, 1923-5; Ambassador to Brazil, 1925; died, June, 1929.

### ATCHESON, George, Jr.

Born, 1896; educated, Oakland, California and College of Chinese Studies, Peking; newspaper and magazine work, 1915-20; U.S. army, 1918-19; language officer, U.S. Legation, Peking, 1920-3; Vice Consul, Chingsha, 1923; Consul, Tientsin, Foochow, Nanking, 1928-34; Second Secretary, Embassy, Peking, 1938-9; State Department, 1939-42; U.S. Charge d'Affaires, China, May-October 1943, November-December 1944, February-April 1945; promoted to Class I, May 1945; designated Minister to Siam, August 1945; U.S. Political Advisor for Japan, March 1946; rank of Ambassador, June 1946; died, August, 1947.

### BAILEY, Lt. Col. Fredrick Marshman

Born, 1882; educated, Edinburgh Academy, Wellington College and Sandhurst; joined 17th Bengal Lancers, 1901-3; Member, Younghusband's expedition to Lhasa, 1903-4; led exploration party to Western Tibet, 1904-5; joined Indian Political Department, 1905; British Trade Agent, Gyantse (Tibet), 1905-9; undertook exploration in western China, south-eastern Tibet and Mishmi hills, 1911; awarded Gill Memorial Medal by Royal Geographical Society, 1911; Member, Abor expedition, 1911; with Captain Morshead, explored course of Brahmaputra in southern Tibet, 1913; awarded Macgregor Medal by Royal United Service Institution of India, 1914; awarded Gold Medal by Royal Geographical Society, 1916; served in N.W.F.P., 1917-18; Political Officer in Mesopotamia and Persia, 1916-17; awarded Gold Medal by Royal Scottish Geographical Society, 1920; Political Officer, Sikkim, 1921-3; Political Agent, Central India and Resident, Baroda, 1931-2; Resident in Kashmir, 1932-3; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Nepal, 1935-8; retired, 1938; among his books, *China, Tibet, Assam*, 1945 and *Mission to Tashkent*, 1958 bear mention; died, 1965.

### BALFOUR, Arthur James

Born, 1848; educated, Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge; Private Secretary to Marquess of Salisbury when Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1878-80; employed on Special Mission on Lords Salisbury and Beaconsfield to Berlin, 1878; Privy Councillor, 1885; Leader, House of Commons and First Lord of

Treasury, 1891-2; Leader of Opposition, 1892-5; President, British Association, 1904; Prime Minister, 1902-5; First Lord of Admiralty, 1915-16; Foreign Secretary, 1916-19; President of the Council, 1919-21 and 1925-9; Head of British Mission to U.S.A., 1917 and to Washington Conference, 1921-2; President, British Academy, 1921-8; among a large number of publications *A Defence of Philosophic Doubt*, 1879; *Criticism and Beauty* (Romanes Lecture), 1909; *Theism and Humanism*, 1914; *Essays, Speculative and Political*, 1920; *Theism and Thought*, 1923, bear mention; died, 1930.

### BALLANTINE, Joseph William

Born, 1888; educated Amherst and Roanoke; with American Foreign Service, 1909-47; Secretary, American delegation, London Naval Conference, 1930; Consul General, Canton, China, 1930-4; Mukden, 1934-7; assigned to Department of State, 1937-41; Consul General, Ottawa (Canada), 1944; Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, 1944; Special Assistant to Secretary of State, 1945-February, 1947; Advisor, International Prosecution Secretariat, Allied Military Tribunal for the East, 1946; joined staff of Brookings Institution, 1947; author, *Japanese as it is Spoken*, 1945 and *Formosa*, 1952; died, January, 1973.

### BENN, William Wedgwood, first Viscount Stansgate

Born, 1877; educated, Lycee Condorcet, Paris and University College, London; deeply interested in living conditions in East End of London; member, London Progressive Party and a life-long radical nonconformist; elected as a Liberal to Parliament in 1906 and gained experience at the Treasury, Board of Education, Admiralty as Parliamentary Private Secretary to Reginald McKenna; full-time and active politician, adjudged one of the best parliamentarians; returned for Labour in 1929 and became Secretary of State for India and sworn of the Privy Council; responsible for declaration of Viceroy (Irwin) regarding goal of dominion status for India; elevated to the House of Lords as Viscount Stansgate, January, 1942; when Labour returned to power in 1945, Secretary of State for Air; entrusted with negotiations for revision of Anglo-Egyptian treaty, 1946; President of Inter-parliamentary union, 1947-57; had perpetual effervescence, buoyancy and wit; was a happy warrior and a man of profound ethical convictions with a great love for his fellow-men; died, 1960.

### BENTINCK, (Reverend) Sir Charles Henry

Born, 1879; educated, Trinity College, Cambridge and Wycliffe Hall, Oxford; entered diplomatic service, 1904; Foreign Office, 1905; Third Secretary, Berlin, 1905-6; Secretary, incharge commercial affairs, the Hague, 1908-10; Tokyo, 1914-19; Foreign Office, 1919-20; Consul General, Munich, 1924; British Minister to Peru and Ecuador, 1929-33; H. M. Ambassador, Santiago, 1937-40; retired from diplomatic service and ordained, 1941; died, 1945.

### BERLE, Adolf Augustus

Born, 1895; educated at Harvard, Columbia, Detroit, Yankton; Practised law, Boston, 1916-17; New York City, from 1919; partner Berle and Berle; Professor of Corporation Law, Columbia Law School, 1927-64; Professor Emeritus of Law,

from 1964; Assistant Secretary of State, 1938-44; U. S. Ambassador to Brazil, 1945-6; Chairman, Task Force on Latin America, 1961; also Consultant to Secretary of State, 1961-2; Author: *Studies in the Law of Corporation Finance*, 1928; *Cases and Materials in the Law of Corporation Finance*, 1930; died, 1971.

### BLACKBURN, Sir Arthur Dickinson

Born, 1887; educated, Bedford School, 1908; called to the bar, Middle Temple; entered H. M. Consular Service in China, 1917; served as Vice-Consul and Consul, Peking, Foochow, Shanghai; Chinese Counsellor, British Embassy, 1917-43; retired, 1944; died, 1971.

### BUTLER, Sir (Spencer) Harcourt

Born, 1869; educated, Harrow and Balliol College, Oxford; entered I.C.S.; between 1901 and '15, served as Assistant Collector and Magistrate; Junior Secretary, Board of Revenue; Settlement Officer; Secretary to Famine Commission; Financial Secretary to Government; Director of Agriculture; Judicial Secretary to Government; Commissioner, Lucknow; Foreign Secretary to Government of India; Member of the Governor General's Executive Council; Lieutenant Governor of Burma, 1915-17; Lieutenant Governor of United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, 1918; Governor of U.P., 1921-3; Governor of Bihar, 1923-7; Chairman, Indian States Committee, 1928; among his books, *India Insistent*, 1931, bears mention; died, 1938.

### CAROE, Sir Olaf Kirkpatrick

Born, 1892; educated, Winchester and Magdalen College, Oxford; entered I.C.S., 1919; served in the Panjab till 1923 when posted to N.W.F.P. as officer in Political Department; Deputy Commissioner in various frontier districts including Peshawar, upto 1932; Chief Secretary to government of N.W.F.P., 1933-4; Deputy Secretary, Foreign and Political Department, Government of India, 1934; officiated Political Resident in Persian Gulf and as Agent to Governor-General, Baluchistan, 1935-6; Resident, Waziristan and Revenue Commissioner in Baluchistan, 1937-8; Foreign Secretary, Government of India, 1939-45; Governor of N.W.F.P., 1946-7.

### CHANG HAN-FU

Born, 1905; educated, Tsinghu University, Peking; editorial committee member of *Chan-hsien* ('war front'), 1937; member, Chinese Communist Party, 1938; Editor-in-Chief, *Hsin-hua-jih-pao* ('New China Daily'), 1942-6; attended founding conference United Nations, 1945; Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, October 1949-mid 60's; negotiated with India on status of Tibet, December 1953-April 1954, in Peking; held preliminary talks with Indonesia on status of Chinese in that country, 1954; member, Prime Minister Chou En-lai's delegation to Bandung, April, 1955; visited India, Iraq, U.A.R., 1959; accompanied Chou En-lai to Burma, India, Nepal, to discuss border questions, 1960; deputy leader, Chinese delegation to conference on Laos, 1961-2.

### CLAUSON, Miles John

Born, 1902; educated, Eton and Corpus Christi College, Oxford; served in Secre-

tary's office, General Post Office, 1925-6; Assistant Principal, India Office, 1927; Resident Clerk, 1927; Assistant Private Secretary to Secretary of State, 1928; Acting Principal Secretary, January, 1932; Private Secretary to Secretary of State for India and Burma, October, 1937.

#### DAUKES, Lt. Col. Clendon Tuberville

Born, 1879; educated, Haileybury College; entered Political Department, Government of India, 1903; Consul, Seistan, 1906; Political Agent, Gilgit, 1911; member, General Malleson's mission to North-east Persia, 1918-19; British envoy to court of Nepal; raised to the status of Minister, 1934; died, 1947.

#### DAWSON, James Alexander

Born, 1880; educated, Gordon's College, Aberdeen University and Christ Church, Oxford; Chief Secretary, Assam, 1933; retired, 1939; died, 1956.

#### DENNEHY, Sir Harold George

Born, 1890; educated, Clifton and Emmanuel College, Cambridge; entered I.C.S., 1914; served European war with I.A.R.O., 1915-19; Deputy Commissioner, 1933; Secretary, Transferred Departments, Government of Assam, 1933; Chief Secretary, Assam, 1939-47; died, 1956.

#### DONOVAN, Maj.-Gen. William Joseph

Born, 1883; educated, Columbia University; began practice, Buffalo, 1907; Consul for New York State Fuel Administration, 1924; U.S. District Attorney, Western district, New York, 1922-4; Assistant Attorney General of U.S., 1924-5; Assistant to Attorney General, 1925-9; served on special missions for President Roosevelt in Europe, 1940 and 1941; Coordinator, Defence Information, 1941-2; Director, Office of Strategic Services, 1942-5; died, February, 1959.

#### DUNDAS, Lawrence John Lumley, second Marquess of Zetland

Born, 1876; educated, Harrow and Trinity College, Cambridge; A.D.C. Viceroy's staff, India, 1900; M.P., 1907-16; Member, Royal Commission on the Public Services in India, 1912-14; Governor of Bengal, 1917-22; Secretary of State for India, 1935-40 and Secretary of State for Burma, 1937-40; Member, Indian Round Table Conference, 1930-1; of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on India, 1933; Chairman of the National Trust, 1931-45; publications include *Lands of the Thunderbolt: Sikkim, Chumbi and Bhutan*, 1923; *India: A Bird's Eye-View*, 1924; *The Life of Lord Curzon*, 1928; *The Life of Lord Cromer*, 1932; *Indian Home Rule*, 1935; died, February, 1961.

#### GAUSS, Clarence Edward

Born, 1887; Commissioner, Invalid Pensions, 1903-6; entered Department of State, 1906; Deputy Consul General, Shanghai, 1907-9, 1912-16; Consul, Amony, Tsian, Shanghai and Tientsin, 1926-31; transferred, Department of State, 1931; Counsellor, Legation, Peking, 1933-5; Counsellor, Embassy and Consul General, Paris 1935; Consul General, Shanghai, 1935-40; Minister to Australia, 1940-1; Ambassador to China, 1941-4; member, Board of Directors, Export-Import Bank of Washington, 1946; died, April, 1960.

**GOULD, Sir Basil John**

Born, 1883; educated, Winchester and New College, Oxford; appointed to I.C.S. (Panjab), 1907; joined Political Department, Government of India, 1909; served in Central India, 1909; Under Secretary, Foreign Department, 1910-12; served in Tibet, 1912; Sikkim, 1913; N.W.F.P., 1914-17; Assistant Private Secretary to Viceroy, 1917; Consul, Seistan (Persia), 1918-25; Counsellor, British Legation, Kabul, 1926-9; Charge d'Affaires, 1927-8; Political Agent, Kurram (N.W.F.P.), 1929; Dir, Swat and Chitral, 1930; Resident in Waziristan, 1931; Revenue and Judicial Commissioner, Baluchistan, 1933-5 and Agent to Governor General, 1934; Political Officer in Sikkim (and for Bhutan and Tibet), 1935-47; died, 1956.

**HAMILTON, Maxwell McGaughey**

Born, 1896; educated, Princeton and California College in China (Peking); entered Foreign Service as student interpreter at American Legation, Peking, May, 1920; promoted Consul, 1924; Vice Consul and Consul, Canton, 1922-5; Consul, Shanghai, 1925-7; assigned for duty in Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, 1927; Assistant Chief, 1931-7; Chief, after 1937; Appointed Minister Counsellor, American Embassy, Moscow, June 1943; assigned to Department of State and appointed Special Assistant to Secretary of State, September, 1944; Minister to Finland, 1945-7; resigned to work with State Department on Japanese peace treaty; assigned to State Department, after 1948; died, November, 1957.

**HARDING, Harold Ivan**

Born, Toronto, 1883; educated, Switzerland, Elizabeth College, Guernsey and Germany; entered British Consular Service in China, 1902; stationed at Peking, Shanghai, Canton, Wurchow, Changsha, Shanghai, Hoihow, Pakhoi, Ichang and Foochow in varied capacities, until 1913; thence, until 1922, Chinese Second Secretary at Peking, save for three months in 1917 when he was incharge of Consulate at Harbin; Vice Consul at Kashgar, 1922-3; Consul at Tengyueh on Sino-Burmese frontier, 1923-7; subsequently Consul at Changsha and Foochow and Consul General, Tsinan and Yunnanfu; retired, 1937; died, 1943.

**HOLMAN, Adrian**

Born, 1895; educated, Harrow and New College, Oxford; served in the European war, 1915-18; won Military Cross and was mentioned in despatches; entered Diplomatic Service as 3rd Secretary, 1920; H. M. Embassy, Brussels, 1921-4; Second Secretary, 1922; H. M. Embassy, Rome, 1924-6; Paris, 1926-31; First Secretary, 1931; Foreign Secretary, H. M. Embassy, Berlin, 1938-9; the Hague, 1939; Bagdad, 1940; promoted Counsellor, 1940; Teheran, 1942; British Mission, Algiers; Minister at H.M. Embassy, Paris, 1944; died, 1973.

**HSU MO**

Born, 1893; educated, Peiyang and George Washington Universities; Professor of Law and Dean, College of Arts, Nankai University, Tientsin; Judge, Shanghai Provisional Court, 1927; Chief Judge, Chengkiang District Court, 1928; Director of European and American Affairs in (Chinese) Foreign Office, 1928-31; Director, Asiatic Affairs, 1931; Special Foreign Commissioner, Shanghai, 1929;

Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1932-41; Minister to Australia, 1941-5; Ambassador to Turkey, 1945.

### HULL, Cordell

Born, 1871; attended school in Kentucky and later Ohio; elected to House of Representatives (1906) where he served, with one interruption, until 1931; a dedicated supporter of President Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations; was elected to the U. S. Senate in 1930 where he took special interest in the tariff question consistently advocating freer trade relations for the U. S.; President Roosevelt appointed him Secretary of State, 1933; served in that capacity longer than any other incumbent, until 1944; during Roosevelt's first two administrations, his special contribution in the development of good-neighbourly relations with Latin America; fought vigorously, and successfully, for freer trade arrangements; in the 1930's took a firm stand against Japanese imperialism while seeking to avoid actual armed conflict; visited Moscow and obtained Stalin's consent to the establishment of the U. N., 1943; resigned from the State Department, partly because of failing health, 1944; awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, 1945; died, July, 1955.

### INGRAM, Edward Maurice Berkeley

Born, 1890; educated, Eton and King's College, Cambridge; entered service in General Staff, War Office, 1914-18; joined Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service, 1919; Private Secretary to Additional Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Assistant Secretary to Lord Milner's Special Mission to Egypt; served in Oslo as Charge d'Affaires, 1924, 1925; in Berlin, 1926, 1927; transferred to the Foreign Office, 1927; Acting Counsellor and transferred to Peking, 1929; acted as Charge d'Affaires, 1931, 1933, 1934; Counsellor, 1932; acted as Charge d'Affaires, 1935, 1936 and 1937; transferred to the Foreign Office, 1937 and to Ministry of Economic Warfare, 1939; died, 1941.

### KINGDON-WARD, Francis (Frank)

Born, 1885; educated, St. Paul's School and Christ's College, Cambridge; first exploratory journey into China to Tachienlu in Szechuan and Kansu, 1909; from now on becomes a professional plant collector, his 25 expeditions to the un-explored mountain regions where India, China and Burma meet; his best known introduction, the blue poppy, one of the most prized garden plants; his keen observation of botanical detail and understanding of plant ecology; his major discovery that the rain screen formed by the main range does not end at the Tsangpo gorge but is traceable along the terrific longitudinal mountain ranges into north-west Yunnan; prolific writer; apart from contributing articles to various magazines, periodicals and scientific journals, wrote some 25 books mostly descriptive of his expeditions and their botanical results; the more important are *Land of the Blue Poppy*, 1913; *In Farthest Burma*, 1921; *From China to Khamti Long*, 1924; *The Riddle of the Tsangpo Gorges*, 1926; *Assam Adventure*, 1941; Recipient of numerous honours, including the Royal Horticultural Society's Victoria Medal of Honour in 1932, and the Vaitch memorial medal in 1934; the Royal Geographical Society's highest honour, the Founder's Medal, in 1930; died, 1958.



**KUNG, H. H. (Kung Hsiang-hsi)**

Born, 1881, a lineal descendant of Confucius in the 75th generation; educated at Oberlin College and Yale University; active in revolutionary years, 1910-17; Founder-Principal, Oberlin Shansi Memorial College, T'aiku; Resident Director, Sino-Russian negotiations, 1924-7; Minister of Industry and Acting Minister of Finance, Canton government, 1926-7; Minister of Industry, Nationalist Government, 1932; Special Industrial Commissioner to Europe and U.S.A., 1932-3; Vice President, Executive Yuan and Governor, Central Bank of China, 1933-8; Vice President, Executive Yuan, 1939-44; died, 1967.

**LIGHTFOOT, Gordon Shelley**

Born, August, 1897; served in the Indian Army, 1915-23; joined Indian Police, 1923; awarded King's Police Medal, 1930; Political Officer, Balipara Frontier Tract, 1934-8; Political Officer, Charduar, 1938-43; Superintendent, Police, 1943-47.

**MACLEAY, Sir (James William) Ronald**

Born, 1870; educated, Charterhouse and Balliol College, Oxford; Attache in the Diplomatic Service, 1895; served in different capacities in Washington, Copenhagen, Brussels, Madrid, Constantinople, Belgrade, Mexico, the Foreign Office and again in Brussels; Counsellor of Embassy to H. M. Legation at Peking, 1914; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Argentina Republic, 1919-22; British Minister to China, 1922-6; to Czechoslovakia, 1927-9; British Ambassador to the Argentina Republic, 1930-3; died 1943.

**MERRELL, George R.**

Born, 1898; educated, Cornell University; Third Secretary of Legation, the Hague, 1922-3; Charge d'Affaires, Port au Prince, Haiti, 1924-6; Second Secretary of Embassy, Paris, November 1926; assigned to Latin American Division of State Department, June 1931; First Secretary of Embassy, Peking, October 1935; incharge of Consulate, Amoy, 1940; Consul General at Calcutta, India, September 1941-March 1942; Commissioner of U.S. to India, 1945-7; Minister to Ethiopia, 1947-9; appointed to serve temporarily on selection board, Academy of American Foreign Service, 1948; died, December, 1962.

**METCALFE, Sir Herbert Aubery Francis**

Born, 1883; educated, Charterhouse and Christ Church, Oxford; entered I. C. S., 1908; served in the Panjab and Delhi province, 1908-13; entered Political Department, 1913; Assistant Secretary to Viceroy, 1914-17; served in N. W. F. P., 1917-25, 1926-30; Counsellor to Legation, Kabul, 1925-6; Deputy Secretary in the Foreign and Political Department, 1930-2; Foreign Secretary to Government of India, 1932-9; Resident and Chief Commissioner, Baluchistan, 1939-43; died, 1957.

**PANIKKAR, Sardar Kavalam Madhava**

Born, 1895; educated, Madras and Oxford; Bar-at-Law (Middle Temple); Lecturer, Aligarh Muslim University; Editor, *The Hindustan Times*, 1925; Secretary to Chancellor, Chamber of Princes, 1931-7; Foreign Minister, Patiala;

Foreign and Political Minister and Minister for Education and Health, Bikaner, 1937-44; Prime Minister, Bikaner state, 1944; Delegate, U.N. General Assembly, 1947; Vice President, Royal Indian Society, London, 1948-52; Ambassador to China, 1948-52; Ambassador to Egypt, September, 1952-December, 1953; Member, States Reorganization Commission, 1954-6; Ambassador to France, 1956-9; Vice Chancellor, Jammu and Kashmir University, 1960-3; Vice Chancellor, Mysore University, 1963; author of several books of which the following may bear mention: *The Future of South-east Asia*, 1943; *India and the Indian Ocean*, 1945; *Survey of Indian History*, 1947; *Asia and Western Dominance*, 1953; *In Two Chinas*, 1955; also wrote numerous novels, plays and poems in Malayalam; died, December, 1963.

### PHILLIPS, William

Born, 1868; educated, Harvard University; Secretary of Legation, Peking, 1905-7; Secretary of Embassy, London, 1909-12; Third Assistant Secretary of State, 1917-20; Minister to Netherlands, 1920-2; Under Secretary of State, 1922-4; 1933-6; Ambassador to Italy, 1936-41; President Roosevelt's Personal Representative, India, 1942-3; Political Advisor to General Eisenhower, 1943; Member, Anglo-American committee of enquiry in regard to Palestine, December, 1945; died, February, 1968.

### RAGHAVAN, Nedyam

Born, 1900; educated, University of Madras, Inns of Court (London) and called to the Bar (Inner Temple); practised as Barrister in Malaya, 1928-47; founder-president, All-Malay Indian Association; Consul General of India in Indonesia, 1947-8; Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, 1948-50; Ambassador to Belgium (and concurrently Minister to Luxembourg), 1950-1; Ambassador to Switzerland and Minister to the Holy See and Austria, 1951-2; Ambassador to China, 1952-5; Ambassador to Argentina, 1956-9; Ambassador to France, 1959-60; died, December, 1963.

### SANSOM, Sir George Beilby

Born, 1883; educated, Palmer's School, Grays and Universities of Giessen and Marburg; held various consular posts in Japan from 1904; Acting Japanese Counsellor to H. M. Embassy, Tokyo, 1925-30; retired, 1940; Visiting Professor, Columbia University, New York, 1935-6 and 1940-1; Minister, British Embassy Washington, D. C., 1942-7; among his publications, the following may be listed: *Historical Grammar of the Japanese Language*, 1928; *A Short Cultural History of Japan*, 1931; *A History of Japan*, 3 vols., 1958-63; died, 1965.

### SHEN SHIH-HUA

Appointed Chinese Commissioner to H. M. G. in India, March, 1942; prior to his appointment, he was Director General, Transportation Control Administration; earlier, he was Superintendent, Rangoon office of China-Burma Transport Bureau and had acted as Director, General Affairs Department, Ministry of Communications.

### SIMON, John Allsebrook, first Viscount Simon

Born, 1873; educated, Bathe Grammar School and Wadham College, Oxford;

President of the Oxford Union, 1896 and Fellow of All Souls, 1897; at 37, in 1910, was appointed Solicitor General, with a knighthood conferred, 1910; sworn to the Privy Council, 1912; succeeded Rufus Isaacs as Attorney General, with a seat in the Cabinet, 1913; Chairman, Indian Statutory Commission to investigate working of 1919 reforms, 1927; before his report (1930) came out, Labour government (1929) had defined India's goal as 'attainment of dominion status'; by 1935, the report had become a mere storehouse for historians; was appointed Foreign Secretary to deal with a deepening international crisis arising out of the rise of Nazi Germany, 1931-5; Home Secretary, 1935; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1937; Lord Chancellor in Winston Churchill's war cabinet, 1940-5; delivered judgements on torts, contracts, property, criminal law, revenue law and evidence; died in London, January, 1954.

### SOONG, T. V. (Sung Tsu-wen)

Born, 1891; studied at Harvard and Columbia Universities; English Secretary of Canton Government, 1924; Minister of Finance, Nationalist government, Canton, 1925-7 and at Nanking, 1928-33; Member, Executive Committee of K. M. T.; Chief Delegate, World Economic Conference, London, 1933; Chairman, Bank of China, 1935-42; Foreign Minister, 1941-5; Acting President, Executive Yuan, 1932-3 and 1944-7; died, April, 1971.

### STEWART, Sir (Samuel) Findlater

Born, 1879; educated, Edinburgh University; appointed to India Office, 1903; Joint Secretary, Military Department, India Office, 1920; Joint Secretary, Royal Commission on the Superior Civil Services in India (the Lee Commission), 1923-4; one of the Assistant Under Secretaries of State for India and Clerk to the Council of India, 1924-30; Secretary to the Indian Statutory (Simon) Commission, 1927-30; Permanent Under Secretary of State for India, 1930-42; retired, December 1945; died, 1960.

### STETTINIUS, Edward R.

Born, 1900; educated, Pomfret School, Connecticut and University of Virginia; Vice Chairman, Finance Committee U. S. Steel Corporation, 1934; Director and Chairman, Finance Committee, 1936; Chairman, Board of Directors and member, Finance Committee, 1938; Member, Advisory Committee to Council for National Defence, 1940; Lend Lease Administrator, U.S.A. and Special Assistant to President, 1941-3; Under Secretary of State, 1943-4; Secretary of State, U. S. A., 1944-5; American Representative on the Security Council and Chairman, U. S. delegation to General Assembly of United Nations, 1945-6; among his publications mention may be made of *Roosevelt and the Russians*, 1949 (posthumous); died, October, 1949.

### STILWELL, Joseph Warren

Born, 1883; graduated from U. S. Military Academy, 1914; served in the U. S. IV Corps, 1917-18; earlier had acquired a good knowledge of Chinese language at the University of California, Berkeley; after 1935, served as military attache to Chinese government where his worth as tactician and trainer impressed his superiors in Washington; in 1941, was ordered to sustain and strengthen Chinese

resistance to the Japanese, improve Chinese army as chief of staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, take command of all U. S. forces in the China-Burma-India theatre and direct all Chinese forces in Burma; in 1942, the Japanese worsted him in battle and cut off the Burma road, then a major Chinese supply line; known as 'Vinegar' Joe, because of his integrity, refusal to ingratiate himself with others and the demands he made on those around him. Stillwell despised Chiang who succeeded (1944) in easing him out of China; died at San Francisco, October, 1946.

#### TEICHMAN, Sir Eric

Born, 1884; educated, Charterhouse and Caius College, Cambridge; entered H. M. Consular Service in China, 1907; Assistant Chinese Secretary to H. M. Legation at Peking, 1919-20; employed in Foreign Office, 1921-2; Chinese Secretary at H. M. Legation, Peking, from 1922; Counsellor of Embassy from 1927; retired, 1936; re-employed as Counsellor of Embassy, 1942-4; Awarded Murchison grant, Royal Geographical Society, 1925; died, 1944.

#### TILLEY, Sir John Anthony Cecil

Born, 1869; educated, Eton and King's College, Cambridge; entered Foreign Office, 1893; Second Secretary in Diplomatic Service and Secretary to British Agent for Venezuela Arbitration at Paris, 1899; Secretary to Committee on Consular Service, 1902; Secretary to Imperial Defence Committee, 1903-4; First Secretary to Embassy at Constantinople, 1906-8; British Plenipotentiary at Brussels Arms Conference, 1909; Chief Clerk of Foreign Office, 1913; Assistant Secretary, 1919-20; British Ambassador to Brazil, 1921-5; to Japan, 1926-31; publications include *London to Tokyo*, 1942; (with Stephen Gaselev), *The Foreign Office*, 1933; died, 1952.

#### TOLSTOY, Count Ilia A.

Grandson of Russian author, Leo Tolstoy; immigrated to the U. S. in 1924 and became noted, in his own right, as an explorer, conservationist and ichthyologist; as an O. S. S. (Office of Strategic Services) agent in World War II, led an expedition from India into Tibet to enlist the Dalai Lama's aid in effecting transport of goods overland from India to China, across Tibet; as a scientist, developed a hypodermic harpoon for live capture of huge sharks and contributed widely to the conservation of marine life; in Florida, he is remembered as co-founder of the famed Marineland near St. Augustine; died, November, 1970.

#### TSIANG, T. F.

Born, 1895; professor of History, Nankai University, Tientsin and later Tsinghua College, Peking, 1924-34; Director of Political Affairs in the Cabinet, 1935-6 and 1939-42; Ambassador to U. S. S. R., 1936-8; Acting Representative of China on U. N. Security Council, 1947; Head of Chinese delegation to U. N. General Assembly, 1949, 1950, 1951.

#### WAKELY, Sir Leonard Day

Born, 1880; educated, St. Olave's School and St. John's College, Cambridge; entered India Office, 1902; Secretary, Political Department, 1924-30; Assistan'

Under Secretary of State, India Office and Clerk to the Council of India, 1930-4; Deputy Under Secretary of State for India, 1934-41; died, 1962.

### WALTON, Sir John Charles

Born, 1885; educated, Tonbridge School and Brasenose College, Oxford; entered the Admiralty, 1908; transferred, India Office, 1909; Secretary, Political Department, 1930; Assistant Under Secretary of State for India, 1936; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Burma, 1942; Retired, 1946; died, 1957.

### WANG, Ch'UNG-HUI

Born, 1882; educated, Peiyang and Yale Universities; Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nanking and Minister of Justice, Peking, 1912; Chief Justice, Supreme Court, 1920; Delegate, League of Nations Assembly and Washington Conference, 1921; Deputy Judge, Permanent Court of International Justice, 1921 and Judge, 1931-6; Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1937-41.

### WEIGHTMAN, Hugh

Born, 1898; educated, Hymer's College and Corpus Christi College, Cambridge; entered I. C. S., 1922; transferred to Indian Political Service, 1929; served in Assam, Central India, Baluchistan, Persian Gulf and Delhi; Secretary to Government of India, External Affairs Department; retired, 1947; died, October, 1949.

### WEIR, Lt. Col. James Leslie Rose

Born, 1883; educated, Wellingborough and Royal Military Academy, Woolwich; joined Royal Indian Artillery, 1900; transferred to 5th Cavalry, Indian Army 1904; seconded to Political Department, 1908; Assistant Resident, Gwalior, 1908; British Trade Agent, Gyantse (Tibet), 1909-12; served in Baluchistan, 1912-14; saw active service, N. W. F. P. and Mesopotamia, 1914-18; Consul in Kermanshah and Shiraz (both in Persia), 1918-20; Deputy Commissioner, Hazara, 1922; served in Kashmir, 1926-8; Political Officer, Sikkim, during which time, deputed on mission to Lhasa, 1928-33; Resident for Baroda and Gujarat states, 1933-8; died, 1950.

### WILLIAMSON, Fredrick

Born, 1891; educated, Bedford Modern School and Emmanuel College, Cambridge; entered I. C. S., 1914 and served in Bihar and Orissa; saw military service in India during World War I, attached 1/9th Middlesex Regiment, 1915-16; in Mesopotamia, with the Gurkha Rifles, 1918; various appointments in Bihar, 1919-22; Secretary to Resident, Mysore, November, 1922; Secretary, Hyderabad, April, 1923; Assistant Commissioner, N. W. F. P., January, 1924; Officiating Political Officer, Sikkim, June, 1926; Consul General, Kashgar, 1927-30; Political Officer, Sikkim, 1931-35; died, in Lhasa, November, 1935.



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